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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis was to examine the way individual responses to global climate change 
are determined by intrapersonal, social and experiential factors through three streams of 
research. The first stream employs cross-sectional and experimental methods to demonstrate 
that the influence of climate change information on behavioural intentions among two African 
populations is largely conveyed indirectly through perceived threat and concern. My findings 
support a view that a failure to account for the indirect effects of knowledge may have resulted 
in a systematic underestimation of its importance as a basis for environmental action.  
In the second stream, I sought to resolve previous inconsistencies in the evidence for a link 
between flooding experiences and climate change engagement. Using secondary data analysis, 
I found that political affiliation modulates the link between flooding experience and 
preparedness to engage in climate change mitigation behaviour in the UK, such that the indirect 
links between flooding experience and preparedness to reduce energy use, and willingness to 
pay higher prices for energy efficient products, was stronger among left-leaning voters. These 
results were followed up with four experimental studies in which flooding experience was 
operationalised with a mental simulation technique. The experiments were designed to examine 
how values and attribution may moderate the effects of flooding experiences on climate change 
attitudes, but they did not yield any conclusive findings.  
Finally, I examined the interplay between descriptive and injunctive social norms as influences 
of behavioural engagement with climate change using cross-sectional and experimental data. I 
found that social norms may influence behavioural engagement with climate change indirectly 
through their effects on individuals’ perceptions of, and emotional responses to, the problem. 
However, the nature of this influence may also be dependent on the convergence of the two 
norm types and the level of individuals’ intrinsic prioritization of pro-environmental outcomes. 
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Chapter 1 
General introduction 
Human activities are changing the natural environment at an unprecedented scale (Vitousek, 
Mooney, Lubchenco, & Melillo, 1997). Uncontrolled population growth, intensive agriculture, 
deforestation, hazardous and toxic waste management practices, natural resources extraction, 
and fossil fuel consumption (to name a few) have given rise to rapid and profound 
modifications of ecological systems (Oskamp, 2000). These changes have produced a variety 
of negative consequences including climate change, biodiversity loss, and air, soil and water 
contamination. Addressing these consequences necessitates tackling the human behaviours that 
drive detrimental environmental change, reorienting environmental attitudes and reforming 
humanity’s relationship with nature (Nickerson, 2003; Stern, 1992).  
Despite being primarily concerned with the study of the human mind and behaviour; 
psychology’s potential has been underutilized in the development of solutions to environmental 
change (Gifford, 2008; Nolan, Kenefick, & Schultz, 2011; Spence & Pidgeon, 2009). A wealth 
of knowledge already exists in psychology that can be effectively harnessed to promote pro-
environmental attitude and behaviour change in society (Gifford, Kormos, & McIntyre, 2011; 
Swim et al., 2009). However, some this knowledge still requires thoughtful interpretation and 
adaptation, and further complementing investigation of the more challenging aspects of the 
behavioural dimensions of environmental change, to be truly useful for informing 
environmental policies (Spence & Pidgeon, 2009). 
Psychologists have been studying the behavioural dimensions of environmental problems for 
over four decades. Early research on this topic mainly focused on the effects of environmental 
conditions on human functioning and less on the environmental consequences of human 
behaviour. More recently, research addressing the latter has burgeoned in response to the rising 
prominence of overarching environmental challenges such as global climate change 
(Nickerson, 2003). To date, remarkable progress has been made in identifying various 
psychological factors that operate as key facilitators of, and barriers to, public engagement with 
adverse environmental change.  
The primary purpose of this thesis is to build upon, and extend, current understanding of the 
psychological influences that underpin the way individuals engage with global manifestations 
of detrimental environmental change. This purpose will be pursued with a focus on the way 
12 
 
attitudinal and behavioural responses to global climate change are determined by intrapersonal 
factors and influences arising from the social and physical environment. Climate change 
currently ranks as one of the world’s most pressing anthropogenic environmental problems. It 
poses a threat to the ecological systems that support life on earth, and has dire implications for 
human socioeconomic security, prosperity, and wellbeing (Bellard, Bertelsmeier, Leadley, 
Thuiller, & Courchamp, 2012; McMichael, Woodruff, & Hales, 2006; Stern, 2007). There is a 
consensus among scholars that human behaviour is not only integral to causing climate change, 
but also to mitigating and adapting to it (Clayton et al., 2015; Gifford et al., 2011).  
In subsequent sections of this chapter, I discuss the characterization of climate change as a 
psychological problem. In this respect, I outline the ways in which psychological processes are 
implicated in the causal antecedence of climate change, how climate change impacts 
psychological wellbeing and social relations, and how research in psychology can aid the 
development of effective adaptation and mitigation strategies. Subsequently, I address the 
conceptualization of environmental behaviour and present a concise review of psychological 
theorizing of the antecedence of environmental actions. Next, I discuss how key intrapersonal 
and external factors identified in this review, can be organized within an integrative framework 
to obtain a functional and parsimonious model for understanding the antecedence of climate 
change-related behaviour. Finally, I present an outline of the research comprising the different 
chapters in this thesis. 
Understanding climate change as a psychological problem 
The causal role of human behaviour 
There have been fluctuations in global temperatures and climate in the course of the earth’s 
history, but the magnitude of changes in global climate has increased exponentially in the last 
century (Pachauri & Reisinger, 2007). Research shows that the recent changes in global climate 
are a result of human activities; particularly the emission of greenhouse gases such as carbon 
dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide from fossil fuel use, agriculture and deforestation (Cotton 
& Pielke, 2007; Dale, 1997; Schneider, 1989; Solomon, Plattner, Knutti, & Friedlingstein, 
2009; Wuebbles & Jain, 2001). It is important to note that, although the terms ‘global warming’ 
and ‘climate change’ are often used interchangeably, climate change involves more than just 
temperature change. The human activities that drive temperature change have also triggered a 
series of associated phenomena including sea level rise, loss of polar ice, ocean acidification, 
melting of continental glaciers and more (Pachauri & Reisinger, 2007; Swim et al., 2011).  
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Scholars have described climate change as a common1 goods dilemma as it involves collective 
action driven by individuals’ short-term interests that degrades a long-term common good 
(Dietz, Ostrom, & Stern, 2003; Gifford, 2008; Swim et al., 2011). Human behaviour 
contributes to climate change through the consumption of goods and services that directly and 
indirectly involve fossil fuel consumption, greenhouse gas emission and the other biophysical 
processes that alter the climate (Gifford et al., 2011; Swim et al., 2011). A great deal of 
evidence supports the view that current levels of human consumption, combined with 
population growth, are contributing to climate change and are having a negative impact on the 
natural environment (Dietz & Rosa, 1994; Dietz, Rosa, & York, 2007; Ehrlich & Holdren, 
2017; Vlek & Steg, 2007). Continuing the current rate of greenhouse gas emission is expected 
to yield a variety of adverse consequences (IPCC, 2007b; Pachauri & Reisinger, 2007). If per 
capita emissions were held constant, the population increase expected in the next fifty years 
would produce a 50% increase in the global emissions rate (Swim et al., 2009).  
Research in the US suggests that individuals and households account for nearly 40% of national 
carbon emissions through home energy use and transport; a greater proportion than the entire 
US industrial sector (see Gardner & Stern, 2008). This illustrates the centrality of individual 
decisions and actions to the problem of climate change. It also highlights an avenue for 
psychology to play a role in developing climate change solutions by improving understanding 
of how climate-relevant decisions and actions are influenced by personal, social, economic, 
institutional and social-structural factors, and using that understanding to help devise effective 
interventions (Stern, 2011).      
Climate change impacts psychological wellbeing and intergroup relations   
The threat and unfolding impacts of current climate change encompass direct, indirect and 
mediated experiences with global climatic patterns, region-specific weather conditions and 
physical environmental impacts (Reser & Swim, 2011). These experiences are likely to have 
significant effects on mental health and wellbeing, particularly among the most vulnerable 
populations (Berry, Bowen, & Kjellstrom, 2010; Mudaliar & Rishi, 2012; Trombley, 
Chalupka, & Anderko, 2017). Localized consequences of extreme weather events and degraded 
landscapes, such as injury or stress, can be viewed as direct personal climate change impacts 
(Doherty & Clayton, 2011).  
                                                 
1 Commons is defined as any desirable, divisible entity to which multiple individuals or groups have access 
(Gifford & Hine, 1997). 
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By some estimates, 25% to 50% of people will suffer negative mental health outcomes 
following experiences of extreme weather events (Shukla, 2013). Psychological responses are 
typically heightened in the first year after the disaster occurs (Goldmann & Galea, 2014), and 
factors such as the magnitude of the traumatic event, exposure to the injury or death of a loved 
one, lower socioeconomic status, lower education, inadequate social support, and being young 
and female all contribute to the risk of developing a mental illness in the aftermath of such 
disasters (Neria & Shultz, 2012; Trombley et al., 2017).  Common initial responses to 
experiencing a climate change-related disaster may include anxiety, hypervigilance, social 
withdrawal, anger, flashbacks, guilt and avoidance (Forbes et al., 2015; Halpern & Tramontin, 
2007).  
Flooding is expected be one of the main impacts of climate change on UK communities (DoH, 
2001). Following widespread flooding across England in 2007, Paranjothy et al. (2011) found 
that the prevalence of psychological distress, anxiety, depression and probable post-traumatic 
disorder (PTSD) was two- to five-fold greater among people who had been affected by 
floodwater in their home. Agrarian communities are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of 
climate change. The incidence of droughts and crop failure are projected to increase 
considerably due to global climate change (Challinor, Simelton, Fraser, Hemming, & Collins, 
2010; Dai, 2012). In parts of the world, these events have been linked to farmer suicide 
(Guiney, 2012; Hanigan, Butler, Kokic, & Hutchinson, 2012) and higher levels of distress and 
helplessness induced by economic hardship (Dean & Stain, 2010; Vins, Bell, Saha, & Hess, 
2015).  
Other psychological impacts of climate change may be gradual, cumulative and experienced 
indirectly through social communication and the media (Reser & Swim, 2011; Weber & Stern, 
2011). Disasters often receive more attention than gradual climate change impacts of climate 
change, but the latter can also have negative implications for human health (Trombley et al., 
2017). The severity of climate change impacts is not solely due to extreme weather and other 
natural events, but also to the way human systems interact with these events (Doherty & 
Clayton, 2011). In this regard, the psychological impacts of climate change are likely to be 
moderated by vulnerability to environmental changes (Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003), and 
mediated by media representations and information technologies (Nerlich & Jaspal, 2014; 
Ripberger, Jenkins-Smith, Silva, Carlson, & Henderson, 2014).  
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For example, pre-existing psychiatric illness are closely associated with death during a 
heatwave (Bouchama et al., 2007). Research in Israel shows that admission to psychiatric 
hospitals for bipolar depression and exacerbation of acute psychosis is associated with periods 
of increased heat (Shapira et al., 2004; Shiloh et al., 2005). Increased suicide rates, particularly 
among men and the elderly, have also been associated with increasing temperatures in Korea 
(Y. Kim, Kim, & Kim, 2011) and the UK (Page, Hajat, & Kovats, 2007). The indirect, vicarious 
impacts of climate change include emotional and affective responses associated with viewing 
images of environmental degradation or human suffering in the media (Doherty & Clayton, 
2011). Although not every individual experiences strong reactions to climate change, those 
who perceive this information as the manifestation of a ‘global ecological crisis’ may suffer 
feelings of uncertainty and emotional distress (Searle & Gow, 2010; Stokols, Misra, 
Runnerstrom, & Hipp, 2009).  
Both climate-related disasters and gradual climate change effects can have severe impacts on 
communities (Trombley et al., 2017). In the aftermath of Hurricane Floyd, research shows a 
significant increase in the rate of inflicted and non-inflicted traumatic brain injuries among 
children aged two years or younger in the affected areas (Keenan, Marshall, Nocera, & Runyan, 
2004). Temperature rise has also been linked to an increase in acts of aggression and violence 
(Anderson, 2001). Increased competition for natural resources, jobs and land due to climate 
change can set the stage for intergroup conflict. For example, an unusually long, severe, and 
plausibly climate change-induced, drought that destroyed large areas of arable land in Syria 
has been shown to have had a direct impact on the country’s economic condition and played a 
role in the outbreak of civil war (Gleick, 2014; Kelley, Mohtadi, Cane, Seager, & Kushnir, 
2015).  
The issues discussed in this section are by no means an exhaustive reflection of the wide-
ranging psychological implications of climate change, but they serve to illustrate how climate 
change can be understood as a challenge for psychologists in the dimensions of mental health 
and social relations. Doherty and Clayton (2011) argue that: “psychologists are well positioned 
to provide guidance on what constitutes healthy coping with the psychological impacts of 
climate change and to intervene in situations of mental health injury or disordered adjustment” 
(pg. 271). Optimal coping responses to climate change impacts will require accurate risk 
recognition, effective management of emotions, a focus on pro-social outcomes, and 
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engagement in mitigation and adaptation actions that are likely to be effective (Doherty & 
Clayton, 2011; Swim et al., 2011; Weber & Stern, 2011).  
Effective solutions require psychological engagement with climate change 
Human interactions with global climate occur at multiple levels of social organization 
including individuals, households, governments and entire societies (Clayton et al., 2015). To 
date, research has largely focused on institutional actors (e.g., government and industries) and 
the demographic, economic and technological trends that drive climate change, with minimal 
attention directed at the factors that influence decisions and actions at the individual level 
(Clayton et al., 2015; National Research Council, 2011). Despite being central to the cause of 
climate change, human behaviour remains the least understood dimension of the problem 
(Gifford et al., 2011; Pachauri & Reisinger, 2007). Public policy discourse on climate change 
often emphasizes technocratic solutions while the role of psychology is virtually 
unacknowledged (Gifford, 2008; Klöckner, 2011).  
Some scholars have suggested that the imprint of human activities on the global environment 
has grown so large that we can consider the current period a unique geological era in the Earth’s 
history - termed the Anthropocene (Steffen, Grinevald, Crutzen, & McNeill, 2011). The human 
activities that drive global climate change primarily refer to behaviours that involve the release 
of carbon dioxide (e.g., burning fossil fuels for energy or heat production), methane (e.g., 
agriculture) and nitrous oxide (e.g., through industrial processes). Because climate change is 
rooted in human behaviour, the contribution of a psychological perspective is indispensable 
(Swim et al., 2009). 
Through support for policies and the adoption of technologies, individual behaviour drives 
societal change (Clayton et al., 2015). Considering research in the UK and US shows that 
changes in individual behaviours and lifestyle could reduce national carbon emissions by as 
much as twenty to thirty percent (Dietz, Gardner, Gilligan, Stern, & Vandenbergh, 2009; Dietz, 
Stern, & Weber, 2013; Gardner & Stern, 2008; Skea et al., 2009), the lack of consideration of 
psychological perspectives on individual behaviour is puzzling (van der Linden, 2014b). While 
the potential of behaviour change in addressing climate change is clear, research in the UK and 
US suggests that the majority of the public still view climate change as a temporally and 
spatially distant threat (Bord, Fisher, & Connor, 1998; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Spence, 
Poortinga, & Pidgeon, 2012) with relatively low personal relevance compared with other 
economic and social issues (Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003). According to Clayton et al. (2015), 
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effective societal responses to climate change cannot be achieved in the absence of an 
understanding of how people perceive climate change, the factors that influence mitigation and 
adaptation behaviours, and how climate change will affect human wellbeing.  
Individuals play a key role in responding to climate change; they are the actors who initiate, 
inspire, guide and enact the cuts in greenhouse gas emissions needed to mitigate climate 
change, and they develop and implement adaptive responses to minimize its impacts (Wolf & 
Moser, 2011). Given this understanding, involving individuals with climate change must be 
considered an imperative. Involving or engaging individuals with climate change means 
creating a sense of personal connection with the issue. From a psychological perspective, 
climate change engagement encompasses cognitive (knowledge, beliefs), affective (concern, 
worry) and behavioural (action motivation, behaviour) dimensions (Lorenzoni, Nicholson-
Cole, & Whitmarsh, 2007). In other words, engagement involves what people think, feel and 
do about climate change (Whitmarsh, O’Neill, & Lorenzoni, 2013).  
By implication, the different dimensions of climate change engagement are potential avenues 
for intervention. While there are still significant gaps in our understanding of how to increase, 
balance and maintain engagement on these various levels, there is a consensus among many 
psychologists that unilateral communication (e.g., providing scientific information regarding 
climate change) generally fails to foster cognitive engagement or produce sustained 
behavioural engagement (Whitmarsh, O’Neill, & Lorenzoni, 2011). Affective engagement is 
even more difficult to achieve, not to mention sustain or control, through unilateral 
communication (Moser, 2007). Research suggests that dialogic processes, culturally-relevant 
narratives (e.g., stories), and the constructing of meaning in social interaction may have greater 
potential to touch people deeply, motivate interest and sustain engagement with climate change 
(Brulle, 2010; Kearney, 1994; Wolf & Moser, 2011).  
A lot of policy is based on oversimplifications and inaccurate assumptions about the processes 
that guide individual engagement with climate change (Clayton et al., 2015). For example, 
while economic incentives – a popular policy instrument, can be a significant motivation to 
make pro-environmental choices and decisions, research in psychology has shown that they 
also crowd out people’s intrinsic pro-environmental motivations (e.g., Evans et al., 2012), and 
only tend to be effective while the incentive is maintained. In other words, external incentives 
are not an effective long-term motivation for pro-environmental behaviour (Steg, Bolderdijk, 
Keizer, & Perlaviciute, 2014; van der Linden, 2014b). Yet, the determinants of sustained pro-
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environmental conduct have been a key area of research for environmental and social 
psychologists (Clayton et al., 2015; Gifford, 2008). In a subsequent section of this introduction, 
I briefly review some of the psychological perspectives on the antecedence of pro-
environmental behaviour that are most relevant to the focus of this thesis. However, before 
proceeding to this review, I will present an overview of the concept of environmental behaviour 
and its operationalization in the context of climate change. 
Conceptualizing environmental and climate change-related behaviour 
Impact-oriented definitions of environmental behaviour 
Environmental behaviour has been conceptualized in two ways relating to impact on the 
environment (Stern, 2000). In this respect, impact is understood as the extent to which 
behaviour results in changes in the availability of materials or energy from the environment or 
alters the structure and dynamics of ecosystems or the biosphere itself (Stern, 1997, 2000). The 
rationale for an impact-focused conceptualization of environmental behaviour lies in the need 
to identify and target actions that have large effects on the environment and environmental 
issues (Heiskanen & Pantzar, 1997; Stern, 2000). The first concept of environmental behaviour 
concerns behaviours that have a direct impact on the environment such as clear-felling of 
forested areas for commercial monocultures, waste disposal processes, burning fossil fuels for 
energy etc. A second concept of environmental behaviour addresses actions that have an 
indirect impact on the environment by shaping the context in which choices are made that 
directly cause environmental change (Stern, 2000). Examples of such behaviours include 
consumption of unsustainably-sourced products and policymaking that facilitates economic 
growth at the expense of natural resource conservation.  
Defining environmental behaviour from actors’ perspective 
Environmental behaviour can be defined from the actor’s perspective based on whether they 
intend their action to have an impact on the environment. Historically, environmental impact 
has largely been a by-product of human desires for comfort, mobility, power, security and 
status, and the technologies and organisations humanity has created to achieve these desires 
(Stern, 2000). However, with growing awareness of anthropogenic environmental change, 
environmental protection has become a significant consideration in decision-making. 
Therefore, from the actor’s standpoint, environmental behaviour can also be understood as any 
actions taken with the intent to have a [beneficial] impact on the environment. According to 
Stern (2000), the intent-oriented definition differs from an impact-oriented definition insofar 
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that the former highlights intent as an independent cause of behaviour and highlights the 
possibility that environmental intent may not result in environmental impact. In the context of 
climate change, actions defined by experts as having the most impact (e.g., energy 
conservation) may not overlap with those taken by the public with the intention of mitigating 
climate change (e.g., recycling). For example, in a survey of UK residents, 96% of respondents 
reported engagement in actions objectively determined to have an impact on climate change 
(e.g., domestic energy conservation) while only 31% reported that they engaged in pro-
environmental behaviour out of concern about climate change (Whitmarsh, 2009). 
Nonetheless, both definitions are important for research. An impact-oriented focus is necessary 
for targeting behaviours that cause large changes in the environment and is critical for making 
research useful, while an intent-oriented definition focuses on people’s beliefs and motives and 
is necessary for understanding and changing the target behaviours (Stern, 2000; Stern & 
Gardner, 1981).  
Typologies of environmental behaviour 
There are number of different types of environmental behaviour and each may be determined 
by a different set of causal factors. In broad terms, pro-environmental actions may be 
categorized as public- or private-sphere behaviours (Stern, 2000). Public-sphere behaviours 
include active involvement in environmental groups and political activities (environmental 
activism), launching and signing petitions on environmental issues (environmental 
citizenship), and endorsement of environmental regulations (support for environmental 
policies). Whereas, private-sphere behaviours include ‘green’ consumerism (e.g., purchasing 
sustainably-sourced products or products made from recycled materials), domestic energy and 
water conservation practices, and adoption of low-carbon transport options (Stern, 2000). 
Clayton and Myers (2009) also offer a tripartite typology of environmental behaviours. The 
first category in their typology is termed curtailment behaviours. This refers to behaviours 
aimed at reducing the exploitation of natural resources and they include voluntary adoption of 
frugal lifestyles, reducing energy use, and reducing the size of families. The second category 
of behaviour, they term behavioural choices. This refers not to what action is taken but how it 
is done. Examples of such behaviours include choosing to reuse or recycle items rather than 
throwing them away, choosing to use public transport instead of driving or choosing to 
consume only locally-sourced produce. The final category of behaviours involves 
technological choices. These include decisions made concerning the adoption of pro-
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environmental technologies such as electric vehicles, renewable energy in the home or energy-
efficient appliances.  
Some authors have suggested that psychologists should focus primarily on high impact 
behaviours given the limits on attention, time and resources (e.g., Gardner & Stern, 2002). 
However, all behaviours are worthy of examination, irrespective of their impact. Due to the 
effects of self-perception, commitment, conformity and a desire to appear consistent, people 
who take a small step for an environmental cause may go on to take bigger steps (Burger, 1999; 
Clayton & Myers, 2009).  
Behaviour in the context of climate change: Adaptation vs. mitigation 
Behavioural engagement with climate change involves mitigation and adaptation (van der 
Linden, 2014b). According to the IPCC (2001), mitigation refers to actions that minimize the 
release, or enhances the sinks, of greenhouse gases. On the other hand, adaptation refers to 
adjustments in human or natural systems in response to present or anticipated climate change 
to moderate harm and take advantage of beneficial opportunities. In other words, adaptation 
addresses the effects and mitigation addresses the cause of climate change. The two categories 
of action are complementary aspects of any potentially effective societal response to climate 
change.  
The impacts of climate change are already apparent across the globe (Collier, Conway, & 
Venables, 2008; Parmesan & Yohe, 2003; Wheeler & von Braun, 2013). Therefore, adaptation 
measures are a necessity (IPCC, 2007a; Parry, Arnell, Hulme, Nicholls, & Livermore, 1998). 
However, relying on adaptation alone could lead to a scale of climate change to which 
adaptation can only be achieved at high social and economic costs. Consequently, mitigation 
is also essential for reducing the risks of climate change (Klein, Schipper, & Dessai, 2005).  
The research comprising this thesis focuses mainly on environmental behaviours relevant to 
climate change mitigation. According to van der Linden (2014), mitigation actions are an 
interesting subject for psychology because of the spatial and temporal scales on which they are 
effective, and the relative distribution of the associated benefits and costs. While the need for 
adaptation is clearly illustrated by perceptible and imaginable local risks (e.g., flooding), 
mitigation entails acting in ways that involve significant immediate and personal costs in order 
to obtain potentially large but uncertain, and globally distributed, future benefits (Klein et al., 
2005; van der Linden, 2014b). Further, the benefits of adaptation to the public are self-evident, 
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while the benefits of voluntary mitigation actions are based on a belief that climate change is 
caused by human activities - a notion that may be contested by some groups (Leiserowitz, 
Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Smith, & Dawson, 2013; Poortinga, Spence, Whitmarsh, Capstick, & 
Pidgeon, 2011). As a result, the motivations that underlie adaptation actions tend to be less 
psychologically challenging than those that drive mitigation actions (van der Linden, 2014b). 
Psychological perspectives on the antecedence of pro-environmental behaviour 
Pro-environmental behaviours and their underlying motivations have been linked to a distinct 
set of cognitions, emotions and values (Stern & Dietz, 1994; Stern, Dietz, & Kalof, 1993), a 
recognition of the inextricable link between human survival and a fragile natural environment 
(Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 2000), and a variety of psychological dispositions 
including empathy with non-human life and an affinity toward nature (Gosling & Williams, 
2010; Schultz, 2000). The cognitive, affective and behavioural dimensions of engagement with 
environmental issues have complex interrelationships, and numerous theoretical models have 
been advanced with the aim of representing these interrelationships in ways that help 
psychologists understand, and make predictions about, how individuals respond to 
environmental issues. No single theoretical model is solely sufficient to account for the 
complexity of pro-environmental behaviour, but some models are more widely used than others 
(Gifford et al., 2011).  Below, I present a brief overview of a number of key theories of 
environmental behaviour with an emphasis on those most pertinent to the focus of this thesis. 
Theories of environmental behaviour 
The knowledge-deficit model 
Also known as the linear awareness model, the knowledge-deficit model proposes a linear 
causal relationship between knowledge of environmental problems, environmental concern and 
pro-environmental behaviour. This model of pro-environmental behaviour emerged in the 
1970s and was based on a fundamental notion that educating the public about environmental 
issues would naturally promote engagement in pro-environmental behaviour (Kollmuss & 
Agyeman, 2002). The knowledge-deficit model lies at the heart of a multitude of environmental 
education and public communication programs that have been launched across the world in 
response to various problems including water conservation, littering and the energy crisis 
(Akerlof, 2017; F. Campbell, 2007; Syme, Nancarrow, & Seligman, 2000). Over the last forty 
years, interest in public awareness as a precursor of to the adoption of environmental policies 
and behaviour has grown in tandem with government enthusiasm for low-cost ‘soft’ policy 
22 
 
approaches to achieving sustainability goals. In support of the knowledge-deficit model, 
several studies have shown that knowledge and awareness are positively linked to pro-
environmental attitudes and actions (Gamba & Oskamp, 1994; Masud, Akhtar, Afroz, Al-
Amin, & Kari, 2015), and that informational campaigns can significantly promote pro-
environmental attitudes and behaviours (Bidwell, 2016; Staats, van Leeuwen, & Wit, 2000; 
van der Ploeg, Cauilan-Cureg, van Weerd, & De Groot, 2011). However, the popular adoption 
of the knowledge-deficit model as an orienting framework for communicating scientific issues, 
including those relating to the environment, has been widely criticized on empirical and 
theoretical grounds.  
From an empirical perspective, scholars have repeatedly highlighted the fact that the 
relationship between public knowledge and attitudes is often weak (Abrahamse, Steg, Vlek, & 
Rothengatter, 2005; Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 1998). Further, while individuals with 
relatively high levels of knowledge have been shown to have more consistent attitudes toward 
general domains of scientific (or environmental) issues, the predictive power of knowledge 
decreases with the increasing specificity with which the focal issue is defined (G. Evans & 
Durant, 1995). In other words, the strength of the link between knowledge and attitudes varies 
considerably, depending on the nature and specificity of the attitude domain. The effect of 
information provision and knowledge on behaviour is also highly subject to the moderating 
influence of situational factors. For instance, attitudes and behaviour may remain unchanged, 
irrespective of heightened awareness of environmental problems, if prevailing social norms 
and customs promote negative environmental practices (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). 
Similarly, information provision may be ineffective in changing behaviour if the desired 
behaviour is associated with high costs or difficulty (Kaiser & Fuhrer, 2003).  
From a theoretical perspective, scholars have criticized the knowledge-deficit model on the 
basis of its underlying assumptions that ignorance lies at the root of negative attitudes and that 
shortfalls in the public’s knowledge can be remedied via unilateral communication of factual 
information from experts to lay citizens (Ahteensuu, 2012; Brunk, 2006; Bulkeley, 2000a). 
Research suggests that scientists often have inaccurate perceptions of public knowledge and 
attitudes regarding scientific issues (Carr, Grand, & Sullivan, 2017). Further, communication 
strategies that focus solely on knowledge of ‘scientific facts’ as the yardstick of public 
understanding of environmental and technological risks are often insensitive to the diversity of 
individuals’ values regarding the acceptability of risks, as well as the differences between 
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experts and lay people in their responses to different dimensions of risk (e.g. certainty, 
catastrophic potential, controllability, equity and risk to future generations) (for a review of 
these issues, see Hansen, Holm, Frewer, Robinson, & Sandøe, 2003). In contrast to expert 
perspectives, the lay public understanding of environmental issues typically reflect a 
combination of scientific information, values and local experience (Bulkeley, 2000a). This 
understanding develops through day-to-day social practices that occur within discursively 
constructed and institutionally embedded relations of trust, dependency and agency between 
individuals, communities, science and governments (Bulkeley, 2000a; Wynne, 1996). 
Consequently, the public may hold views that diverge from scientific facts for reasons other 
than a lack of understanding of the issue in question.  
Nonetheless, research shows that familiarity with the causes and consequences of 
environmental problems generally has significant indirect links with behavioural engagement 
(Bamberg & Möser, 2007), and knowledge can help build competence leading to pro-
environmental action (Jensen, 2002). Thus, a widely shared view among psychologists is that 
factual knowledge of environmental issues alone is an insufficient motivation, but a necessary 
precondition, for pro-environmental behaviour (Bolderdijk, Gorsira, Keizer, Steg, & Ouellette, 
2013; Jensen, 2002; Steg & Vlek, 2009). 
Protection motivation theory 
Protection motivation theory was originally proposed as a framework for understanding the  
appraisal processes that underlie individuals’ responses to perceived risks in the health domain 
(Rogers, 1975). According to this theory, individuals’ responses to perceived risks are 
determined by the outcome of two processes, termed threat appraisal and coping appraisal. 
Threat appraisal entails assessment of the severity of a risk/hazard and the likelihood of being 
subjected to its effects. On the other hand, coping appraisal entails assessments of the 
effectiveness of potential response options, the effectiveness of the individual to perform the 
response options and the costs of responding.  
From the protection motivation theory perspective, people are more likely to engage in adaptive 
responses when they perceive a risk to be severe and likely to affect them, and when they 
perceive themselves to be capable of executing responses with a perceived high likelihood of 
effectiveness (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 1975). According to Rogers (1983), these 
processes of deliberation may not be within conscious awareness. A number of studies have 
demonstrated that the protection motivation theory can help explain a variety of environmental 
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behaviours including those relating to climate change (Bockarjova & Steg, 2014; Kim, Jeong, 
& Hwang, 2013; Rainear & Christensen, 2017). However, while this theory has been most 
widely used in relation to health communications involving fear appeals, it does not explicitly 
address the role of emotions as a motivation for responses to perceived threats.  
The theory of planned behaviour 
The theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) is an extension of the theory of reasoned action 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), and is one of the most widely applied models in environmental 
psychology. According to the theory of planned behaviour, intentions are the most proximal 
determinant of behaviour and intentions are causally determined by attitudes toward the 
behaviour, perceived control over the behaviour, and perceived social expectations to engage 
in the behaviour. This model has been successfully applied to explain various environmental 
behaviours including recycling (Boldero, 1995; Nigbur, Lyons, & Uzzell, 2010; Tonglet, 
Phillips, & Read, 2004) and choice of transport mode (Bamberg, Ajzen, & Schmidt, 2003). A 
major strength of the theory of planned behaviour is its parsimony (Heath & Gifford, 2002). 
However, it is entirely situated in a view of people as rational actors and fails to account for 
the influence of key motivations such as emotions and values. Several studies have shown that 
the explanatory power of the model can be increased by incorporating factors such as value-
driven environmental concerns (de Groot & Steg, 2007a), anticipated emotions (Perugini & 
Bagozzi, 2001), and personal norms (Harland, Staats, & Wilke, 1999).   
The norm activation model 
Following a meta-analysis of studies addressing the predictors of pro-environmental behaviour, 
Bamberg and Möser (2007) found that moral norms and emotions such as anticipated guilt 
explain a considerable amount of variance in behaviour. On this basis, they argued that the 
causal antecedence of pro-environmental behaviour is best conceptualized as reflecting a 
combination of self-interested and pro-social motives. Considering that pro-environmental 
behaviours typically produce benefits for individuals other than those performing the 
behaviours, several authors have suggested that they should be categorized as a form of pro-
social or altruistic behaviour (Dietz, Fitzgerald, & Shwom, 2005; Steg & de Groot, 2010).  
In line with this, theories of altruistic behaviour such as Schwartz' (1977) norm  activation 
model (NAM) have been employed in explaining pro-environmental behaviour. According to 
the NAM, altruistic behaviours arise from an activation of internalized personal moral norms 
(otherwise known as personal norms), which in turn emerge from a knowledge that not acting 
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altruistically will have negative consequences for valued others and an acceptance of personal 
responsibility for averting these negative consequences (Steg & de Groot, 2010). In the 
environmental domain, the NAM’s awareness of consequences component is generally 
conceptualized as knowledge of the adverse consequences of environmental issues.  This form 
of knowledge has been empirically shown to predict acceptance of responsibility, which in turn 
predicts personal norms regarding pro-environmental actions (de Groot & Steg, 2009). In 
combination, these factors have been used to explain public engagement in a variety of 
behaviours including recycling, green purchasing and pro-environmental driving behaviour (de 
Groot, Steg, & Dicke, 2007; Joireman, Lasane, Bennett, Richards, & Solaimani, 2001; 
Onwezen, Antonides, & Bartels, 2013). Like the theory of planned behaviour, the NAM has 
been widely used in environmental behaviour research because of its parsimony. However, its 
explanatory power is limited by its explicit account for the roles of value-based and affective 
influences (Onwezen, Antonides, & Bartels, 2013; Stern & Dietz, 1999). For this reason, 
several attempts have been made to extent the model by incorporating additional predictors. 
Value orientations theory and the value-belief-norm model 
One of the most popular extensions of the NAM is the value-belief-norm (VBN) model 
developed by Stern et al. (1999). The VBN model links the NAM to a value orientations theory 
previously proposed by Stern, Dietz, and Kalof (1993). According to Stern et al. (1993), 
environmental concern and individuals’ motivation to act pro-environmentally are determined 
in part by value orientations. Values are desirable goals and stable beliefs, linked inextricably 
to affect, that transcend actions and situations (Schwartz, 2006). They motivate action and are 
used by individuals as a standard for evaluating attitudes and behaviours (Rokeach, 1968; 
Schwartz, 1992). Schwartz (1992) identified ten core values (self-direction, stimulation, 
hedonism, achievement, security, power, tradition, conformity, benevolence and universalism) 
that occur across cultures. Value orientations are defined as clusters of compatible value types, 
and Stern et al. (1993) proposed that environmental concern generally arises from one of three 
value orientations which they termed egoistic, social-altruistic and biospheric value 
orientations.  
Egoistic value orientations comprise values that prioritize the pursuit of personal advancement 
and security, while social-altruistic value orientations are strongly aligned with concern for the 
welfare of other individuals, and biospheric value orientations involve concern for the welfare 
of non-human life and environmental protection (Stern, Dietz, & Kalof, 1993). Egoistic value 
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orientations are a strong motivation for most human behaviour, and they induce pro-
environmental behaviours particularly when such action serves the personal interests of the 
actor. However, social-altruistic and biospheric value orientations have more consistent links 
with environmental concern and pro-environmental behaviour. These inspire pro-
environmental behaviour when people perceive a threat to other individuals or nature as a 
consequence of adverse environmental conditions (Nordlund & Garvill, 2002; Steg, Dreijerink, 
& Abrahamse, 2005; Stern, Kalof, Dietz, & Guagnano, 1995). 
According to Stern et al. (1993), egoistic, social-altruistic and biospheric value orientations 
toward the environment are not incompatible, and individuals’ environmental attitudes often 
reflect a combination of these orientations.  The relative strength of each value orientation 
determines individuals’ sensitivity to information about outcomes for value objects such as 
personal welfare, community welfare, or the integrity of the biosphere. Drawing on Schwartz’ 
NAM, Stern et al. (1993) argue that people who are aware that adverse environmental 
conditions have negative consequences for things they value will be motivated to take 
meliorating action, and the significance of this can be understood in terms of their value 
orientation. They illustrate this argument with the following regression equation: 
𝑀 =  𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑜𝐴𝐶𝑒𝑔𝑜 + 𝑉𝑠𝑜𝑐𝐴𝐶𝑠𝑜𝑐 +  𝑉𝑏𝑖𝑜𝐴𝐶𝑏𝑖𝑜 + 𝑒 
Where (M) represents individuals’ motivation to engage in pro-environmental behaviour, the 
subscripts ego, soc and bio represent egoistic, social-altruistic and biospheric value weights 
(V) or consequences (AC). They propose that motivation to act pro-environmentally can be 
calculated by summing the product of knowledge of consequences for valued objects (AC) and 
the importance of the value orientation toward the object (V) across the three value orientations. 
Using this model Stern et al. (1993) found that value orientations explained 46% of the variance 
in intentions to engage in pro-environmental political actions, 12% variance in willingness to 
pay higher income taxes, and 8% variance in willingness to pay higher taxes on petrol in a 
sample of American university students. They also found that egoistic value orientations were 
the strongest predictors of pro-environmental intentions, and none of the intentions measures 
had an exclusive (or independent) value base. In a subsequent study, de Groot et al. (2007) also 
found that value orientations had a significant effect on individuals’ intentions to reduce their 
car use and willingness to accept increases in vehicular tax in five European countries. 
However, they found that the relationships between value orientations and pro-environmental 
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behaviours were significantly mediated by personal moral norms and acceptance of 
responsibility. 
Stern et al. (1999) proposed the value-belief-norm (VBN) model as an amalgamation of the 
value orientations theory and NAM. The VBN represents pro-environmental behaviour as 
being most proximally determined by personal norms, which are in turn determined by 
acceptance of responsibility, awareness of consequences, environmental worldviews2 and 
value orientations (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. The Value-Belief-Norm Model (adapted from Stern et al. 1999) 
One of the most significant features of the VBN is its attempt to link the value-based and 
cognitive antecedents of moral motivations for pro-environmental behaviour. It explains a 
considerable amount of variance in behaviours relating to environmental citizenship, support 
for environmental policies and willingness to undertake pro-environmental lifestyle changes 
(de Groot & Steg, 2009; Nordlund & Garvill, 2003; Steg et al., 2005). However, like its 
predecessors, the VBN overlooks the crucial role of emotions as components of pro-
environmentalism3. Further, research indicates that the VBN is a poor predictor of 
environmental behaviours that entail significant behavioural costs and strong external 
constraints such as recycling, certain conservation behaviours and car use (Raymond, Brown, 
& Robinson, 2011). Intrapersonal processes are indisputably only a fraction of the antecedence 
of pro-environmental behaviour (Turaga, Howarth, & Borsuk, 2010). Consequently, some 
                                                 
2 Environmental worldviews are typically operationalized in the VBN using the New Ecological Paradigm 
(NEP) scale developed by Dunlap and Van Liere (1978) (see also Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 2000). 
3 Pro-environmentalism refers to a propensity to take act with an intent to achieve positive environmental 
outcomes. In other words, a drive to engage in behaviours intended to achieve outcomes that support the 
maintenance of a healthy and balanced environment (Stern, 2000). 
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authors have argued that pro-environmental behaviour may be better explained by models that 
account for interactions between its attitudinal (or personal) and social-contextual determinants 
(Guagnano, Stern, & Dietz, 1995). 
Social identity and social influence perspectives on environmental behaviour 
Some authors have argued that environmental behaviours are a function of group processes and 
as such should be analysed from a perspective of social groups (e.g., Duke, 2010). As discussed 
previously in this chapter, climate change, and other prominent global environmental 
challenges, can be understood as common goods dilemmas where individual gains can lead to 
collective losses (Hardin, 1968). When individuals act in ways that harm the environment to 
obtain personal benefits, they externalize the costs to others. If too many people act in a self-
serving way, the collective losses may accumulate to outweigh the individual gains. Therefore, 
cooperation among individuals is necessary to achieve a mutually beneficial outcome (Duke, 
2010). The larger point being made here is that global environmental problems are shared 
problems requiring a collective response, and theorizing on how people appraise and respond 
to these problems should take account of collective processes and collective thinking (Fritsche, 
Barth, Jugert, Masson, & Reese, in press). 
The processes that underlie the human capacity to think and act in line with collectives are 
described in the social identity perspective (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987a). According to this view, people define themselves in terms of 
their unique person or as interchangeable members of a group as a function of situationally 
salient comparative contexts and the cognitive accessibility of relevant social categories. The 
collectively interchangeable state of ‘social identity’ makes people susceptible to internalizing 
collective beliefs, goals and action tendencies, and explains how individual actors are 
psychologically transformed into collective actors (Fritsche, Barth, Jugert, Masson, & Reese, 
in press).  
People are particularly susceptible to the influence of collective or normative beliefs and 
actions regarding environmental issues because environmental problems are often ambiguous 
(Duke, 2010). Social norms play a key role in guiding human behaviour by providing 
information about how to act (Bicchieri, 2006). In a number of experiments, Cialdini et al. 
(1990, 1991) found that focusing people on information regarding socially approved or 
disapproved behaviour had a significant effect on their subsequent littering behaviour. 
Similarly Bolsen (2013; see also Bolsen, Leeper, & Shapiro, 2014) found that incorporating 
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information regarding social norms into persuasive appeals increased people’s motivation to 
perform actions addressing climate change and energy conservation. A considerable amount of 
empirical evidence also suggests that social norms have indirect effects on pro-environmental 
behaviour through their influence on the way people perceived the consequences of 
environmental problems, attribute responsibility for mitigating responses and perceive their 
efficacy, and that of others around them, in addressing environmental threats (Klöckner, 2013; 
Steg & Vlek, 2009).  
Researchers have delineated a number of different types of social norm with corresponding 
differences in the mechanisms via which they exert an influence on pro-environmental 
behaviour. I present an in-depth discussion of the different modes of social influence in Chapter 
5 with a focus on how two specific types of social norm: descriptive and injunctive, contribute 
to individuals’ motivation to engage in climate change-related pro-environmental actions. In 
the next section, I discuss the interrelationships between different key factors identified in the 
preceding review and subsequently integrate them into a framework of social and intrapersonal 
influences on pro-environmental behaviour that serves as a blueprint for the studies reported 
further on in this thesis. 
Conceptualizing relationships among key determinants of individual responses to 
environmental threats 
The fundamental role of threat perception as a motivation for pro-environmental action 
My organization of the influences that underlie climate change engagement into an integrated 
framework is oriented around the importance of threat perception as a basis for action. As 
evidenced in the summary of environmental behaviour theories presented above, many models 
of pro-environmental behaviour share an assumption that motivations to address environmental 
problems arise primarily from an understanding (or awareness) that environmental issues pose 
an active or potential threat, and that this threat entails negative consequences to valued entities 
such oneself, important social referents or the natural environment. This understanding has 
been operationalised in various forms including problem awareness (e.g., Nordlund & Garvill, 
2002), environmental awareness (e.g., Grob, 1995), environmental concern (Fransson & 
Garling, 1999) and perceived threat (Baldassare & Katz, 1992). The importance of threat 
perception as an underlying driver of pro-environmentalism is validated by a great deal of 
empirical support and I consequently adopted it as a rallying point in the development of my 
framework. 
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The diversity of operationalisations of the perceived negative consequences of environmental 
change may have served to obscure the predictive value of the concept. Ogunbode and Arnold 
(2014) indicate that researchers typically measure individuals’ knowledge of the factually 
accurate implications of environmental problems that lay individuals may not necessarily 
possess. Lay evaluations of environmental problems tend not be constituted entirely by a 
technical knowledge of the properties, causes and effects of environmental phenomena 
(Dunlap, 1998; Henry, 2000). Rather, they generally reflect a combination of influences 
including ‘local knowledge’, personal values and scientific information (Bulkeley, 2000b). 
Consequently, it seems more likely that people are motivated to act pro-environmentally by 
their subjective construal of the implications of environmental problems. Further, where the 
perceived implications of environmental problems relate to potential impacts on valued entities 
and objects, the degree of motivation to act is more likely to be a function of the perceived 
magnitude (or severity) and likelihood, than a factual cognizance, of these impacts. 
Threat perception and concern: linking the cognitive and affective motivations for pro-
environmental action 
Research suggests that behavioural responses to perceived threats follow an ordered process 
wherein threat recognition creates an emotional drive, or a state of heightened anxiety, that 
focuses individuals on information about potential response options and motivates behaviour 
and/or attitude change (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; Zeelenberg, Nelissen, Breugelmans, 
& Pieters, 2008). Other perspectives on the relationship between perceived threat and emotions 
also suggest that emotions act as information to guide the evaluation of perceived threats, and 
can help people act morally, even when such actions are in conflict with their short term 
interests (Böhm & Pfister, 2000; Finucane, 2012; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 
2002). In the environmental domain, van der Linden (2014a) found that the perceived threat 
and affective responses to climate change influence each other in a stable feedback system. On 
this basis, he advocates that the relationship between threat perception and affect should be 
understood as having a dual nature in which affect operates as a post-cognitive process as well 
as an information processing heuristic that guides the evaluation of environmental threats.  
The significance of these perspectives for environmental behaviour research is that they 
address the links between cognitive and affective engagement with environmental change; a 
relationship which is often poorly conceptualised in models of pro-environmental behaviour. 
Previously, concern about environmental change has been operationalised as an attitudinal 
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component of pro-environmentalism and researchers have largely focused on measuring its 
cognitive indicators (Fransson & Garling, 1999; Schultz, 2001). Moser (2007) argues that 
emotional responses are a vital dimension of pro-environmentalism and their role as 
determinants of pro-environmental action should not be neglected. Modelling pro-
environmental behaviour as a response to the perceived severity and likelihood of negative 
impacts due to environmental change offers an opportunity to coherently link the cognitive and 
affective dimensions of pro-environmentalism because it encompasses the interactions 
between cognitive evaluations of the significance of environmental threats, the emotional 
responses that drive and are produced by these cognitions, and the combined influence of both 
psychological processes on exerted behaviour.  
Perceived efficacy and behavioural responses to environmental threats 
Efficacy beliefs operate as an important set of proximal determinants of human motivation, 
affect and action (Bandura, 1982, 1997). Further, their influence pervades all dimensions of 
human psychological functioning including our thoughts, aspirations, goals, expectations, and 
appraisals of opportunities and impediments in the external environmental (Bandura, 2000). 
Efficacy beliefs are a common feature in models of pro-environmental behaviour. For example, 
the perceived behavioural control component of the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) 
is a form of efficacy appraisal, insofar that it represents individuals’ evaluation of their 
capability of performing a specific behaviour.  
The degree of individuals’ belief in their own efficacy to perform potential behavioural 
responses, and the efficacy of these responses to mitigate an identified threatening situation, is 
directly related to their likelihood of responding adaptively to a perceived threat (Bandura, 
1982, 2000). This view has been supported by empirical evidence from several studies showing 
that threat perception is most likely to elicit adaptive responses under conditions of high 
perceived efficacy (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rimal, 2001; Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987; Rogers, 
1975). Although the majority of studies in the environmental domain have only focused on the 
independent effects of threat perception and efficacy beliefs on pro-environmental behaviours 
and intentions (Bockarjova & Steg, 2014; S. Kim et al., 2013; Rainear & Christensen, 2017), 
one study suggests that threat perceptions and efficacy beliefs may have a paradoxical 
relationship in the context of climate change (Hornsey et al., 2015).  
Climate change poses severe negative implications for the planet and this is a widely 
recognized fact among scientists and many members of the broader population (Cook et al., 
32 
 
2013; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Reynolds, Bostrom, Read, & Morgan, 2010). However, 
there are a number of reasons for uncertainty about the prospect that these implications can be 
mitigated (Gifford et al., 2009). Firstly, the effects of carbon emissions may have already 
reached a tipping point, which means that it may be too late to avoid the negative consequences 
of climate change even if carbon emissions were drastically reduced (Mora et al., 2013; 
Pachauri & Reisinger, 2007). Secondly, resolving climate change requires the coordinated 
efforts of major corporations, governments and billions of individuals. Finally, there is limited 
evidence of political will to coordinate a global response (Coss, 2000; Rogelj et al., 2010). 
Individuals may wonder how much their own personal efforts can influence climate outcomes 
in the face of these complicated interdependencies (Hornsey et al., 2015).  
Yet, several studies show a moderately large positive association between perceived efficacy 
and self-reported concern about climate change (Heath & Gifford, 2006; Kellstedt, Zahran, & 
Vedlitz, 2008; Milfont, 2012). Further, mean scores on various indices of perceived efficacy 
regarding climate change tend to settle above the midpoint (e.g., Heath & Gifford, 2006; Reser, 
Bradley, Glendon, Ellul, & Callaghan, 2012). These trends are in conflict with a considerable 
amount of evidence in psychology suggesting that efficacy beliefs tend to serve as a buffer 
against perceived threat (Bandura, 1997; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Rogers, 1983). However, 
Hornsey et al. (2015) argue that they can be understood as an indication that perceptions of 
efficacy emerge from feelings of threat regarding climate change, such that compensatory and 
protective perceptions of efficacy increase in line with increase in perceived threat. Their 
argument is based in a view of efficacy beliefs as motivated cognitions that are designed to 
manage helplessness in the face of threat, and was supported by evidence from two studies 
involving samples of Australian and US residents. 
From this brief review, one can conclude that efficacy beliefs have a complex interrelationship 
with perceived threat, and they play a key role in determining the way people respond to 
threatening issues including environmental change. 
The role of values in environmental threat perception and response 
 People judge the outcomes of their deliberative choices against their values, but cognitive 
limitations demand that they only focus on a few values out of all possible ones (Dietz & Stern, 
1995). Typically, values can be integrated into a few general categories of which the most 
robust relate to individuals’ welfare and to collective welfare. This understanding is consistent 
with the notion of value orientations discussed previously in this chapter. Attitudes are 
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constructed on the basis of expectations about how the attitude object (e.g., environmental 
problem) is likely to affect specific people or things we value, and beliefs (e.g., perceived 
negative consequences/threat) about the nature and likelihood of these effects mediate between 
values and attitudinal responses (e.g., intentions and action motivation) (Stern & Dietz, 1994). 
In other words, values determine our responses to threatening situations or issues through its 
influence on our beliefs about the way the focal situation or issue is likely to affect things that 
are important to us.  
One of the ways values can shape our beliefs is by acting as an amplifier for social information 
(Kasperson et al., 1988). For example, having a strong biospheric value orientation may lead 
an individual to selectively seek or attend to information about the implications of 
environmental problems and consequently develop beliefs about those implications that guide 
their behaviour (Stern & Dietz, 1994). Values may also influence beliefs by leading people to 
accept information selectively on account of the congruence between the information and their 
values (Kahan, 2013; Stern & Dietz, 1994). Through such processes, values exert a strong 
influence on our inclination to recognize and attend to environmental threats. 
Contextual influences on environmental threat perception and response 
Contact and experiences with the natural environment shape our sense of connectedness with 
nature, our environmental attitudes, and our behavioural proclivities (Byrka, Hartig, & 
Kaiser, 2010; Collado & Corraliza, 2015; Kil, 2016). First-hand and vicarious exposure to the 
evidence of environmental change and degradation can also have a powerful effect on our 
understanding of the immediacy and gravity of environmental problems, and through this 
process engender a motivation for pro-environmental action (Borick & Rabe, 2010; Hine & 
Gifford, 1991; Schultz, 2000). However, not all environmental threats may be directly 
perceptible to lay members of the public. For example, the evidence of global climate change 
is largely represented by technical meteorological, ecological and hydrological data, 
systematically gathered and curated by scientific experts, that is then transmitted to the public 
through purposive communication efforts. In this respect, awareness-raising programs and 
other such informational campaigns constitute a part of the context in which individuals 
identify and proceed to make sense of salient environmental threats. Further, the uncertainty 
and ambiguity of global climate change also increases the likelihood that individuals will 
look to the reactions of other around them for social cues on how the threat of climate change 
is collectively construed and what constitutes an appropriate response (Duke, 2010). Even 
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though contextual factors such as directly observable changes in the environment, 
information delivered via awareness campaigns and social norms may be relatively distal 
influences on behavioural responses to environmental threats, it is important to consider their 
connection with personal beliefs, affective responses and intentions as intrapersonal 
psychological processes do not operate independently of the social and physical context 
within which the agentic individual is situated. 
 
Meta-theoretical framework of the thesis: an integrative psychological model of social 
and personal influences on pro-environmental behaviour in the context of climate 
change 
According to Bandura (1986), behaviour, internal cognition and affect, and the external 
environment operate as interacting determinants in what he termed a cycle of triadic reciprocal 
determinism (Figure 2). Bandura (1986, 1989a) argues that internal cognitions and affect are 
developed and modified by contextual influences that provide information and stimulate 
emotional responses through modelling, instruction and social persuasion. He further argues 
that people’s beliefs, feelings, goals and intentions give shape and direction to their behaviour 
and that the extrinsic effects of their actions in turn partly determine their thoughts and 
emotional reactions.  
  
    Figure 2. A causal model of triadic reciprocal determinism (Bandura, 1986, 1989b). 
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To facilitate the development and testing of hypotheses regarding linear relationships among 
the key determinants of pro-environmental action discussed above, I outlined a unidirectional 
framework loosely based on Bandura’s model of triadic reciprocal determinism to serve as a 
rough blueprint for the studies comprising this thesis (Figure 3). Drawing from Bandura 
(1989b), I envisaged that influences originating from our external and social environment, 
specifically targeted communication campaigns, experiences with the impacts of climate 
change, and social norms, shape behavioural engagement with climate change through their 
effects on, and interactions with, values, perceived threat, concern and perceived efficacy. 
   
Figure 3. A conceptual framework of social and personal influences on pro-environmental 
action  
Bandura (2000) highlights the fact that individuals are not mere conduits for external influences 
on behaviour. Pre-existing values determine the way we interpret our experiences of the 
physical world and how we integrate externally generated information into our beliefs and 
worldviews. While information campaigns may draw our attention to climate change and 
furnish us with knowledge of the causes and consequences of the problem, we may not be 
motivated to act unless our emotions are engaged and we perceive climate change to be a threat 
to entities we value. Similarly, although the ambiguity of problems like climate change may 
make us more predisposed to look to the behaviour and expectations of others around us for 
guidance on what constitutes an appropriate response, such social information may only have 
an influence on own beliefs and behaviour if we feel a sense of connection or identity with 
other actors in our environment. In the next section, I present an outline of how the different 
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elements of my integrative model are examined in the chapters comprising the rest of this 
thesis.  
Thesis outline  
The remainder of this thesis is organised around four chapters that examine the relationships 
between distal external factors – information campaigns, extreme weather events and social 
norms, and more proximal personal influences – perceived threat, concern, perceived efficacy, 
and biospheric values, as predictors of climate change-related pro-environmental behaviour 
and intentions (Table 1.1). In Chapter 2, I examine the indirect influence of exposure to climate 
change information on willingness to engage in civic actions aimed at addressing climate 
change through perceived threat and concern. The studies reported in that chapter were 
conducted in two sub-Saharan countries: Nigeria and South Africa. While, individual responses 
to climate change (and other environmental problems) are self-apparently global phenomena, 
research on the behavioural dimensions of climate change has been markedly characterised by 
a focus on Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic (WEIRD: Henrich, Heine, 
& Norenzayan, 2010) societies. Compared with WEIRD societies with near universal 
awareness of climate change, research suggests that climate change awareness is still very low 
in many parts of Africa (T. M. Lee, Markowitz, Howe, Ko, & Leiserowitz, 2015). Further, 
although research in WEIRD societies suggests that the link between knowledge and 
environmental behaviour may be weak or inconsistent, and this often presented as a universal 
truism, there is no evidence showing that it is the case in Africa. The purpose of the research 
presented in Chapter 2 was, in part, to address this issue.  
In Chapter 3, I address the link between personal experience of flooding and climate change 
engagement. Using secondary data, I explore the role of political affiliation as a moderator of 
the relationship between flood experience, climate change perceptions and preparedness to 
engage in climate change mitigation behaviours in a nationally-representative sample of UK 
residents. Chapter 4 builds on the focus of Chapter 3 by exploring the moderating influence of 
biospheric values and attribution in the link between flood experience and climate change 
perceptions, and pro-environmental behaviour and intentions. In Chapter 4, flood experience 
is operationalized in four experiments using a mentally simulated personal experience of 
flooding. In Chapter 5, I present an overview of theoretical and empirical perspectives on the 
influence of social norms on behaviour and how the interaction between descriptive norms 
affect intentions to perform socially desirable behaviours including environmental actions. 
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This is followed by two studies in which I examine the indirect independent and interactive 
influence of descriptive norms on climate change-related behaviours and intentions conveyed 
via perceived efficacy, perceived threat and concern. The main findings in the thesis are 
summarised and discussed in Chapter 6. 
Table 1.1. Outline of chapters and PhD thesis 
Outline of chapter Key research aims Method 
1. Introduction   
2. The indirect effects of exposure 
to information on willingness to 
act pro-environmentally in 
response to climate change 
Examine indirect links between 
exposure to information and 
climate change attitudes in 
previously underexplored 
cultural contexts 
Cross-sectional 
survey and 
Experiment 
3. The moderating role of political 
affiliation in the link between 
flood experience and individual 
engagement with climate change 
in the UK 
Examine the equivalence of the 
link between flood experience, 
climate change perceptions and 
preparedness to engage in 
mitigation behaviour across 
groups of individuals at different 
ends of the political spectrum  
Quantitative 
secondary analysis 
4. The effects of a mentally 
simulated flood experience on 
climate change engagement 
Explore the moderating effects 
of values and attribution on the 
link between flood experience 
and climate change attitudes 
using a mentally simulated 
experience of flooding 
Experiment 
5. The interactive influence of 
descriptive and injunctive norms 
on climate change perceptions 
and pro-environmental behaviour 
Examine interactions between 
descriptive and injunctive norms 
with a focus on how the 
interactive influence of the two 
types of norm on climate 
change-related behaviour and 
intentions are conveyed via 
perceived efficacy, perceived 
threat and concern 
Cross-sectional 
survey and 
Experiment 
6. General discussion and 
conclusion 
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Chapter 2 
The indirect effects of exposure to information on willingness to act pro-
environmentally in response to climate change: Evidence from Nigeria and South Africa 
 
Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 1, it is commonly assumed that providing people with information 
about environmental problems increases their likelihood of acting pro-environmentally 
(Akerlof, 2017; Hungerford & Volk, 1990). Information campaigns typically seek to elicit 
behaviour change through various channels including: appealing to the alignment between 
altruistic personal values and environmental goals (value-based campaigns); informing people 
about the perceptions, attitudes and behaviour of salient actors and role models (social norm 
marketing campaigns); and targeting attitude change via increasing factual knowledge of 
environmental problems (awareness campaigns) (Steg & Vlek, 2009). The research presented 
in this chapter focuses on awareness campaigns and the underlying assumption that exposure 
to information affects environmental attitudes and behaviour.     
Revisiting the contested link between knowledge and environmental behaviour: 
empirical and methodological considerations  
Even though awareness campaigns remain a popular strategy among organizations seeking to 
promote pro-environmental changes in social practices, research suggests that knowledge is 
only weakly linked to environmental attitudes and behaviour (Abrahamse et al., 2005; 
Mckenzie-Mohr, 2000). Compared with direct experiences, such as witnessing dead fish 
floating across the surface of a polluted lake, providing people with information about 
environmental problems has a weaker effect on attitudes, and is less likely to produce changes 
in behaviour (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). The effect of information on environmental 
behaviour may be even further reduced when performance of the behaviour is associated with 
severe situational costs or constraints (Kaiser & Fuhrer, 2003; Steg & Vlek, 2009). 
Yet, individuals need to know what needs to be done and what they can do before actions can 
take place. Hence, some researchers have maintained that knowledge is an important precursor 
to pro-environmental actions (Jensen, 2002; Kaiser & Fuhrer, 2003), and this view is supported 
by evidence that awareness campaigns are effective in promoting pro-environmental attitudes 
and behaviours (Bidwell, 2016; Staats et al., 2000; van der Ploeg et al., 2011). Knowledge 
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delivered through awareness campaigns can be particularly crucial for triggering concern and 
facilitating appropriate behavioural responses in situations where the evidence for an 
environmental problem is not readily accessible, as with long-term weather patterns and 
anthropogenic climate change (Osbaldiston & Schott, 2012; Rasool & Ogunbode, 2015). 
According to Kaiser and Fuhrer (2003), the influence of knowledge on environmental 
behaviour is systematically underestimated due to a number of reasons. Firstly, it is not simply 
the amount of knowledge available that determines behaviour. Rather, environmental 
behaviour arises from the convergent influence of different forms of knowledge including 
declarative or system knowledge (understanding of how environmental systems work), 
procedural knowledge (understanding of actions required to achieve environmental or 
conservation goals), effectiveness knowledge (understanding of the ecological consequences of 
different actions) and social knowledge (understanding of the relevant motivations and 
intentions of others). Most studies focus on one or two forms of knowledge and their absolute 
effects on environmental behaviour; thereby neglecting the ways in which the different forms 
of knowledge interact in convergent and divergent ways. Secondly, knowledge is not a 
sufficient condition for environmental action and must be understood as a distal predictor of 
behaviour that is conveyed by more proximal mediators (Carmi, Arnon, & Orion, 2015; Kaiser 
& Fuhrer, 2003). The mediated influence of knowledge on behaviour is underestimated by 
commonly used statistical methods that are sensitive to absolute direct influences but do not 
account for measurement error attenuation (Kaiser & Fuhrer, 2003).   
In this chapter, I address the mediated influence of knowledge by examining the indirect links 
between exposure to information and climate change-related attitudes in two African 
populations. The purpose of this research is to clarify the extent to which information provision 
and knowledge determine individual responses to environmental issues in African societies. 
Why is it necessary to examine the link between knowledge and environmental attitudes 
in Africa? 
According to researchers at the BBC World Service Trust (Deane, 2009), people in Africa are 
at ‘humanity’s climate change frontline’. The reality of climate change is evidenced across the 
continent by rising temperatures, growing pressure from pests and disease, declining 
agricultural productivity, and the increasing frequency of extreme weather events (Toulmin, 
2009). Yet, due to shortfalls in funding and communication infrastructure, climate change 
awareness is generally low in Africa (Godfrey, Le Roux-Rutledge, Cooke, & Burton, 2010; 
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Pugliese & Ray, 2009). A recent study revealed that more than two-thirds of adults in several 
African countries including Egypt, Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria and Zambia have no awareness 
of climate change (T. M. Lee et al., 2015). Scholars argue that the information needs of African 
citizens should be accorded greater priority as the capacity for effective responses to climate 
change is contingent on the availability and accessibility of relevant information (Cooke, 
Mohammed, Pauker, & Godfrey, 2010; Gandure, Walker, & Botha, 2013).  
While knowledge may not presently be a focal determinant of public engagement with 
environmental issues in affluent post-industrial societies with generally greater information 
provision and environmental awareness levels, its role in African countries has yet to be 
empirically established. Among populations with a high level of awareness of environmental 
problems, the motivation to engage in pro-environmental actions is arguably more likely to be 
subject to the influence of factors with greater variability such as the value attached to pro-
environmental outcomes and the perceived personal and social benefits of achieving such 
outcomes. In other words, the influence of knowledge in such contexts may be masked by a 
ceiling effect. Whereas, the variability in knowledge levels may have a more pronounced effect 
on environmental attitudes and behaviour among populations with a generally lower level of 
environmental awareness. On this basis, I present findings from three studies examining the 
link between exposure to information and climate change-related attitudes in two sub-Saharan 
African countries. Below, I outline a theoretical model that connects exposure to information 
with climate change attitudes and provide a brief overview of public engagement with climate 
change in the context of my research populations. 
Theoretical framework and hypotheses: Linking exposure to information with 
motivation to address climate change 
Previous studies addressing the effect of information on individual responses to climate change 
in Africa have primarily focused on rural and agrarian settings. These studies show that access 
to information has a significant influence on farmers’ perception of climate change 
(Habtemariam, Gandorfer, Kassa, & Heissenhuber, 2016; Regassa & Stoecker, 2014) and 
choice of adaptation strategies (Deressa, Hassan, Ringler, Alemu, & Yesuf, 2009). However, 
beyond examining direct effects, no attempt has yet been made to empirically investigate if and 
how exposure to information indirectly affects climate change attitudes through its influence 
on knowledge. In the current research, I sought to obtain a more holistic understanding by 
assessing the indirect effects of exposure to information on climate change attitudes. My 
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inquiry was guided by a theoretical model rooted in an amalgam of knowledge-deficit theory 
and appraisal theories of risk/threat mitigation.  
The knowledge-deficit theory is one of the oldest models of environmental behaviour. It 
proposes that pro-environmental behaviour arises from environmental awareness and concern 
in a linear sequential process (see Burgess, Harrison, & Filius, 1998). In this perspective, 
awareness is conceptualized as a factual knowledge of environmental problems (i.e. their 
nature, causes and consequences), while concern represents an environmental attitude index 
resulting from knowledge. Environmental attitudes are typically understood as encompassing 
the beliefs, emotions and behavioural intentions that people hold regarding environmental 
issues (Schultz, Shriver, Tabanico, & Khazian, 2004). Thus, taken at face value, the concern 
construct in the knowledge-deficit model appears to tap primarily into the affective component 
of environmental attitudes. Extrapolating from this theory, knowledge can be understood as a 
mediator in the link between exposure to information and environmental attitude and behaviour 
(Figure 4). However, the knowledge-deficit model does not unpack the process by which 
knowledge gives rise to attitude change, nor does it explicitly describe the relationship between 
knowledge and other attitude dimensions such as beliefs and behavioural intentions. The lack 
of account for behavioural intentions is particularly significant as these are understood to be 
the most proximate predictors of behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). Therefore, it is necessary to look to 
other theories for a more elaborate framework of the relationship between knowledge and 
environmental attitudes. 
 
Figure 4. The knowledge-deficit model (adapted from Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). 
According to Akerlof (2017), environmental awareness can be understood as comprising 
knowledge that human actions cause environmental problems, and cognizance of the threat 
posed to value objects including humans, other life-forms and the environment by these 
problems (see also de Groot & Steg, 2009). This concept of environmental awareness overlaps 
significantly with the concept of risk perception – a term that broadly encapsulates ‘lay’ 
evaluations of situations or events that could have negative consequences for value objects 
(Breakwell, 2007). Risk perception comprises two components: knowledge of risk gained from 
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direct or vicarious experience, and a judgment of the severity and likelihood of negative 
consequences (Akerlof, 2017). This conceptual overlap between environmental awareness and 
risk perception led me to co-opt perspectives from risk and coping appraisal research in 
developing a theoretical framework that links knowledge with environmental attitudes.    
Appraisal theorists propose that encounters in the external environment (e.g. exposure to 
information about a risk or hazard) trigger appraisal processes in which individuals evaluate if, 
and how, the encountered stimulus is relevant to their wellbeing (Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel-
Schetter, DeLongis, & Gruen, 1986). The most fundamental of these appraisal processes – 
termed primary appraisal, entails evaluations of what is at stake in the encounter; such as the 
potential for harm or benefit to the individual and/or things they value. The choice, and 
motivation to follow the course, of a given response to any perceived risk or hazard are 
determined in part by the outcomes of primary appraisal (Floyd, Prentice-Dunn, & Rogers, 
2000)4.  
Research shows that knowledge predicts climate change concern and perceived threat 
(Mumpower, Liu, & Vedlitz, 2016; Shi, Visschers, Siegrist, & Arvai, 2016). Concern (or 
worry) and perceived threat/risk have also been consistently shown to predict support for 
climate policies and engagement in mitigation and adaptation actions (Grothmann & Patt, 
2005; Rainear & Christensen, 2017; Zahran, Brody, Grover, & Vedlitz, 2006). Therefore, the 
relationship between knowledge and individuals’ responses to climate change can be evaluated 
within a framework of primary appraisal. I consider perceived threat to be a cognitive 
dimension of primary appraisal insofar that it encompasses judgments of the severity and 
likelihood of adverse impacts on the individual (and valued others such as family, community, 
nature) resulting from climate change. Likewise, concern and worry represent the affective 
dimension of primary appraisal as they reflect anticipatory feelings elicited by expected 
negative consequences (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001). 
                                                 
4 Appraisal theories also detail a secondary appraisal process that complements primary appraisal (Floyd, 
Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 2000). Secondary appraisal involves evaluation of the efficacy of response options 
(i.e. behavioural/coping responses), and the individual’s ability to execute the relevant behavioural responses 
(i.e. personal or self-efficacy).  
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Figure 5. A conceptual model of the link between information exposure and threat mitigation 
responses through the primary appraisal process. 
Although some popular models of threat appraisal and coping such as the protection motivation 
theory (Rogers, 1975) do not explicitly address the relationship between perceived threat and 
affective responses such as worry and concern, research in the environmental domain suggests 
that environment-related threat perception and affective responses can be conceptualized as 
reciprocal influences in a stable feedback system (van der Linden, 2014a). In this regard, 
concern operates both as an information processing heuristic that guides the evaluation of 
perceived threats as well as a product of the cognitive threat appraisal process (Figure 5). 
Further, based on an understanding of environmental attitudes as encompassing beliefs, 
emotions and behavioural intentions, the outcomes of primary appraisal (perceived threat and 
concern) and the consequent action intentions/motivation can be interpreted as reflecting a 
common latent environmental attitude; of which perceived threat and concern are more 
proximally determined by exposure to information. 
Based on these considerations, I propose that exposure to climate change information has a 
significant positive influence on intentions to address climate change that is serially mediated 
by knowledge and perceived threat (H1: exposure → knowledge → perceived threat → 
behavioural intentions), and knowledge and concern (H2: exposure → knowledge → concern 
→ behavioural intentions). Following Frick, Kaiser and Wilson’s (2004) concept of ‘system 
Encounter 
with 
information 
Perceived Threat 
severity + 
likelihood 
Concern 
Mitigation 
intentions + 
action 
Stimulus Primary Appraisal Motivation to act 
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knowledge’, I operationalized knowledge as cognizance of the causes and consequences of 
climate change. This hypothesis was tested with data gathered in Nigeria and South Africa. 
A brief overview of public engagement with climate change in Nigeria and South Africa 
Nigeria and South Africa are responsible for much of Africa’s greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. Gas flaring in Nigeria’s petroleum industry alone accounts for roughly 25% of 
Africa’s total annual GHG emissions (Ukala, 2010). Similarly, due its heavy dependence on 
coal for energy, South Africa contributes three times more to global carbon-dioxide emissions 
than it contributes to global GDP and is ranked the 13th highest carbon-dioxide emitter in the 
world (Seymore, Inglesi-Lotz, & Blignaut, 2014). In the last few decades, the Nigerian and 
South African governments have introduced various policies and legislation aimed at reducing 
GHG emissions and promoting sustainable economic growth (Nachmany et al., 2015). Further, 
both governments have identified climate change awareness raising as a key priority for 
facilitating behaviour change and informed public participation in efforts to build climate 
change resilience (Environmental Affairs Department – Republic of South Africa, 2011; 
Federal Ministry of Environment, 2009). Therefore, research addressing the influence of 
information provision on individuals’ engagement with climate change is highly pertinent in 
these countries. 
Although no study involving nationally-representative population samples of either country 
has been conducted, research suggests that public understanding of climate change is patchy in 
Nigeria and South Africa (Godfrey et al., 2010). Research respondents in Nigeria purportedly 
conflate climate change with Ozone layer depletion, and a majority see climate change as a 
natural phenomenon (Abegunde, 2016) or the ‘will of God’ (Cooke et al., 2010). Findings from 
a qualitative study commissioned by the BBC World Service Trust indicate that South Africans 
have a comparatively better understanding of the causal role of human activities in climate 
change but consider climate change impacts a remote threat to their country and the wider 
African continent (Neville, 2010). Citizens in both countries commonly express feelings of 
powerlessness to respond to climate change and generally attribute the responsibility for action 
to the government (Godfrey et al., 2010).  
Yet, through civic actions such as pushing for policy changes at varying levels of government 
and enacting behaviour changes in line with adaptation and mitigation strategies individuals 
can play key roles in tackling climate change (Moser, 2009; Whitmarsh et al., 2013). Thus, in 
the current research, I examined the influence of information exposure in relation to willingness 
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to engage in behaviours with direct implications for the political, social and economic 
circumstances within which Africans engage with climate change. These types of behaviours 
are typically overlooked in African climate change research in favour of agricultural adaptation 
behaviours. Below, I report findings from tests of my hypotheses across three studies. In Study 
1, I demonstrate that, as hypothesized, knowledge, perceived threat and concern mediate the 
link between exposure to information and willingness to act on climate change in a Nigerian 
sample. Similarly, the hypothesized mediation was supported by cross-sectional data from a 
South African sample in Study 2. In Study 3, I distinguish between the effects of knowledge 
of climate change causes and consequences and show that exposure to information is indirectly 
linked to willingness to act pro-environmentally through knowledge of climate change 
consequences and perceived threat. However, knowledge of climate change causes did not 
significantly mediate the indirect effects of exposure to information. Details of my methods 
and findings from the studies are presented in the following sections. 
Study 1 
 Method 
Participants and procedure 
Data were gathered in two southern Nigerian states, Abia and Imo, from an opportunity sample 
of 217 respondents attending a teachers’ seminar series organised by the education department.  
81% of respondents were school teachers, while others were employed in various educational 
support roles. Further, the majority of respondents were female (82.5%), urban residents 
(55.8%) and the mean age was 50.2 years (SD = 8.97). The questionnaires used to gather the 
data were delivered to a member of the secretarial staff within the education department, who 
in turn distributed them to attendees at the seminar series. Respondents were briefly informed 
about the purpose of the study before being asked to provide their consent to participate. 
Measures 
Exposure to climate change information was assessed with a single item: ‘How often do you 
come across information about climate change (or global warming)? Responses to this item 
were recorded on a 5-point scale (1 = Never, 2 = Rarely, 3 = Regularly, but less than 4 times 
each month, 4 = Weekly, 5 = Daily). The modal rate of encounter with climate change 
information among the sample was ‘Rarely’, although 20.3% of respondents indicated that they 
encountered climate change information ‘Daily’.  
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Knowledge of climate change causes and consequences was assessed with eight items adapted 
from Ogunbode and Arnold (2014). Three of the items were factual statements about climate 
change (e.g. ‘climate change is caused by increased carbon-dioxide concentration in the 
atmosphere’), three others were reverse-worded statements (e.g., ‘climate change has nothing 
to with the rise in sea levels’) and two were common misconceptions reported in prior research 
(e.g., climate change is caused by Ozone layer depletion). Responses to the items were initially 
recorded using a 5-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 3 = Unsure, 5 = Strongly Agree). 
Subsequently, the responses were recoded into a dichotomy of wrong and right answers (‘1’, 
’2’, ‘3’, = 0; ‘4’, ’5’ = 1) and a composite knowledge measure was derived from the sum of 
right answers provided by each participant (α = .60). The knowledge measure is presented in 
full in Appendix 1. 
Using a measured adopted from Ogunbode and Arnold (2014), perceived threat was assessed 
by asking participants to rate the extent to which they consider climate change a threat in six 
domains (lifestyle, health, livelihood, family, community, country). Responses to these items 
were recorded using a 5-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree). Principal axis 
factor analysis showed that the items load on to a single factor explaining 47.3% of the variance 
in responses (Eigenvalue = 2.84, α = .77). 
Concern was measured with two items. The first was a rating of respondents’ level of concern 
about the effects of climate change in the world, and the second a rating of concern about the 
effects of climate change in their country. Responses to both items were recorded using a 5-
point scale (1 = Not Concerned, 5 = Extremely Concerned). These items were moderately 
correlated (r = .45, p<.001) and principal axis factor analysis showed that they load on a single 
factor which explains 72.4% of the variance in responses (Eigenvalue = 1.45; α = .61). 
The behavioural outcome in this research was operationalised as willingness to engage in 
climate change-related behaviour. As an indicator of willingness to act on climate change, 
participants were asked to rate their level of agreement with the statement: “I am willing to pay 
special taxes aimed at reducing the impacts of climate change”. Further, based on research 
suggesting that the government’s response to climate change is commonly perceived as 
inadequate in Nigeria and South Africa (Cooke et al., 2010; Neville, 2010), participants were 
asked to rate their agreement with the statement: “I would participate in protests or rallies 
against government inaction on climate change”. Responses to both questions were recorded 
with a 5-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree). These two items were only 
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modestly correlated (r = .22, p = .001) and willingness to pay taxes for addressing climate 
change was significantly lower than willingness to participate in protests or rallies among the 
sample (Mdiff = -.254, t (216) = -2.44, p = .015). The two items were consequently analysed as 
separate measures. 
This choice of outcome measures is justified by prior research showing a moderate positive 
association between intentions and behaviour measures in the environmental domain (e.g., 
Bamberg & Möser, 2007). Additionally, the construct and criterion validity of hypothetical 
measures of willingness to pay for addressing environmental problems and willingness to 
engage in climate change-related political activism have been demonstrated in other studies 
(e.g., Clements, McCright, Dietz, & Marquart-Pyatt, 2015; O’Garra & Mourato, 2016; Roser-
Renouf, Maibach, Leiserowitz, & Zhao, 2014).  
Results 
Preliminary analyses 
I found that exposure to climate change information was significantly correlated with 
knowledge and concern, but not perceived threat and willingness to protest or pay taxes to 
address climate change (Table 2.1). Willingness to pay taxes to reduce climate change and 
willingness to participate in protests and rallies were regressed on exposure to climate change 
information, knowledge, perceived threat and concern using the Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation (MLE) method in AMOS 20. Based on previous research indicating that gender and 
age affect environmental attitudes and access to information in Nigeria (Ogunbode & Arnold, 
2012), both factors were included in the analysis as control variables. This analysis revealed 
that exposure to information, knowledge, concern and perceived threat explained 12% and 15% 
of the variance in willingness to pay taxes to address climate change and willingness to protest 
government inaction respectively (Figure 6). 
Test of hypotheses 
I tested my mediation hypotheses using the PROCESS macro for regression-based estimation 
of mediation, moderation and conditional effects in SPSS (Hayes, 2013). Exposure to 
information had significant indirect effects serially mediated by knowledge and perceived 
threat on willingness to protest government inaction (B = .02, SE = .01, 95%CI: [.01, .04], N = 
215) and willingness to pay taxes to reduce climate change (B = .01, SE = .01, 95%CI: [.00, 
.04], N = 215), which supports my hypothesis (H1). Similarly, knowledge and concern serially 
mediated the indirect effects of exposure to information on willingness to protest government 
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inaction (B = .00, SE = .00, 95%CI: [.00, .02], N = 215) and willingness to pay taxes to reduce 
climate change impacts (B = .00, SE = .00, 95% CI: [.00, .01], N = 215), which supports my 
second hypothesis (H2)5. 
Table 2.1. Zero-order correlations for the measured constructs in Study 1 
 M(SD) 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Exposure to information 3.03(1.27) .18** .20** -.00 .02 .03 
2. Knowledge 5.29(1.90)  .13* .38*** .03 .16* 
3. Concern 3.43(0.80)   .19** .24*** .13† 
4. Perceived threat 3.66(0.75)    .28*** .29*** 
5. Willingness to protest 3.30(1.19)     .22** 
6. Willingness to pay climate tax 3.05(1.27)      
aPearsons correlation coefficient, †p<.10, *p<.05, **p<0.01, ***p<.001. N = 217. Scale range for knowledge 
measure is Min = 0 and Max = 8, while others have a range of Min = 1 and Max = 5. 
Discussion 
The findings from Study 1 support the hypothesized roles of knowledge, concern and perceived 
vulnerability as serial mediators of the link between exposure to information and willingness 
to act on climate change. They also elucidate the process by which exposure to information 
plausibly triggers behavioural responses to climate change among the sample. While exposure 
to climate change information had a significant direct relationship with knowledge, it was not 
directly linked with perceived threat (see Figure 6). This suggests that, among this sample of 
individuals, the indirect effects of exposure to information on behavioural outcomes conveyed 
by knowledge and perceived threat plausibly occur in the serial process implied by the 
theoretical model.  
Overall, these findings support previous indications by Ogunbode and Arnold (2014) that 
concern and the perceived threat of climate change are important determinants of climate 
change-related behaviour in Nigeria. Therefore, I sought to replicate these findings among 
another African sample in Study 2. 
                                                 
5 Alternative configurations to the hypothesized mediation: [perceived threat → knowledge] and [concern → 
knowledge] were not supported by the data.  
49 
 
Study 2 
Method 
Participants and procedure 
Using the same questionnaire employed in Study 1, I gathered data from 198 respondents in 
four urban (Bloemfontein, Cape Town, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth) and five rural locations 
(Coffee Bay, Giyani, Hoedspruit, Humansdorp, Jeffreys Bay) across South Africa. This was 
achieved using a combination of opportunistic and snowball sampling methods. Respondents 
were approached and recruited at random in public areas (shopping malls in urban areas and 
food markets in rural areas). The sample comprised 2.5% unemployed individuals, 18.2% full-
time students and 73.7% individuals employed in part-time or full-time blue and white-collar 
roles across a variety of sectors. The gender distribution of respondents was closely matched 
(Females = 49%), but the majority were urban residents (59.1%), and the mean age was 35.2 
years (SD = 11.57). 
Results 
Preliminary analyses 
11.6% of respondents indicated that they encounter climate change information ‘Daily’, but 
the modal rate of encounter with information was ‘Rarely’ (34.8%). Using the same approach 
as in Study 1, a composite measure was derived from the sum of correct responses to the eight 
knowledge items but the measure had low reliability (α = .54) among the South African sample. 
Consequently, two items with low item-total correlations estimates were dropped to increase 
the reliability of the scale (α = .63). Factor analysis showed that the items constituting the 
perceived threat measure loaded on a single factor explaining 71.73% of variance in responses 
(Eigenvalue = 4.30, α = .92) and a similar result was observed with the concern items 
(Eigenvalue = 1.77, Variance explained = 88.44%, α = .87). Respondents reported slightly 
greater willingness to protest government inaction than willingness to pay taxes to reduce 
climate change. However, the difference between mean scores on both measures was not 
statistically significant (Mdiff = -.193, t (196) = -1.72, p = .087). 
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Table 2.2. Zero-order correlations and factor loadings for the measured constructs in Study 2 
 M(SD) 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Exposure to information 2.93(1.11) .17* .35*** .11 .16* .04 
2. Knowledge 4.82(1.36)  .23** .23** .17* -.04 
3. Concern 3.56(1.00)   .43*** .32*** .28*** 
4. Perceived threat 3.93(0.86)    .42*** .28*** 
5. Willingness to protest 3.13(1.31)     .25*** 
6. Willingness to pay climate tax 2.93(1.26)      
aPearsons correlation coefficient, †p<.1, *p<.05, **p<0.01, ***p<.001. N = 197. Scale range for knowledge 
measure is Min = 0 and Max = 6, while others have a range of Min = 1 and Max = 5. 
Exposure to climate change information was correlated with knowledge, concern and 
willingness to protest, but not perceived threat and willingness to pay taxes to address climate 
change (Table 2.2). Regression analysis using the MLE method in AMOS 20 revealed that 
exposure to information, knowledge, concern and perceived threat explained 13% and 23% of 
the variance in willingness to pay taxes to reduce climate change and willingness to protest 
government inaction respectively (Figure 7). 
Tests of hypotheses 
My mediation hypotheses were tested using the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013). The first 
hypothesis (H1) was supported as exposure to information had significant indirect effects 
serially mediated by knowledge and perceived threat on willingness to participate in protests 
against government inaction (B = .01, SE = .01, 95%CI: [.00, .04], N = 197) and willingness 
to pay taxes to reduce climate change (B = .01, SE = .01, 95%CI: [.00, .03], N = 197). Similarly, 
I found support for my hypothesis (H2) as exposure to information had significant positive 
indirect effects serially mediated by knowledge and concern on willingness to protest against 
government inaction (B = .01, SE = .01, 95%CI: [.00, .02], N = 197) and willingness to pay 
taxes to reduce climate change (B = .01, SE = .01, 95%CI: [.00, .03], N = 197).  
Exposure to information was more strongly related to concern than knowledge among the 
sample (see Table 2.2. and Figure 7), and this led me to explore alternatives to the hypothesized 
relationships between these factors. Interestingly, exposure to information also had a 
significant negative effect serially mediated by concern and knowledge on willingness to pay 
taxes to reduce climate change (B = -.01, SE = .01, 95% CI: [-.03, -.00], N = 197) but not on 
willingness to protest (B = .00, SE = .01, 95%CI: [-.00, .03], N = 197). There was no significant 
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effect mediated by perceived threat and knowledge on either willingness to protest (B = .00, 
SE = .00, 95%CI: [-.00, .01], N = 197) or willingness to pay taxes to reduce climate change (B 
= -.00, SE = .00, 95%CI: [-.01, .00], N = 197). 
 Discussion 
The hypothesized mediating role of knowledge, perceived threat and concern in the link 
between exposure to information and willingness to act on climate change were supported in 
Study 2. However, the data also supported an alternative configuration in which concern 
precedes knowledge and together both factors mediate a negative indirect link between 
exposure to information and willingness to pay taxes to address climate change. The valence 
of this indirect link appeared to rest mainly on a negative relationship between knowledge and 
willingness to pay taxes to address climate change. Research in other contexts has shown that 
factors such as political orientation and trust in scientists can play a role in moderating the 
effect of knowledge on climate change attitudes, whereby people with conservative political 
leanings or lack of trust in the scientific consensus on climate change may report lower levels 
of concern and willingness to act with increasing knowledge (Malka, Krosnick, & Langer, 
2009; McCright, 2011). In this study, knowledge was only negatively linked with willingness 
to pay taxes (Figure 7) which suggests that a third factor, such as a lack of trust in government 
or confidence in the efficacy of taxation to reduce climate change, may be involved in the link 
between both factors (see Bakaki & Bernauer, 2017).  
To further clarify the role of knowledge in the South African context, I conducted a follow-up 
experiment using established measures of climate change knowledge and willingness to act 
pro-environmentally in response to climate change. The purpose of Study 3 was to address 
some of the limitations of the first two studies including a lack of control for the quality and 
content of climate change information encountered by participants and the relatively low 
internal consistency of the knowledge measures.
5
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Study 3 
Method 
Participants and procedure 
I recruited 105 South African residents to participate in an online survey experiment through 
advertisements on social media. Entry into a raffle for a 500 Rand reward was offered as an 
incentive for participation. In studies 1 and 2, I operationalized exposure to climate change 
information as rate of encounter with climate change information. Although this measure 
captures the volume of information participants are likely to have been exposed to, it does not 
reflect the quality or content of the information. Therefore, in the present experiment, I 
employed experimental stimuli with an explicit focus on information pertaining to the causes 
and consequences of climate change. Further, I adopted a measure of climate change 
knowledge that allows distinction between the two dimensions of knowledge and explicit 
examination of their roles in the link between exposure to information and climate change 
attitudes. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: (1) a control condition in which 
they were only presented with a scientific definition of climate change; and (2) an information 
condition in which they were presented with the climate change definition and some 
information about the causes and impacts of climate change. The experimental stimuli are 
presented in Appendix 2. The experiment was framed as a memory exercise and participants 
were instructed to bear the information they had read in mind as they subsequently completed 
measures of climate change knowledge, perceived threat, concern and intentions to act on 
climate change.6 Participants were fully debriefed at the end of the study. 
Twenty-two participants were excluded from the analyses due to incomplete responses (>50% 
missing values), and an additional 47 cases had missing values across the items measuring 
climate change concern due to a malfunction of the hosting platform used to administer the 
study. We imputed the concern values for the 47 cases using the Expectation Maximization 
(EM) algorithm as Little’s MCAR test showed that they were missing at random (χ2(6) = 6.73, 
                                                 
6 Those who opted in to the raffle for a reward were also asked to indicate if they would be willing to donate 
part of their remuneration to a climate change advocacy group in the event that they were selected to receive the 
reward. This was intended to be analysed as a measure of actual behaviour but it was omitted from the analysis 
due to over half of the sample (57%) electing not to participate in the raffle. 
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p = .346). The final sample obtained with complete responses (N = 83) comprised 61.4% 
females and 36.1% males with a mean age of 32.18 years (SD = 9.93).  
Measures (Dependent Variables) 
Knowledge of the causes of climate change was measured using 12 items presented to 
participants in random order. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which each item (e.g., 
Deforestation) contributes to climate change (minor contribution / no contribution / major 
contribution). Five of these were correct statements while seven were incorrect. Responses 
were scored (0 = wrong, 1 = right) and indexed (0-12) based on the number of correct responses 
(α = .66). I also measured knowledge of climate change impacts (consequences) with 11 items 
using a similar approach (α = .61). The items constituting both scales are presented in Appendix 
3 and the scoring method has been validated in previous research (see van der Linden, 2014; 
van der Linden, 2015).  
Perceived threat was measured by asking participants to rate the extent to which they consider 
climate change a threat in 6 domains (lifestyle, health, livelihood, family, community; α = .90). 
I also measured climate change concern by asking participants to rate their level of concern 
about the effects of climate change across the world, in South Africa and on their wellbeing (α 
= .89). Lastly, I assessed participants’ willingness to act in 4 actions aimed at addressing 
climate change (donate money to an environmental group engaged with climate change, sign a 
petition calling on the South African government to make stronger commitments to reducing 
emissions, participate in protests or rallies against inadequate government action on climate 
change, pay higher prices – i.e. pay a climate change tax on goods and services consumed; α = 
.72).  
Table 2.3. Zero-order intercorrelations among the variables addressed in Study 3 
 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Information Condition .03 .24* .01 .03 .14 
2. Knowledge (Cause)  .52*** .23* .26* .16 
3. Knowledge (Consequences)   .30** .30** .29** 
4. Perceived Threat    .83*** .50*** 
5. Concern     .41*** 
6. Willingness to act     - 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, N = 83. 
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Results 
Preliminary analyses 
There was no significant difference in the distribution of participants’ gender (Χ2(1) = .79, p = 
.375, N = 81) and age (MControl = 31.36, SDControl = 10.02; MInformation = 33.16, SDInformation = 
9.87; t(81) = -.82, p = .413) between the experimental conditions; and neither factor was 
significantly related to the dependent variables (see Appendix 4). Hence, gender and age were 
not included as predictors in the analyses. Zero-order correlations among the independent and 
dependent variables are presented in Table 2.3. Participants in the information condition had 
significantly higher mean scores on the knowledge of climate change consequences measure 
than those in the control condition but there was no significant difference in mean scores on 
the knowledge of climate change causes measure between the two groups (Table 2.4). 
Regression analysis using the MLE method in AMOS 20 revealed that the experimental 
manipulation and mediating variables explained 29% of the variance in willingness to act on 
climate change (Figure 8). 
Table 2.4. Descriptive and comparative statistics for the dependent variables across the 
experimental conditions 
DV 
Condition 
t p 
Control Information 
M (SD) 
Knowledge (Cause) 5.89 (1.90) 6.03 (2.25) -.30 .763 
Knowledge (Consequences) 7.38 (1.66) 8.13 (1.46) -2.18 .032 
Concern 5.88 (.88) 5.93 (.93) -.27 .788 
Perceived threat 5.80 (.92) 5.83 (.98) -.12 .907 
Willingness to act 3.64 (.90) 3.88 (.83) -1.25 .215 
Listwise valid N = 83 (Control = 45, Information = 38). DV = Dependent Variable.  
Tests of hypotheses 
Using the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013), I found that exposure to information did not have 
a significant indirect effect on willingness to engage in climate change-related behaviour 
serially through knowledge of climate change causes and perceived threat (H1: B = .01, SE = 
.03, 95% CI: [-.03, .09, N = 83) or knowledge of climate change causes and concern (H2: B = 
-.00, SE = .01, 95% CI: [-.05, .01], N = 83), which contradicts my hypotheses. However, in 
support of my hypothesis (H1), exposure to information had a significant indirect effect on 
willingness to act serially through knowledge of climate change consequences and perceived 
threat (B = .07, SE = .05, 95% CI: [.01, .25, N = 83). Exposure to information did not have a 
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significant indirect effect on willingness to engage in climate change-related behaviour 
serially through knowledge of climate change consequences and concern (H2: B = -.01, 
SE = .02, 95% CI: [-.10, .02], N = 83). 
 Discussion 
The results of Study 3 provide further evidence of the serial mediating role of 
knowledge (specifically of climate change consequences) and perceived threat in the 
link between exposure to information and behavioural responses to climate change. 
Although climate change knowledge is commonly operationalised as a unitary 
construct, my findings suggest that climate change cause and consequences knowledge 
have different implications for motivation to address climate change. This study shows 
that information may be more likely to motivate pro-active engagement with climate 
change when it enables people understand climate change as a personally relevant 
threat. 
However, the hypothesized serial mediation of the link between exposure to 
information and willingness to act on climate change by knowledge and concern (H1) 
was not supported by the experimental data. My findings may be reflective of 
Loewenstein et al.’s (2001) argument that the affective and cognitive outcomes of risk 
evaluations can have divergent effects on subsequent behaviour. On the other hand, 
considering the proportion of responses to the concern items that was missing due to 
the error in the administration of the study, no definitive statements on the role of 
concern can be made based on the data obtained in this study. 
General Discussion 
The purpose of this research was to assess the indirect effects of exposure to 
information on responses to climate change behaviour in the African context. Climate 
change awareness is generally low across Africa and increasing access to relevant 
information as a means to enable effective public engagement with climate change has 
been strongly advocated (Godfrey et al., 2010; Pugliese & Ray, 2009). Yet the 
effectiveness of awareness campaigns with regard to Africans’ responses to climate 
change seemed dubious in light of prior indications that such strategies typically have 
little tangible impact on environmental behaviour (e.g., Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; 
Mckenzie-Mohr, 2000; Owens, 2000). Further, it appears that the value of awareness 
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campaigns may be systematically underestimated due to a common practice of 
neglecting to estimate the indirect effects of knowledge mediated by other more 
proximate determinants of behaviour such as beliefs and emotions (Carmi et al., 2015; 
Kaiser & Fuhrer, 2003). Consequently, I investigated the indirect links between 
exposure to information and willingness to engage in climate change-related behaviour 
in three studies involving population samples from Nigeria and South Africa. I 
hypothesized that exposure to information is significantly linked with willingness to 
engage in climate change-related behaviour in a serial sequence mediated by 
knowledge, concern and perceived threat.  
I found support for the prediction that knowledge and perceived threat serially mediate 
the link between information exposure and willingness to engage in climate change-
related behaviour in all three studies. I also found some support for the predicted serial 
mediation by knowledge and concern of the relationship between information exposure 
and willingness to engage in climate change-related behaviour in Study 1 (Nigeria) and 
Study 2 (South Africa). These findings are consistent with the notion that awareness 
campaigns can promote positive engagement with climate change through their 
influence on peoples’ understanding and perceptions of the problem.  
The results of this research have important implications for our understanding of 
awareness campaigns as a means of promoting positive engagement with 
environmental issues in Africa. As opposed to narrowly focusing on the direct effects 
of informational strategies on behaviour, identifying the mediators that link exposure 
to information with behavioural responses to environmental problems provides a more 
accurate reflection of the significance of knowledge in the web of influences that 
underlie environmental behaviours. This research shows that exposure to information 
can contribute positively to climate change-related behaviour to the extent that it 
generates knowledge that enables people in African societies recognize the threat posed 
by climate change impacts. 
Research suggests that the traditional mass media (television, radio, print) are the 
primary source of climate change information for people in Africa (e.g., Abegunde, 
2016; Cherotich, Saidu, & Bebe, 2012; Godfrey et al., 2010). Media coverage of climate 
change in Nigeria and South Africa tends to focus disproportionately on international 
events such as climate change summits and major disasters, while local climate change-
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related issues receive less publicity (Tagbo, 2010). Such information is unlikely to 
motivate citizens to act in response to climate change because it frames climate change 
as a global, rather than local, problem and fosters a view of climate change as a distant 
threat (C. Jones, Hine, & Marks, 2017; Scannell & Gifford, 2013).  
Across the three studies, exposure to information, knowledge, concern and perceived 
threat together explained a modest amount of variance (12 – 29%) in the indices of 
willingness to engage in climate change-related behaviour. This plausibly reflects the 
involvement of other predictors that were beyond the scope of this research. For 
example, while I only focused on primary appraisal in this chapter, appraisal theories 
also propose a secondary appraisal process – termed coping appraisal that may be 
involved in the link between encounter with information and environmental behaviour 
(see Rainear & Christensen, 2017).  
Coping appraisal encompasses individuals’ evaluation of available response options for 
coping with perceived risks in three dimensions: (1) response efficacy – which refers to 
the perceived efficacy of a given behavioural response to mitigate the risk/threat; (2) 
individuals’ self-efficacy or beliefs about their ability to perform the behavioural 
response; (3) and the response costs or barriers associated with the behaviour. Meta-
analytic studies have shown that coping appraisal may be more closely related to 
behaviour than primary appraisal (e.g., Floyd et al., 2000). Incorporating measures of 
African citizens’ perceptions of the efficacy and costs of individual mitigation and 
adaptation behaviours would likely increase the explanatory power of my theoretical 
framework. For example research in the United States suggests that exposure to climate 
change information is negatively related to perceived personal efficacy to address 
climate change, but personal efficacy is positively linked to climate change concern 
(Kellstedt et al., 2008). The negative link between exposure to information and 
perceived efficacy in the United States has been attributed to media portrayals of the 
polarization of public opinion and ignorance of the scientific consensus on climate 
change (ibid.). However, in African contexts, clarifying how information about the 
causes and consequences of climate change influences such perceptions remains a 
question for further research. 
The social and normative context in which climate change information is encountered 
and processed is an additional factor that is likely to have important implications for 
61 
 
the link between encounter with information and willingness to engage in climate 
change-related behaviour. Against a backdrop of widespread ignorance of the relevance 
and immediacy of adverse climate change impacts, and externalization of the 
responsibility for mitigation action, unfavourable social norms may limit the 
effectiveness of awareness campaigns to motivate engagement in pro-environmental 
action. Further, the perceived corruption of public institutions and legacies of 
government suppression of political activism in African countries may be significant 
barriers to citizens’ willingness to engage in the behaviours that were represented in 
our studies. Therefore, to better assess the effects of information provision and 
knowledge, it is important to consider the modulating influence of such contextual 
factors on Africans’ perceptions of climate change and their willingness to engage in 
adaptation and mitigation behaviour. 
Limitations 
This research has a number of limitations that must be considered in the interpretation 
of my findings. Firstly, the effects of exposure to information were only tested using 
self-reported willingness to engage in climate change-related behaviour. Further studies 
involving experimental methods, longitudinal designs and measures of actual behaviour 
are needed to substantiate the current findings. Secondly, the measures of climate 
change knowledge showed poor to modest reliability (as determined by α < .70) across 
the three studies. Reliable psychometric measurement of factual knowledge is a long-
standing challenge for research following the knowledge-deficit paradigm (Bauer, 
Allum, & Miller, 2007). Formulating short unambiguous statements for which an 
authoritative answer can be determined is an empirical problem for many fields of 
science (ibid.). In this research, this problem is arguably exacerbated by poor 
conceptual understanding of climate change among the target population. For example, 
given the repeatedly documented conflation of climate change with ozone layer 
depletion and the greenhouse effect with hot steamy weather among African citizens 
(Cooke et al., 2010; Deane, 2009; Godfrey et al., 2010), one cannot be absolutely 
certain that participants respond to questions about climate change causes and impacts 
in relation to an accurate concept of climate change rather than an altogether different 
environmental issue7. The ubiquity of such misconceptions makes it difficult to achieve 
                                                 
7 31.3% and 40.6% of respondents answered affirmatively or were unsure about the statement: 
“Climate change is caused by Ozone layer depletion” in Study 1 and Study 2 respectively. 
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a high level of internal consistency even when using previously validated measures as 
demonstrated in Study 3. Nonetheless, this highlights the need for more basic research 
addressing public understanding of climate change in African contexts with a view to 
developing standardized and validated measures that can be used to accurately map the 
distribution of climate change knowledge in African societies and test models of the 
origins and effects of such knowledge.  
Conclusion     
The studies presented in this chapter show that exposure to information can help 
promote engagement in climate-change related pro-environmental behaviour by 
influencing the way people in Africa understand climate change and the level of threat 
posed to them. This result may seem fundamental and time-worn in an environmental 
research context dominated by WEIRD interests and priorities. Yet, it is of high 
pertinence in such areas as Africa; where awareness of climate change is still low and 
a large degree of change in attitudes and behaviour is required to achieve long-term 
resilience to climate change impacts.
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Chapter 3 
Flood experience, political affiliation and individual engagement with climate 
change in the United Kingdom8 
Introduction 
Research suggests that ‘proximizing’ climate change (i.e. framing the issue as more 
immediate, relevant and real) can help mobilize public support for mitigation and 
adaptation policies and promote pro-environmental behaviour (Lorenzoni et al., 2007; 
McDonald, Chai, & Newell, 2015; Spence et al., 2012). Proximizing climate change 
has the potential to motivate individuals to act pro-environmentally by (1) making 
climate change consequences more personally relevant and easier to visualize, (2) 
creating feelings of personal vulnerability and concern, and (3) decreasing the 
psychological distance of climate change among individuals with a responsibility or 
capacity for action (see Weber 2006; Brügger et al. 2015; Jones et al. 2017). Based on 
this premise, researchers have suggested that highlighting the links between local 
weather events and global climate change may be an effective strategy to proximize 
climate change and galvanize public action (Spence, Poortinga, Butler, & Pidgeon, 
2011; A. Taylor, de Bruin, & Dessai, 2014).  
Although it is practically impossible to detect the evidence of climate change through 
casual weather observations, personal experience of extreme weather events associated 
with climate change (such as flooding or heatwaves) has been linked to climate change 
belief, concern and willingness to act pro-environmentally (Akerlof, Maibach, 
Fitzgerald, Cedeno, & Neuman, 2013; Demski, Capstick, Pidgeon, Sposato, & Spence, 
2017; Konisky, Hughes, & Kaylor, 2015; Myers, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Akerlof, & 
Leiserowitz, 2013). However, there are also indications that many people see extreme 
weather and climate change as separate issues. Perceived vulnerability to extreme 
weather events may readily change in accordance with local experiences, but such 
change in perceptions does not invariably culminate in a shift in attitudes regarding 
                                                 
8 Parts of this chapter have been published in an article entitled: “The moderating role of political 
affiliation in the link between flooding experience and preparedness to reduce energy use”, by 
Ogunbode, C.A., Liu, Y. & Tausch, N. Climatic Change (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-017-
2089-7 
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climate change (Bruine de Bruin, Wong-Parodi, & Morgan, 2014; Dessai & Sims, 
2010; Whitmarsh, 2008).  
The evidence for the psychological effects of extreme weather experiences is seemingly 
beset by contradictions. This is due in part to flawed operationalisations of the concept 
in previous research (see also Demski et al. 2017) and a common neglect to account for 
key intervening variables, such as values and identities, that modulate the way people 
interpret their experiences with extreme weather (Fielding & Hornsey, 2016). In this 
chapter, I present a re-analysis of data from a prior study purporting a link between 
flood experience and preparedness to engage in climate change mitigation behaviour in 
the United Kingdom. I address the plausible moderating role of political affiliation in 
the relationship between extreme weather experience and climate change perceptions, 
and critically discuss the implications for efforts to harness personal experiences in 
promoting climate change engagement. Here, I use the term ‘climate change 
engagement’ to describe the collective cognitive, affective and conative dimensions of 
engagement including awareness, concern and motivation to act (Lorenzoni et al., 
2007). The empirical and conceptual considerations that guided my analysis are briefly 
discussed in the following sections. 
Disentangling ‘extreme weather experience’ from ‘climate change experience’ 
The purported association between extreme weather experiences and climate change 
attitudes appears more consistent when extreme weather experience is operationalised 
as ‘perceived personal experience of climate change or global warming’ (e.g., asking 
survey respondents if they have experienced “any extreme weather conditions that they 
interpret as caused by long-term, global climate change”: see Blennow, Persson, Tomé, 
& Hanewinkel, 2012) compared with unattributed measures of extreme weather 
experience (e.g. simply asking if respondents have experienced flooding: see Bruine de 
Bruin et al., 2014; Whitmarsh, 2008). Considering the challenges inherent in 
scientifically attributing any single weather event to global climate change (Hulme, 
2014), perceptions of a causal relationship between extreme weather and climate 
change among lay individuals reflects the involvement of subjective appraisal and 
attribution processes that likely exert unique influences on attitudes, over and above 
that of mere experience with extreme weather. In other words, ‘extreme weather 
experience’ is a step removed from ‘perceived personal experience of climate change’. 
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Conflating the links between either of these two constructs and climate change 
engagement is misleading because it spuriously inflates the inherent value of extreme 
weather experiences and subsumes the intervening roles of other factors that modulate 
how extreme weather events are interpreted and integrated into individuals’ beliefs, 
feelings and motivations.      
The social construction of extreme weather as indicative of climate change 
According to Reser et al. (2014), the interconnection between extreme weather patterns, 
the intensity and frequency of natural disasters, and the unfolding meteorological and 
geophysical impacts of climate change have imbued extreme weather events with a 
powerful ‘climate change signal’ in the context of human risk perception, experience 
and understanding. Extreme weather experiences can heighten climate change 
engagement by confirming pre-existing beliefs, increasing the salience of climate 
change, and enabling personal realization of the immediacy and reality of the problem 
among people who perceive this ‘signal’, (Akerlof et al., 2013; Myers et al., 2013; Reser 
et al., 2014). Extreme weather events can also create opportunities to teach people about 
climate change as individuals may become more attentive and receptive to education 
efforts following adverse personal experiences with extreme weather (Howe, Boudet, 
Leiserowitz, & Maibach, 2014; C. Lang & Ryder, 2016; Rudman, McLean, & Bunzl, 
2013). However, extreme weather experiences may fail to produce changes in climate 
change engagement when the event(s) experienced are not explicitly attributed to 
climate change (Reser et al., 2012); especially when engagement pertains to mitigation 
actions and policies (e.g., McCright et al. 2014; van der Linden 2014).  
Research shows that people situated in the same, or proximate, locations can have 
remarkably different perceptions of their experiences with the same extreme weather 
event(s) (Cutler, 2015; Shao, 2016). As academic debate on the psychological 
mechanisms that underlie the effects and constitution of extreme weather experiences 
continues to unfold with new evidence and perspectives, different streams of research 
have converged on the socially constructed nature of perceived ‘extreme weather’ with 
regard to societal interpretation of climatic trends and events (Goebbert, Jenkins-Smith, 
Klockow, Nowlin, & Silva, 2012; Hulme, Dessai, Lorenzoni, & Nelson, 2009). There 
is growing evidence that pre-existing values, beliefs and worldviews have a significant 
moderating influence on whether or not people perceive salient weather events to be 
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‘extreme’ or ‘unusual’ (Goebbert et al., 2012; Shao, 2016), or perceive their 
experiences with unusual weather to be consistent with trends expected from climate 
change (Capstick & Pidgeon, 2014). Indeed, the influence of political values and 
identification may eclipse that of objective climate extremes on climate change 
perceptions in some instances (Marquart-Pyatt, McCright, Dietz, & Dunlap, 2014). 
Nonetheless, irrespective of the moderating influence of social and personal 
psychological attributes, people tend to ascribe undue weight to perceived weather 
abnormalities; with the result that perceived experiences of abnormal weather, by and 
large, appear to give rise to greater climate change belief and concern (Zaval, Keenan, 
Johnson, & Weber, 2014).    
Objective weather has a weaker influence on climate change engagement than 
perceived weather (Shao, 2016). It seems evident that the impact of extreme weather 
experiences as triggers of climate change proximization and engagement is inextricably 
linked to the motivations that underlie variability in individuals’ predisposition to 
attribute extreme weather events to climate change. Therefore, it is necessary to identify 
the attributes that influence the likelihood that individuals will make causal attributions 
of extreme weather events to climate change, and assess if and how these attributes 
moderate the relationship between extreme weather experiences and climate change 
engagement. With these considerations in mind, I revisited previous research by Spence 
et al. (2011) in which a positive link was found between reported flood experience and 
preparedness to reduce energy use in a UK national sample. 
Prior research on perceptions of flooding and climate change in the United 
Kingdom 
Flooding is expected to be one of the main threats to UK communities resulting from 
climate change (DoH, 2001; Schaller et al., 2016). In a study by Spence et al. (2011), 
people with experience of local flooding reported greater perceived ability to address 
climate change (perceived instrumentality), higher levels of climate change concern, 
less uncertainty that climate change is occurring, and stronger perceptions of local 
vulnerability to climate change impacts compared to those without (Figure 9). 
Additionally, Spence et al. (2011) found that perceived instrumentality, concern and 
perceived local vulnerability positively mediated a link between flood experience and 
preparedness to reduce energy use. These findings were interpreted within the 
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framework of goal-setting theory. Goal-setting theory proposes that setting concrete, 
specific goals can boost individuals’ belief that their actions will lead to outcomes 
(perceived instrumentality) and increase their likelihood of taking subsequent action 
(Locke & Latham, 2002). On this basis, Spence et al. (2011) argued that experiences of 
extreme events such as flooding which can be attributed to climate change may help 
individuals better relate to climate change impacts and confer them with an increased 
sense of instrumentality, which in turn translates into greater preparedness to engage in 
actions that help tackle the issue. Although Spence et al. (2011) did not directly address 
the question of attribution, they proffered a statement that: “[the] relationships observed 
[….] may have developed in people’s understandings through the interaction between 
a series of major flooding events in the UK and the salience accorded to climate change 
in public life and discourse in recent years” (pg. 48).  
 
Figure 9. Effect of flood experience on preparedness to reduce energy use 
mediated by perceived instrumentality, concern, uncertainty and perceived 
vulnerability. Age, gender and socio-economic grade were included as covariates in the 
analysis and observed effects are net of their impact. Values are unstandardized regression 
estimates with solid lines indicating paths significant at p < 0.05 (Adapted from Spence et al. 
2011).  
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Following a run of exceptionally severe storms and flooding across the UK in 
December 2013 and January 2014, Capstick et al. (2015) also conducted a survey of 
public perceptions of the climate change using a nationally representative sample. Like 
Spence et al. (2011), they found that people with direct experience of the floods were 
more likely to see their local area as vulnerable to climate change impacts and were 
more likely to view climate change as a serious threat to themselves and their family. 
Most respondents (64%) in Capstick et al.’s (2015) survey agreed that the floods had 
been caused in part by climate change, and a greater majority (72%) agreed that the 
floods demonstrated what could be expected from climate change in the future. 
Interestingly, 45% of respondents in the study agreed with the notion that ‘it is 
impossible to link a single weather event with climate change’, compared with 33% 
who disagreed. Capstick et al.’s (2015) findings show that a considerable proportion of 
UK residents are not naïve to the difficulty inherent in scientifically establishing a 
causal link between extreme weather and climate change, yet many perceive climate 
change to be implicated in their experience of unusually severe flooding.  
Similarly, Demski et al. (2017) found that UK residents with direct experience of 
flooding as a consequence of the 2013/2014 winter storms reported greater levels of 
negative emotional responses to flooding, perceived risk from climate change and 
personal salience of the issue. Interestingly, they also found that some of these changes 
in perceptions and emotions not only mediated a link between flood experience and 
behavioural responses to climate change, but also a link between flood experience and 
adaptation intentions regarding heatwaves - a different weather event potentially linked 
with climate change. These findings were speculatively interpreted as evidence that 
flood experiences increase the cognitive availability of climate change (i.e. they make 
climate change more tangible); and in so doing prompt support for climate change 
policies and intentions to personally engage in mitigation and adaptation behaviours.     
However, other research in the UK (Hamilton-Webb, Manning, Naylor, & Conway, 
2016; Whitmarsh, 2008) addressing the link between flood experience and climate 
change engagement has produced some contrasting findings. Prior to Spence et al.’s 
(2011) study, Whitmarsh (2008) found no significant differences in perceived 
vulnerability to climate change or actions taken to address the issue between flood and 
non-flood victims in the south of England. More recently, Hamilton-Webb et al. (2016) 
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found that while flood experience was significantly associated with climate change 
concern and behavioural responses in a sample of UK farmers, mitigation actions such 
as reducing energy use and increasing use of minimum tillage were largely being 
undertaken as part of normal practice rather than with the intention of addressing 
climate change. In both studies, climate change was the least cited perceived cause of 
flooding, compared with other locally observable factors such as lack of watercourse 
maintenance. Though, Hamilton-Webb et al. (2016) observed that farmers who were 
reducing their energy use were also more likely to believe that climate change is a major 
cause of flooding in the UK. The authors of these two studies concluded that personal 
values appeared to be more important than experience in determining the way people 
engage with flooding in the context of climate change.  
The current research: conceptual framework and hypotheses 
The notion of climate change is a statistical abstraction. Research suggests that people 
typically prefer to constitute their attitudes from information gained through 
experiences of directly observable trends and events than expend the additional amount 
of cognitive effort required to process abstract climate change information (Myers et 
al., 2013; Weber, 2006). Inferring the evidence of climate change from experience is 
not only less cognitively demanding than analytical processing of abstract statistical 
information, it also occurs more rapidly and has a stronger influence on attitudes and 
perceptions (Myers et al., 2013). However, experiential processing of climate change-
related evidence is often guided by values (Hornsey, Harris, Bain, & Fielding, 2016; 
Kahan, 2013). More specifically, social identity – as a function of membership in social 
groups with shared fundamental values (e.g. political and ideological groups), operates 
as a filter in climate change information processing and assimilation (Fielding & 
Hornsey, 2016; Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, & Braman, 2011).  
According to social identity and self-categorization theories, individuals internalize the 
values and norms of the groups they belong to by incorporating their social identity, as 
group members, into their self-concept (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987a). 
Through this process, political and ideological group membership provide a template 
of beliefs and norms that prescribe and describe prototypical in-group views on key 
issues (Fielding & Hornsey, 2016). Consequently, when people perceive themselves in 
terms of membership in such groups, they assimilate to the group prototype – i.e., their 
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attitudes and beliefs become regulated by the norms and standards associated with the 
salient social identity (Rabinovich, Morton, Postmes, & Verplanken, 2012). Political 
and ideological group identity can be expected to modulate perceptions of climate 
change to the extent that they influence whether or not individuals perceive relevant 
events as unnatural or a reason to act (Hahnel & Brosch, 2016). Indeed, research shows 
that political affiliation and ideological orientation are significantly linked to the way 
people perceive flooding and other extreme weather events (Cutler, 2015; L. C. 
Hamilton, Wake, Hartter, Safford, & Puchlopek, 2016), as well as their climate change 
beliefs and willingness to act pro-environmentally (Gromet, Kunreuther, & Larrick, 
2013; L. C. Hamilton & Stampone, 2013; McCright & Dunlap, 2011; McCright, 
Dunlap, & Marquart-Pyatt, 2016; Whitmarsh, 2011).  
Research in the United States has consistently revealed a strong effect of political 
orientation on climate change views, whereby Democrats and liberals express greater 
concern about climate change and report beliefs about climate change that are more 
consistent with mainstream science than Republicans and conservatives (e.g., 
Marquart-Pyatt et al., 2014; McCright & Dunlap, 2011). Similarly, Conservative voters 
and individuals with a right-leaning ideological views have been shown to exhibit 
greater levels of scepticism about climate change on average than their liberal or 
politically left-leaning counterparts in the UK (B. Clements, 2012; Poortinga et al., 
2011; Whitmarsh, 2011). These findings suggest that variations in climate change belief 
and concern may be normatively associated with partisan and ideological identification. 
Therefore, I hypothesized that political affiliation significantly modulates the likelihood 
that people see a link between flooding and climate change, as well as the relationship 
between flood experience and climate change attitudes. Specifically, I hypothesized 
that supporters of the Conservative party and other right-leaning parties are less likely 
to see flooding as linked to climate change than supporters of Labour, Liberal 
Democrats or other left-leaning parties (H1). Further, I hypothesized that the 
relationship between flooding experience and climate change attitudes will be weaker 
among supporters of the Conservatives and other right-leaning parties, due to the 
normative association of such political identities with scepticism about climate change 
(H2). I tested these hypotheses by comparing reported flood experience and climate 
change attitudes among sub-populations of left- and right-leaning voters in Spence et 
al.’s (2011) dataset.   
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Method 
 Data 
A detailed summary of the sampling, survey instruments development, and data 
collection procedures is provided in Spence et al.’s (2011) report. The data used in my 
analysis were supplied by the first author of the report on request. According to Spence 
et al. (2011), the survey instrument was developed by a team of four academic 
researchers. It was further refined with input from a partner social research company 
and an expert advisory panel comprising academic researchers, members of relevant 
government departments and members of third-sector groups. Data collection was 
conducted by the social research company using computer-assisted personal interviews 
between 5 January and 2 March 2010, with each interview taking approximately 30 
minutes to complete. A nationally representative quota sample (N = 1,822) of the 
population of Great Britain (i.e., England, Scotland and Wales) was obtained.  
 Data analysis 
Using respondents’ reported voting intentions, I categorised those who indicated 
“Labour”, “Liberal Democrat” or “Green” as left leaning voters (N = 532), and those 
who indicated “British National Party (BNP)”, “Conservative” or “UK Independent 
Party (UKIP)” as right leaning voters (N = 416). The placement of the parties on the 
left-right political spectrum was based on data from public polls conducted by YouGov 
– a major internet-based market research company – over a period of 12 years preceding 
that in which Spence et al.’s (2011) survey was conducted (Dahlgreen, 2014). 
Respondents in YouGov’s polls were asked to place each political party and themselves 
on a left-right scale ranging from “very left-wing” (-100) to “very right-wing” (100). 
I compared reported flood experience, perceived personal experience with climate 
change, and mean levels of climate change attitudes across both groups of voters with 
chi-square and t tests. I also assessed the equivalence of Spence et al.’s (2011) multiple-
mediation model (Figure 1)  ̶  which links flood experience with preparedness to reduce 
energy use through perceived instrumentality, concern, uncertainty about climate 
change and perceived vulnerability  ̶  across the two groups with multi-group path 
analysis. Extending Spence et al.’s (2011) analysis, I further examined their model 
using an alternative outcome variable, willingness to pay higher prices for energy 
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efficient products, and examined the equivalence of the multiple mediation for the two 
groups of voters using this measure. 
I specified the multiple-mediation model in AMOS 22 following the procedure detailed 
by Spence et al. (2011); all mediator residuals were allowed to co-vary freely and the 
demographic factors (age, gender and social grade) were included as covariates in the 
model. I tested the equivalence of the model for right and left-leaning voters by 
comparing a model in which all structural paths were constrained to be equal for both 
groups with one in which they were allowed to vary freely, using chi-square difference 
tests. Subsequently, I assessed the equivalence of each path in the model by comparing 
the fully constrained model with a constrained model in which only one path was 
allowed to vary freely at a time. I estimated the specific indirect effects of flood 
experience conveyed through the mediators using the PROCESS macro for regression-
based tests of mediation, moderation and conditional processes (Hayes, 2013) as was 
done by Spence et al. (2011). Items used in this analysis and descriptive statistics for 
each group are presented in Table 3.1. 
 Missing data 
There was a small proportion of missing data (<5%) on some of the variables and list-
wise deletion was used in the chi-square and t-tests. However, I estimated the multiple 
mediation model in AMOS 22 using two versions of the dataset; one in which list-wise 
deletion was applied and another in which the missing values were replaced with the 
regression imputation method (Arbuckle, 2013). There were no substantive differences 
in the results obtained using either dataset. Hence, here I report the results obtained 
using the imputed data for the multigroup comparisons. 
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Table 3.1. Experience and climate change attitude measures with descriptive and 
comparative statistics for left and right-leaning voters 
 Political Affiliation 
Total (N) 
Left-Leaning Right-Leaning 
Have you personally 
experienced flooding 
in your local area 
recently or not? 
Yes 113 98 211 
No 413 316 729 
Total (N) Pearson Χ2(1) = 0.64, p = 0.425 526 414 940 
     
Have you personally 
noticed any signs of 
climate change 
during your lifetime? 
Yes 339 219 558 
No 173 186 359 
Don’t Know 20 11 31 
Total (N) Pearson Χ2(2) = 14.92, p = 
0.001 
532 416 948 
     
Cited sign of climate 
change 
No sign witnessed 193 197 390 
Other event cited 284 183 467 
Flooding cited 55 36 91 
Total (N) Pearson Χ2(2) = 11.84, p = 
0.003 
532 416 948 
 
Construct Itemsβ M(SD)β t(df) 
Perceived 
instrumentality 
(α = 0.76) 
‘I can personally help to 
reduce climate change by 
changing my behaviour, 
3.54 (1.05) 3.17 (1.07) 
5.24 
(879.58)*** ‘I personally feel that I can 
make a difference with regard 
to climate change’ 
Concern about 
climate change 
‘How concerned if at all are 
you about climate change, 
sometimes referred to as global 
warming?’ 
3.03 (0.90) 2.74 (0.96) 
4.65 
(846.40)*** 
Uncertainty over 
climate change 
‘I am uncertain that climate 
change is really happening’ 
2.35 (1.23) 2.67 (1.25) -3.93(936)*** 
Perceived local 
vulnerability 
‘My local area is likely to be 
affected by climate change’ 
3.32 (1.17) 3.17 (1.21) 1.90 (919) † 
Preparedness to 
reduce energy use 
‘I am prepared to greatly 
reduce my energy use to help 
tackle climate change’ 
3.70 (1.03) 3.42 (1.09) 
3.96 
(841.88)*** 
Preparedness to pay 
for energy efficiency 
‘I am prepared to pay 
significantly more for energy 
efficient products’ 
3.20 (1.22) 2.94 (1.15) 3.34 (935)** 
β Responses to perceived instrumentality, uncertainty, perceived local vulnerability and preparedness to 
reduce energy use items were recorded using a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree); 
concern about climate change was recorded with a 4-point scale (1 = not at all concerned, 4 = very 
concerned), †p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Results 
Left-leaning voters were no more likely to report having had a personal experience of 
local flooding than right-leaning voters (χ 2 (1, 940) = 0.64, p = 0.425). However, the 
former were more likely to report having noticed signs of climate change in their 
lifetime (χ 2 (1, 917) = 13.98, p < 0.001). In line with my hypothesis (H1), they were also 
more likely to cite flooding when prompted to state what signs they had witnessed (χ 2 
(2, 948) = 11.84, p = 0.003). While this does not directly address the question of whether 
respondents attributed their recent experience of local flooding to climate change, it 
provides some indication that the likelihood of seeing a link between flooding and 
climate change covaries with political affiliation. There were also significant 
differences in climate change attitudes between the two categories of voters; with left-
leaning voters reporting greater perceived instrumentality, concern, willingness to 
reduce energy use, preparedness to pay more for energy efficient products and less 
uncertainty about climate change (Table 3.1). 
As expected (H2), I found that Spence et al.’s (2011) mediation model (Figure 10) of 
the relationship between flood experience, climate change perceptions and 
preparedness to reduce energy use was not equivalent for left and right-leaning voters 
(∆χ2 (24, 934)= 46.05, p = 0.004). The total indirect effect of flood experience on 
preparedness to reduce energy use via climate change perceptions was significant 
among left-leaning (B = 0.07, SE = 0.03, 95% CI (0.02, 0.13), N = 491), but not right-
leaning voters (B = 0.07, SE = 0.04, 95% CI (-0.01, 0.15), N = 371). Perceived 
instrumentality (B = 0.04, SE = 0.02, 95% CI (0.00, 0.08)) and uncertainty about climate 
change (B = 0.01, SE = 0.01, 95% CI (0.00, 0 .03)) significantly mediated the 
relationship between flood experience and preparedness to reduce energy use only 
among left-leaning voters. I also found that only the path linking uncertainty about 
climate change and preparedness to reduce energy use in Spence et al.’s (2011) model 
differed significantly for left and right-leaning voters (∆χ2 (1, 934)= 6.58, p = 0.010). 
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Figure 10. Effect of flooding experience on preparedness to reduce energy 
mediated by perceived instrumentality, concern, uncertainty and perceived 
vulnerability. Italicized values below the paths are unstandardized regression estimates for 
right-leaning voters (Conservative, BNP, UKIP; N = 400), and values above paths are 
unstandardized regression estimates for left-leaning voters (Labour, Liberal Democrat, Green; 
N = 532). Estimates are based on bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals using 1,000 bootstrap 
resamples. “*” denotes paths significant at p<0.05. 
Similarly, a multiple mediation model linking flood experience, climate change 
perceptions and willingness to pay higher prices for energy efficient products (Figure 
11) was not equivalent for left and right-leaning voters (∆χ2 (24, 934) = 46.89, p = 0.003). 
However, the total indirect effect of flood experience on willingness to pay higher 
prices for energy efficient products was significant among both left-leaning (B = 0.07, 
SE = 0.03, 95% CI (0.02, 0.13), N = 534) and right-leaning voters (B = 0.04, SE = 0.02, 
95%CI (0.00, 0.09), N = 400). Among left-leaning voters, only perceived 
instrumentality significantly mediated the link between flood experience and 
willingness to pay higher prices for energy efficient products (B = 0.04, SE = 0.02, 95% 
CI (0.00, 0.08)), while perceived local vulnerability to climate change mediated the link 
between flood experience and willingness to pay higher prices for energy efficient 
76 
 
  
Figure 11. Effect of flooding experience on preparedness to pay for energy efficient 
products mediated by perceived instrumentality, concern, uncertainty and 
perceived vulnerability. Italicized values below the paths are unstandardized regression 
estimates for right-leaning voters (Conservative, BNP, UKIP; N = 400), and values above paths 
are unstandardized regression estimates for left-leaning voters (Labour, Liberal Democrat, 
Green; N = 532). Estimates are based on bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals using 1,000 
bootstrap resamples. “*” denotes paths significant at p<0.05. 
products among right-leaning voters (B = 0.02, SE = 0.01, 95%CI (0.00, 0.05)). 
Interestingly, there was a significant difference between both groups of voters in the 
path linking perceived instrumentality with preparedness to pay more for energy 
efficient products (∆χ2 (1, 934) = 10.86, p = 0.001), as well as the path linking uncertainty 
about climate change with preparedness to pay more for energy efficient products (∆χ2 
(1, 934) = 4.61, p = 0.032). Detailed results of the multi-group path comparisons are 
presented in Appendix 5. Overall, these findings indicate that the way flood experience 
affects people’s climate change perceptions and action intentions varies systematically 
depending on their political affiliation; and plausibly in line with their pre-existing 
views and ideologies.  
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Discussion 
The political and ideological polarization of public views on climate change is well 
documented in the United States (Bliuc et al., 2015; McCright & Dunlap, 2011), and to 
a lesser extent in Europe (McCright et al., 2016). Individuals have a tendency to 
interpret and assimilate climate change-related information in ways that correspond 
with their pre-existing values and political loyalties (Hornsey et al., 2016; Kahan, 
2013). This tendency – which is broadly termed motivated cognition, is underpinned by 
the appropriation of normative views and attitudes associated with salient social 
identities and group memberships as a lens through which information is processed and 
incorporated into personal beliefs (Fielding & Hornsey, 2016; Hahnel & Brosch, 2016). 
Motivated cognition is also linked to individuals’ desire to maintain congruence 
between their beliefs and the values they share with significant others (Kahan, 2013). 
Based on this, the objective of this study was to examine the modulating role of political 
affiliation, a commonly salient form of social identity with regard to environmental 
issues, in the link between flood experience and climate change attitudes. To an extent, 
my findings reflect a systematic pattern of differences in the way individuals with 
politically left- and right-wing affiliations are influenced by their experiences with 
flooding. 
In line with the cultural cognition thesis (Kahan, 2013; Kahan et al., 2011), it appears 
that people ‘learn’ from their experiences with flooding in ways that produce climate 
change attitudes that are consistent with their shared values. Where experience of local 
flooding appeared to contribute indirectly to increasing preparedness to reduce energy 
use by reducing uncertainty about climate change and increasing perceived 
instrumentality among left-leaning voters, this effect was not obtained among right-
leaning voters. Therefore, it seems plausible that the influence of flood experience on 
climate change engagement – as reflected in preparedness to reduce energy use, is 
weaker among right-leaning voters, since this demographic has been shown to have 
greater levels of climate change scepticism in the UK (Whitmarsh, 2011).   
Although my analyses showed that left-leaning voters were more likely to report having 
witnessed signs of climate change and cite flooding as a sign of climate change, it is 
not clear that the significant indirect relationship between flooding experience and 
willingness to reduce energy use among this group is simply due to the way they 
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attribute their experience of flooding. In both groups of voters, local flooding 
experience was positively linked with perceived local vulnerability to climate change, 
negatively linked with uncertainty that climate change is happening, and indirectly 
linked with preparedness to pay more for energy efficient products, which suggests that 
flood experiences have a significant impact on climate change attitudes irrespective of 
political affiliation (or the underlying values and identities they reflect). Therefore, I 
will further explore the unique influence of attribution on the link between flood 
experience and climate change attitudes using experimental methods in Chapter 4.   
In contrast to Spence et al.’s (2011) findings, flooding experience had no significant 
link with perceived instrumentality, and the positive link with uncertainty about climate 
change did not translate to greater willingness to reduce energy use, among right-
leaning voters in my analysis. On the other hand, flood experience was indirectly linked 
to preparedness to pay more for energy efficient products among both left and right-
leaning voters. This link was mediated by perceived instrumentality for left-leaning 
voters and perceived vulnerability for right-leaning voters. This may be indicative of 
biases in respondents’ processing of flood experience by their beliefs about the causes 
of climate change. While left-leaning voters are more likely to believe that climate 
change is driven by human activities, right-leaning voters tend to see climate change as 
a natural process (e.g., McCright & Dunlap, 2011; Weber & Stern, 2011)9. Therefore, 
even though local flood experiences may generally promote perceptions of climate 
change as a certain and proximate threat, support for mitigation strategies such as 
reducing energy use may be less likely to result via perceived instrumentality among 
right-leaning voters with greater levels of pre-existing scepticism about the 
anthropogenic nature of climate change. Whereas, the mediating role of perceived 
vulnerability in the link between flood experience and willingness to pay more for 
energy efficient products among left leaning voters may be attenuated by arguably 
greater pre-existing levels of perceived vulnerability to climate change. 
Given an understanding that values and identity function as filters in information 
processing (Fielding & Hornsey, 2016; Kahan et al., 2011), simply highlighting the 
links between extreme weather and climate change is unlikely to be a broadly effective 
                                                 
9 Right-leaning voters (28.61%) were more likely to indicate that climate change is not happening/not 
anthropogenic than left-leaning voters (19.73%) in the current sample (χ2(1) = 9.92, p = 0.002). 
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strategy for promoting climate change engagement. Information which supports climate 
change knowledge and understanding is unlikely to be politically neutral (Gavin, 
Leonard-Milsom, & Montgomery, 2011), and political affiliation can have a 
considerable influence on how individuals interpret their experience with extreme 
weather in relation to climate change (Givens, 2014; Hahnel & Brosch, 2016). Further, 
identification with a political group makes individuals susceptible to align their 
judgments and actions to the standards of their affiliated political group; to the extent 
that political affiliation may have a greater influence on climate change-related 
judgments than the combination of personal experience, values and ideology (Cohen, 
2003; Hahnel & Brosch, 2016). Therefore, while Spence et al.’s (2011) argument that 
flood experience confers a sense of personal efficacy and greater preparedness to reduce 
energy use may hold true for left-leaning voters - whose politics normatively endorse 
belief in anthropogenic climate change and engagement in mitigation actions, my 
findings suggest that these outcomes may not be achieved to the same extent, or may 
be achieved via different psychological routes, among right-leaning voters.  
Nevertheless, drawing on local weather events as a means of proximizing climate 
change remains a promising strategy. My analysis showed that flood experience was 
significantly linked with lower uncertainty about climate change and greater perceived 
vulnerability to climate change impacts among both left- and right-leaning voters. 
Educational interventions that link local extreme weather events with global climate 
change may successfully build on such experiences to help people better understand the 
causes and consequences of climate change (e.g., Zhao et al. 2013). Additionally, the 
fluid and context-dependent nature of social identities provides opportunities to 
circumvent the challenge posed by antagonistic political affiliations by exploiting such 
resources as in-group messengers, and communication strategies that promote pro-
environmental in-group norms and link social identity with pro-environmental 
outcomes (Fielding & Hornsey, 2016). For example, reframing mitigation activities as 
improving technological and economic advancement, rather than averting climate 
change risks, has been shown to significantly increase motivation to act pro-
environmentally among political groups that typically exhibit high levels of climate 
change scepticism (Bain et al. 2012). Similarly, messages that appeal to the 
‘conservative’ value of reducing waste and patriotic support for low carbon 
technologies as “Great British Energy” were found to reduce scepticism and elicit broad 
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support, while social justice framing – a narrative commonly employed in current 
climate change communication, produced political polarization among audiences in the 
UK (Whitmarsh & Corner, 2017).  
It should be noted that the current research has some limitations. Firstly, due to the 
cross-sectional nature of the data, it is impossible to establish causal interrelationships 
between flood experience, climate change perceptions and willingness to reduce energy 
use among the sample. Although the results are consistent with my proposition that the 
link between extreme weather experiences and climate change perceptions and action 
motivations vary systematically depending on political affiliation, longitudinal studies 
are needed to further substantiate the current findings. Secondly, the possibility that 
prior experiences with flooding (or other extreme weather events) may have influenced 
participants’ reported voting intentions and climate change attitudes in the survey 
cannot be ruled out. However, considering that there was no significant difference 
between left- and right-leaning voters in their reported experiences of local flooding, 
and left-leaning voters were more likely to cite flooding as a sign of climate change, it 
seems more likely that political affiliation moderates the interpretation of flood 
experiences and their consequent effects on attitudes.   
The significant differences (in multigroup path analysis) between left and right-leaning 
voters in my re-analysis of Spence et al.’s (2011) model were the paths linking 
scepticism with willingness to reduce energy use and preparedness to pay more for 
energy efficient products; and the path linking perceived instrumentality with 
preparedness to pay more for energy efficient products. Scepticism about the reality 
and drivers of climate change is plausibly the most politically divisive aspect of climate 
change perceptions (with consequent implications for individuals’ willingness to 
engage in mitigation actions) in the UK, rather than the attribution of flooding with 
regard to climate change (c.f. Marquart-Pyatt et al. 2014). Subsequent research 
exploring whether similar patterns are observed in relation to other mitigation actions 
could yield some broader insights into determining how individuals’ political affiliation 
relates to their preparedness to act pro-environmentally. It would also be informative to 
determine if experiences with other extreme weather events such, as heatwaves, in the 
UK affect climate change risk perceptions and uncertainty across different political 
groupings as was observed with flooding in this study. 
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Conclusion 
My results support previous indications that integrating interactions between political 
affiliation and extreme weather experience into predictive models of mitigation and 
adaptation intentions can lend valuable nuance and greater accuracy to assessments of 
the effects of such experiences on climate change engagement in the UK (Capstick, 
Whitmarsh, Poortinga, Pidgeon, & Upham, 2015; Demski et al., 2017). Irrespective of 
the modulating influence of politics, it is unlikely that a strategy of proximizing climate 
change through experiences with extreme weather alone will be sufficient to build and 
sustain positive climate change engagement since a focus on climate change risks can 
lead to maladaptive responses including desensitization, denial and defensiveness 
(Brügger et al., 2015). Therefore, more research is needed to determine how extreme 
weather experiences can be combined with other climate change communication 
strategies to maximize and broaden their positive influence on individuals’ attitudes 
and motivations.
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Chapter 4 
Exploring the effects of a mentally simulated experience of flooding on climate 
change engagement 
Introduction 
Flooding is expected to be one of the main impacts on UK communities to result from 
climate change (DoH, 2001). As discussed in Chapter 3, personal experiences with local 
flooding can promote engagement with climate change (Spence, Poortinga, Butler, & 
Pidgeon, 2011; Taylor, de Bruin, & Dessai, 2014), particularly among people with 
values and ideological leanings that are normatively congruent with belief in 
anthropogenic climate change and pursuing the goal of climate change mitigation. To 
better understand the conditions in which flood experiences can be marshalled to boost 
public concern and willingness to act on climate change, it is necessary to further probe 
the influence of values, and determine how they guide the way individuals integrate 
experiential information into their personal attitudes and beliefs. Drawing on previous 
research showing that imagined situations can have similar effects as real-life situations 
on cognition, affective responses and behaviour (e.g., Crisp & Turner, 2009; 
Greenwood, 1989), I operationalized flood experiences in this chapter using a mentally 
simulated personal experience of flooding. This was used as a means to test more 
specific hypotheses regarding how flood experience interacts with pre-existing values 
and beliefs in determining individuals’ responses to climate change.        
In the absence of direct familiarity with risks, people often draw on indirect or vicarious 
experiences (Marx et al., 2007). One of the ways in which people vicariously 
experience extreme weather and climate change is through exposure to cinematic 
material such as films and documentaries (Sakellari, 2015). This form of visual media 
has immediacy and allows people empathically process climate change information like 
they were with the characters acting/speaking (Howell, 2014). Like direct experiences, 
visual media can promote the psychological availability of climate change information 
and elicit powerful affective responses with important implications for subsequent 
actions and decision-making (Leiserowitz, 2004). However, the effectiveness of 
cinematic productions in changing attitudes toward climate change may be limited by 
a common practice of framing climate change in apocalyptic terms, as well as audience 
perceptions of the credibility of films as sources of scientific information. To avoid 
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these pitfalls, I utilized a method of visualising extreme weather in a manner that affords 
people the perspective of an actor in the event, rather than that of a vicarious observer.  
In subsequent sections of this introduction, I briefly review prior research on the 
psychological effects of cinematic portrayals of climate change. I discuss how the use 
of fear arousal and catastrophe narratives, and public (dis)trust in the scientific 
credibility of film producers, may limit the effectiveness of films as instruments for 
encouraging climate change engagement. Next, I discuss the role of personal 
experiences as a source of mental imagery and the importance of mental imagery as an 
element of public climate change discourse. This is followed by an exposition on the 
concept of mental imagery and applications of mental imagery and mental simulation 
across various fields of psychology. Lastly, I outline the considerations and predictions 
that guided my studies. 
Experiencing extreme weather and climate change vicariously through cinematic 
visual media: effects and limitations    
Research shows that vicarious experiences with natural disasters and extreme weather 
through cinematographic depictions can increase climate change awareness, concern 
and motivation to act in the short term (Howell, 2011; Jacobsen, 2011; Lowe, 2006; 
Lowe et al., 2006). Prominent climate change films like The Day After Tomorrow 
(2004), An Inconvenient Truth (2006) and The Age of Stupid (2009) use dramatic 
images and fictional or true stories to engage audiences with climate change mitigation 
(Manzo, 2017; Weik von Mossner, 2013). Imagery plays a key role in cognitive and 
affective information processing (Leiserowitz, 2006; Marx et al., 2007), and visual 
media have been described as having the power to instantaneously convey motivating 
messages by condensing complex information, contributing to people’s memory and 
awareness, and providing a basis for personal thoughts and conversations (Nicholson-
Cole, 2005).  
Cinematic representations of climate change are recognizably grounded in the 
knowledge-deficit model; insofar that they reflect an assumption that public ignorance 
is a primary reason for the lack of engagement with climate change, and that this can 
be resolved by bolstering public knowledge (Nolan, 2010; Sakellari, 2015). Further, 
climate change films affectively engage their audience through evocations of personal 
loss (Hammond & Breton, 2014), and seek to draw on the motivational influence of 
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fear by representing the consequences of climate change with apocalyptic and 
catastrophe narratives (Morrison & Hatfield-Dodds, 2011; Sakellari, 2015).  
However, the fear of catastrophe has limited effectiveness when dealing with future-
located threats, such as climate change, because the severity of predicted dangers does 
not correlate with everyday knowledge and direct experience of present circumstances 
(Hammond & Breton, 2014). While catastrophe frames may successfully engage 
audiences who already have a level of awareness and concern about climate change 
(Howell, 2011), fear-inducing communication can also undermine perceptions of 
personal efficacy, decrease trust in the information source (O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 
2009), and cause less engaged individuals to become more apathetic toward climate 
change (Morrison & Hatfield-Dodds, 2011).  
Additionally, climate change communication is as much a ‘knowledge deficit’ problem 
as it is one of ‘trust deficit’ (Sakellari, 2015). Public distrust in government, industrial 
agencies and science has long posed a challenge to environmental risk communication 
(Slovic, 1993; Trettin & Musham, 2000). Regardless of the volume or veracity of facts 
provided, the persuasiveness of climate change communication depends largely on the 
extent to which the audience perceive the information and information source to be 
trustworthy (Hmielowski, Feldman, Myers, Leiserowitz, & Maibach, 2014; Malka et 
al., 2009). Because science on screen is often inaccurate (Perkowitz, 2013), many 
people may not perceive climate change films to be a credible source of information. 
Consequently, the effectiveness of climate change films in promoting and reinforcing 
pro-environmental attitudes may be limited to highly engaged individuals who already 
accept the mainstream scientific consensus on climate change (Howell, 2011; Morrison 
& Hatfield-Dodds, 2011). 
Irrespective of the limitations of climate change films, visual media are an appropriate, 
and often optimal, way to present information when taking into account human 
cognitive capabilities (Boomsma, Pahl, & Andrade, 2016; Tufte, 1990). Images help 
transform abstract issues into something that can be visualised and responded to; 
thereby playing a key role in the way people perceive complex real-world issues 
(O’Neill & Smith, 2014). Further, climate change attitudes and perceptions appear to 
be linked to individuals’ mental imagery of the problem (Boomsma et al., 2016), and 
research in the United States suggests that affective mental imagery is a strong predictor 
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of climate change risk perceptions and policy preferences (Leiserowitz, 2006; Smith & 
Leiserowitz, 2012). In the next section, I briefly discuss the relationship between 
personal experience and mental imagery in the context of societal responses to climate 
change. I use this discussion as a background to subsequently introduce the potential 
value of mental simulation as a vehicle to tap into the experiential processing system 
without succumbing to some of the limitations associated with cinematic media.     
Personal experience, mental imagery and engagement with climate change 
Although both direct and vicarious personal experiences can influence subsequent 
behaviour through experiential processes such as affect and availability heuristics 
(Marx et al., 2007)10, people tend to ascribe more weight to direct experiences when 
forming beliefs about environmental risks (Viscusi & Zeckhauser, 2015; Weber, 2006). 
Therefore, individuals with a direct experience of flooding and other extreme weather 
events that can be linked to climate change are less likely to discount the risk of negative 
climate change impacts than those who vicariously obtain such experiences (Viscusi & 
Zeckhauser, 2015). Nonetheless, direct and vicarious personal experiences contribute 
strongly to people’s conception and mental visualization of climate change. Highly 
imageable phenomena such as unusual weather events are typically salient aspects of 
climate change, and public climate change discourse draws heavily on local experiences 
of such events; plausibly due to a need to identify abstract climate change with familiar 
and concrete examples (Nicholson-Cole, 2005). Personal experiences also overlap with 
people’s imaginative representations of climate change and the mental imagery 
conjured by both of these influences plays a significant role in determining climate 
change perceptions and behavioural choices (Nicholson-Cole, 2005).  
Harnessing mental imagery: A brief review of theoretical and applied 
perspectives 
Mental imagery refers to perceptual experience in the absence of sensory input, and is 
commonly described as ‘seeing with the mind’s eye’ or ‘hearing with the mind’s ear’ 
etc. (Ji, Heyes, MacLeod, & Holmes, 2016; Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001). 
Mental images do not only result from the recall of previously perceived objects and 
                                                 
10The affect heuristic (also known as “risk as feelings”) refers to a reliance on the positive or negative 
feelings associated with a stimulus when making judgments about, or acting in response to, the 
stimulus (Loewenstein et al., 2001). The availability heuristic is a rule of thumb that allows people to 
solve problems based on what they remember and how easily the memory is retrieved, i.e. how readily 
available the memory is (Marx et al., 2007). 
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events, they can also be created by combining and modifying stored perceptual 
information in novel ways (Kosslyn et al., 2001). Mental imagery is considered a core 
component of the ‘prospective brain’, which enables the simulation of hypothetical or 
future events based on prior knowledge and experience (Ji et al., 2016; Moulton & 
Kosslyn, 2009; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008). According to Moulton and Kosslyn 
(2009), mental imagery is best understood in terms of mental simulation. In this respect, 
it can be understood as the episodic construction of a hypothetical scenario that mimics 
perception and evokes cognitive and affective associations, consequently allowing us 
to answer ‘what if’ questions by making the likely consequences of performing a 
specific action or being in a specific situation explicit and accessible (Ji et al., 2016; 
Moulton & Kosslyn, 2009). 
Mental imagery derives motivational power, in part, from being linked to emotions, and 
this link arises from the ability of mental imagery to simulate reality. According to Lang 
(1977, 1979), a mental imagery representation of an emotionally charged stimulus (e.g. 
a snake) activates an associative network of stored information that overlaps with that 
activated during actual experience of the stimulus (i.e., encountering a snake). This 
associative network consists of perceptual information about the stimulus (colour, 
shape and size of the snake), semantic information about what it means (danger, 
venomous bite), somatovisceral response information about what it feels like to 
encounter the stimulus (fear, racing heart), and preparatory motor responses evoked by 
the encounter (e.g., muscles tensing to flee from the snake) (P. J. Lang, 1987). Based 
on this overlap in perceptual information between imagined and real stimuli, Lang 
(1977, 1979) further postulated that imagined interaction with stimuli can be used as a 
template for conditioning emotional and behavioural responses to real-life interactions 
with the same stimuli. This proposal is supported by a considerable amount of empirical 
evidence. For example, distressing mental imagery has been shown to be symptomatic 
of a range of anxiety and mood disorders (Burnett Heyes, Lau, & Holmes, 2013; 
Holmes & Mathews, 2010), and research shows that mental imagery cues can used to 
elicit positive emotions (Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, & Mackintosh, 2006) and 
manage the manifestations of conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder (Long 
et al., 2011; Lu, Wagner, Van Male, Whitehead, & Boehnlein, 2009).  
Mental imagery and simulation also play a key role in social cognition. When 
perceiving other individuals’ behaviour, common motor representations are activated 
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such that there is a match between perceived and represented behaviour. This capacity 
allows us to simulate the mental states of others including their intentions, feelings and 
beliefs (Goldman & Sripada, 2005; Preston & de Waal, 2001). In addition to predicting 
the mental states of others, mental simulation is implicated in the inferences we make 
about our own attitudes and behaviours. In this regard, mental simulation has been 
identified as a heuristic that helps fulfil fundamental epistemic and self-evaluative 
needs relevant to basic functioning (Kahneman, 1982). The role of simulation in 
satisfying these needs lies in our ability to consider alternative possibilities for past 
behaviour – otherwise known as ‘counterfactual’ thinking (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 
2000). The ability to imagine better alternatives than reality serves as an incentive for 
future behaviour (Markus & Nurius, 1986), and a motivation for self-improvement 
(Gaglio, 2004). On this basis, mental simulation has been described as a mechanism of 
self-regulation that facilitates our pursuit of goals, ambitions and aspirations (Crisp & 
Turner, 2012).  
Researchers have documented the use of mental simulation as a self-regulatory 
technique across various domains including academic achievement, clinical 
psychology, health, sports performance, advertising and intergroup relations (Miles & 
Crisp, 2013; Oettingen & Mayer, 2002; Smith, Wright, Allsopp, & Westhead, 2007; 
Taylor et al., 1998). This literature indicates that mental simulations can be instrumental 
for eliciting behavioural and attitudinal change. For example, imagining contracting a 
disease has been shown to increase the perceived likelihood of actually contracting the 
disease by increasing the psychological availability of the events imagined (Sherman, 
Cialdini, Schwartzman, & Reynolds, 1985). As discussed in Chapter 2, the perceived 
likelihood of being affected by a hazard or threat is a fundamental determinant of 
behavioural/coping responses. Therefore, this finding was interpreted as having 
important ramifications for preventive health programmes (Sherman et al., 1985). 
Similarly, Morewedge, Huh, and Vosgerau, (2010) demonstrated that people who 
repeatedly imagined eating a particular food (e.g., chocolate) many times subsequently 
consumed less of the imagined food than people who imagined eating that food fewer 
times, imagined eating a different food (e.g., cheese), or did not imagine eating any 
food. Their study suggests that repeatedly simulating an action can trigger its 
behavioural consequents; in this case, people became habituated to a stimulus solely 
due to mental simulation. According to Oettingen (2012) interventions involving 
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mental simulation can be used autonomously by people to regulate their own goal 
pursuits and long-term development.  
Recent research in environmental psychology has also linked mental imagery to pro-
environmental thoughts and the formation of pro-environmental goal intentions. 
Drawing on prior evidence in cognitive psychology, Boomsma et al. (2016) proposed 
that affectively charged external images of environmental change can be internalized 
to bolster the motivational power of new or pre-existing pro-environmental goals and 
serve as triggers for pro-environmental behaviour change. These proposals were backed 
up in three experimental studies where, following exposure to a video depicting marine 
plastic pollution (experiment 1), thermal images depicting heat loss in homes 
(experiment 2), and slideshows of positive and negative future climate scenarios 
(experiment 3),  participants who reported having more vivid mental visualization of 
environmental change as a consequence of encountering these stimuli also reported 
having more pro-environmental thoughts and significant pro-environmental behaviour 
change. Further, vivid mental imagery of the future climate scenarios was found to 
strengthen the link between goal intentions and self-reported pro-environmental 
behaviour change (experiment 3).     
Beyond these examples, applications of mental imagery and simulation have been 
explored in other areas of psychology including affective regulation (Gilbert & Wilson, 
2007), creativity (Clement, 2008), goal pursuit (Blankert & Hamstra, 2017), inter-group 
relations (Crisp & Turner, 2009), and interpersonal communication (Honeycutt & Ford, 
2001). The different streams of psychological research that address mental imagery 
converge on an understanding of mental simulation as a core mechanism that that is 
critical for basic motor control, action initiation, affective regulation, social inference 
and motivation to effect change across a variety of behavioural domains (see Crisp, 
Birtel, & Meleady, 2011).  
Considering the theoretical significance of mental imagery and a strong precedent of 
incorporating mental simulation techniques into interventions aimed at achieving 
attitudinal and behavioural change, it seems plausible that mental simulation may also 
be an effective tool for influencing attitudes toward climate change. According to Crisp 
et al. (2011), mental simulation is a fundamental aspect of the human experience and, 
as such, should be considered a correspondingly critical component of behavioural 
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change strategies. Based on these perspectives, I explored the potential effects of 
mentally simulated experiences of flooding as an instrument for further investigating 
the effects of actual flood experience on climate change attitudes. 
The current research: mentally simulated flood experience and climate change 
attitudes 
The objective of this research was to explore the possibility that individuals’ attitudes 
toward climate change may be significantly influenced through a mentally simulated 
experience of flooding. To my knowledge, this is the first attempt in environmental 
psychology to manipulate the effects of extreme weather experiences on climate change 
attitudes using this strategy. Given the practical constraints inherent in manipulating 
real-world flood experiences, the development of a technique that can be used to 
functionally mimic the effects of flood experience in a ‘laboratory’ setting could enable 
researchers to engage more effectively with questions about the role of extreme weather 
experiences in climate change engagement that have hitherto been unanswerable with 
cross-sectional data. 
Based on the preceding review, I expected that mentally simulating a personal 
experience of flooding (i.e., imagining oneself as a victim of a flooding event) will 
trigger similar perceptual and attitudinal responses as are commonly observed with 
actual flood experience. In other words, I anticipated that mentally simulated flood 
experience will, at the very least, significantly increase perceived vulnerability to (or 
the perceived threat of) climate change impacts (cf. Spence et al., 2011; Taylor et al., 
2014). Further, considering repeated indications in prior research that the motivational 
influence of mental imagery is closely linked with emotions and affect (Holmes & 
Mathews, 2005, 2010; Leiserowitz, 2006), I anticipated that a mentally simulated 
experience of flooding would also produce an increase in climate change concern. 
Boomsma et al. (2016) showed that mental imagery is linked with the formation of pro-
environmental goals, and the vividness of mental imagery strengthens the link between 
environmental goal intentions and self-reported pro-environmental behaviour change. 
In a similar vein, Spence et al. (2011) argued, based on goal-setting theory, that 
experiences of events such as flooding may help individuals to better relate to climate 
change impacts and thus confer them with an increased sense of instrumentality in 
addressing the issue. Therefore, I predicted that mentally simulating an experience of 
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flooding will have a significant effect on individuals’ perceived efficacy in addressing 
climate change.  
As demonstrated in Chapter 3, some effects of flooding experience such as increased 
perceived instrumentality (efficacy), perceived vulnerability (threat) and preparedness 
to engage in mitigation behaviour do not generalize in an equivalent fashion across 
groups of individuals with differing political affiliation. However, the results of that 
study do not provide direct insights into why this the case. Consequently, here I 
examined the potential moderating influence of two variables that may help explain 
these differences: values and attribution, on the link between imagined flood experience 
and climate change attitudes.  
Values are known to have a moderating influence on how people process climate 
change information (Kahan et al., 2011), and people have been shown to exhibit 
significant differences in their endorsement of environmental values depending on their 
political affiliation (Whitmarsh, 2011). People who place a priority on environmental 
protection or have strong biospheric values can be more responsive to information 
highlighting the adverse environmental consequences of human activities (e.g, 
Bolderdijk, Gorsira, Keizer, Steg, & Ouellette, 2013). The reason for this is that 
information about environmental problems is not a sufficient condition for attitudinal 
and behaviour change on its own if individuals are not motivated to act on their 
knowledge of the situation (Bolderdijk et al., 2013; Schultz, 2010). Therefore, I 
predicted that the extent to which mentally simulated flood experience affects climate 
change perceptions and attitudes will be contingent on the strength of individuals’ 
biospheric values.     
In Chapter 3 (section 1.2), I discussed research suggesting that one of the routes via 
which pre-existing values and beliefs influence the link between extreme weather 
experiences and climate change attitudes pertains to individuals’ inclination to see 
salient weather events as ‘unusual’ (Goebbert et al., 2012) or see their experiences with 
extreme weather as consistent with trends expected from climate change (Capstick & 
Pidgeon, 2014). Coupled with the fact that objective weather has been found to have a 
weaker effect on climate change engagement than perceived weather (Shao, 2016), this 
suggests that the way weather events are attributed or interpreted in the context of 
climate change plays a key role in determining the effects of extreme weather 
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experiences on climate change perceptions and attitudes. On this basis, I expected that 
the effect of a mentally simulated experience of flooding on climate change attitudes 
will be modulated by the extent to which people consider the visualized event to be 
linked to climate change.  
I explored these predictions in four experimental studies examining the effect of an 
imagined experience of flooding on climate change perceptions, behavioural intentions 
and pro-environmental behaviour. In these experiments, I also addressed the 
moderating influence of biospheric values (Study 4, Study 5), and attribution (Study 5, 
Study 6 and Study 7). 
Study 4 
Aims and hypotheses 
The aim of Study 4 was to test the effect of a mentally simulated experience of flooding 
on climate change perceptions and behavioural intentions. I hypothesized that 
individuals subjected to a mentally simulated experience of flooding will report higher 
perceived threat from climate change (H1), higher concern (H2), and higher perceived 
efficacy to personally address climate change (H3). I also hypothesized that perceived 
threat (H4), concern (H5) and perceived efficacy (H6) will significantly mediate the 
effect of a mentally simulated flood experience on intentions to engage in mitigation 
actions. Lastly, I hypothesized that the strength of individuals’ biospheric values will 
modulate the effect of the mentally simulated flood experience on climate change 
perceptions; whereby the the indirect effects of the imagined experience manipulation 
on behavioural intentions mediated by perceived threat (H7), concern (H8) and 
perceived efficacy (H9) will be greater among people with stronger biospheric values. 
According to Husnu & Crisp (2010), prior experience has a significant influence on the 
availability of information used when constructing an imagined scenario. In other 
words, people who have previously experienced flooding directly in reality are 
expected to be able to envisage more vivid mental simulations of flood experience and 
consequently experience a more pronounced effect of the simulation on perceptions and 
behavioural intentions. Therefore, I controlled for the influence of past flooding 
experience in my analyses.  
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Method 
Participants 
87 students at the University of St Andrews, 20 males and 67 females, aged between 
18 and 30 (M = 20.8, SD = 2.66), were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: 
control (N = 46) versus imagined flood experience (N = 41). Participants were recruited 
from the research subject pool with advertisements placed within the School of 
Psychology and Neuroscience, and with notices circulated in the weekly student 
memos. Each subject received £3 for taking part in the research. Prior to the start of the 
experiment, participants were provided brief information about the nature of the study 
including the fact that they would be required to answer questions pertaining to their 
attitudes toward extreme weather and climate change. 
Procedure  
At the start of the experiment, participants were directed to complete a questionnaire 
measuring their demographic profile (gender, age, ethnicity and course of study). They 
were then asked to complete one of two tasks depending on the condition to which they 
had been assigned. Participants in the control condition were given the following 
instruction: “We would like you to spend the next two minutes imagining an outdoor 
scene. Try to imagine aspects of the scene around you (e.g., is it a beach, a forest, are 
there trees, hills, what’s on the horizon?). In the space below, please list the different 
things you saw in the scene you just imagined”. This set of instructions was adopted 
from Stathi and Crisp (2008).  
Participants in the imagined flood experience condition were presented with three 
images depicting scenes of severe flooding in southern England captured earlier in the 
same year (see Appendix 6). The images were captioned with the following message:  
“In February 2014, the UK Met Office confirmed that England and Wales had 
experienced the wettest winter since records began in 1766. Downpours totalling 
435mm of rain broke the 250-year old England and Wales precipitation records. Heavy 
rainfall from late 2013 into early 2014 resulted in severe flooding around the UK, 
affecting thousands of homes, cutting off critical transport routes and causing social 
and economic disruption in many parts of the country. According to the Met Office, 
climate change will lead to an increase in extreme weather in the coming years”.  
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After reading this caption, participants were presented with the following instruction:  
“Please take two minutes to imagine yourself as a victim of the flood described above. 
Imagine watching your home and property being extensively damaged by floodwater, 
and being unable to get access to nearby shops for food and groceries, or get to work 
and school as most roads in the vicinity are now submerged. In the space provided 
below, please describe as many aspects of the scenario you just imagined as possible”. 
Subsequently, participants were also asked to indicate how easy it was for them to 
imagine being in the flooding situation (response: 1 = very difficult, 7 = very easy), 
how vivid their mental imagery of being in the situation was (response: 1 = not vivid, 
7 = very vivid), and if they thought it was likely that the flooding that occurred across 
the UK in 2014 is a result of climate change (response: 0 = No/Don’t Know, 1 = Yes). 
After completing the tasks in either condition, participants were asked to complete the 
dependent measures before being thanked and debriefed. All items and responses were 
administered in a testing room at the University of St Andrews via a standard desktop 
computer using the Qualtrics platform.  
Measures 
Past flood experience. This was measured with a single item: “Have you had a personal 
experience of unusually intense rainfall and flooding in the last 5 years?”. This item 
was adopted from van der Linden (2014). Responses were recorded with a yes/no 
format. Approximately half of the total sample of participants indicated that they had 
previous experience of unusually intense rainfall and flooding (50.6%). 
Biospheric value orientation (α = .88, M = 5.76, SD = 1.04). I measured biospheric 
values by asking participants to rate the importance of four values (respecting the earth, 
protecting the environment, unity with nature and preventing pollution) as guiding 
principle in their lives. Response to these items were recorded using a 9-point format (-
1 = opposed to my values, 0 = not important, 7 = extremely important). This measure 
has previously been validated cross-culturally (de Groot & Steg, 2007b, 2008) and has 
been widely used in both experimental (e.g., Bolderdijk et al., 2013) and cross-sectional 
studies (van der Werff, Steg, & Keizer, 2013). 
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Perceived threat (α = .87, M = 5.10, SD = 0.93). This was measured with six items 
addressing the perceived severity and likelihood of being affected by the threat posed 
by climate change. Participants were asked to rate the seriousness of the threat posed 
by climate change to: the environment, people in the UK and themselves as individuals. 
Next, they were asked to rate the likelihood that the threat posed by climate change 
would affect their health and wellbeing, the wellbeing of society as a whole and, 
wildlife and natural landscapes. Responses to this measure were recorded using a 7-
point format (1 = very low, 7 = very high).  
Concern (M = 5.33, SD = 1.36). This was measured with a single item: “how strongly 
do you feel the following emotion when you think about climate change? – concern”. 
Responses were recorded as 1 = not at all, 7 = very strongly. 
Perceived efficacy (M = 5.34, SD = 1.16) was measured with a single item: “I can 
personally help reduce climate change by changing my behaviour”. Responses were 
recorded using a 7-point scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 Strongly agree). 
Behavioural intentions (α = .79, M = 5.00, SD = 1.19). I measured this by asking 
participants how likely they were to engage in the following behaviours in the near 
future: (1) Sign a petition calling on the government to make stronger commitments to 
addressing climate change; (2) donate to an environmental group that focuses on 
climate change; (3) volunteer in or join an environmental group that is engaged with 
climate change issues; (4) try to limit your energy consumption for the sake of the 
environment. Responses were recorded with a 7-point format (1 = not likely, 7 = very 
likely). Principal axis factor analysis showed that all four items loaded onto a single 
factor explaining 61.1% of the variance (Eigenvalue = 2.44). 
There were other variables measured in the questionnaire that are not considered here. 
These include measures of objective climate change knowledge, self-rated climate 
change knowledge, perceived climate change salience, acceptance of responsibility for 
addressing climate change, and emotional responses to climate change: anger, fear, 
worry and outrage (see Appendix 6). 
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 Results and discussion 
Preliminary analyses 
Qualitative analyses of participants’ description of the various aspects of the scenario 
they imagined showed that the most common themes of the mental imagery generated 
by the imagined flood experience task pertained to personal losses incurred due to the 
flood (e.g., “I can see my house sinking under the heavy rain, all my belongings going 
away with the water waves”; “my home is submerged in water, I can’t use any of my 
things anymore; it is difficult to get around”, “I might have limited access to the 
internet, maybe I wouldn’t be able to communicate with friends”), emotional responses 
to the effects of the flood (e.g., “I would be worried about the financial consequences 
flooding will cause”, “I am worried about my relatives and family, thinking when this 
flood is going to end”, “I feel very helpless and trapped”) and the physical dynamics of 
the flood event (e.g., “water rushing down the street”, “woke up in the morning, seeing 
flood water outside”).   
Contrary to Husnu and Crisp (2010), prior real-world flooding experience had no 
significant relationship with the vividness of participants’ mental imagery of being in 
the imagined flood scenario (r (41) = .17, p = .296). Similarly, the vividness of the 
mental imagery was not related to biospheric value (r (41) = -.19, p = .242), perceived 
threat (r (41) = .21, p = .193), concern (r (41) = -.09, p = .565), perceived efficacy (r 
(41) = -.07, p = .687) or behavioural intentions (r (41) = .22, p = .160). There was also 
no significant link between biospheric value and whether participants indicated that 
they thought the 2014 UK flooding is likely to have been linked to climate change (r 
(41) = .25, p = .123). However, there was a significant link between participants’ 
perception that the 2014 UK flooding may have been linked to climate change and their 
level of perceived threat (r (41) = .43, p = .005) and behavioural intentions (r (41) = 
.40, p = .011), but not concern (r (41) = .25, p = .123) or perceived efficacy (r (41) = 
.16, p = .317). Zero-order correlations among the measured variables are presented in 
Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1. Zero-order intercorrelations between the variables addressed in Study 1. 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Imagined Experience -.08 -.07 .13 .13 -.16 -.07 
2. Past flood Experience  .00 -.04 .11 -.06 .08 
3. Biospheric Value   .41*** .20† .11 .33** 
4. Perceived Threat    .36** .13 .54*** 
5. Concern     .13 .49*** 
6. Perceived Efficacy      .31** 
7. Behavioural Intentions      - 
†p<.10, **p<.01, ***p<.001, N = 87. 
Tests of hypotheses 
Contrary to my expectations, there was no significant difference in perceived threat 
(H1), concern (H2), perceived efficacy (H3) or behavioural intentions between 
participants in the control condition and those in the imagined flood experience 
condition (Table 4.2). I further assessed the effect of the imagined flood experience 
manipulation on perceived threat, concern and perceived efficacy, taking into account 
the effects of biospheric values, past flood experience, gender and age. This analysis 
was conducted with the PROCESS macro for regression-based estimation of mediation, 
moderation and conditional effects in SPSS (Hayes, 2013).  
Table 4.2. Descriptive and comparative statistics for Study 4 
DV Condition 
t(85) 
Control  
(N = 46) 
Imagined 
Experience  
(N = 41) 
 M(SD) 
Perceived Threat 4.99(1.03) 5.22(0.80) -1.92 
Concern 5.17(1.57) 5.51(1.08) -1.16 
Perceived Efficacy 5.52(0.91) 5.15(1.37) -1.52 
Behavioural Intentions 5.07(1.26) 4.92(1.11) 0.61 
 
The regression analysis revealed that the imagined experience manipulation had a 
significant effect on perceived threat (H1) when biospheric value, past flood 
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experience, gender and age are controlled (Table 4.3). However, the effects of the 
manipulation on concern and perceived efficacy remained non-significant (Table 4.3). 
As expected, biospheric value was positively linked with perceived threat, but more 
interestingly there was also a significant interaction between biospheric value and 
imagined flood experience in their effect on perceived threat. Closer examination of 
this interaction effect revealed that the imagined flood experience manipulation had a 
significant effect on perceived threat at low levels of biospheric value (B = .89, SE = 
.27, p = .001, 95% CI: [.36, 1.41], N = 86) but not at high levels (B = -.10, SE = .25, p 
= .690, 95% CI: [-.60, .40}, N = 86]). This means that, relative to the control group, 
participants with a weaker endorsement of biospheric values reported a higher level of 
perceived threat following the imagined flood experience task than those with a 
stronger endorsement of biospheric values (Figure 12). Further, biospheric value 
significantly moderated the indirect effect of imagined flood experience on behavioural 
intentions mediated by perceived threat in an opposite pattern to my hypothesis (H7). 
In this respect, the imagined flood experience manipulation had significant indirect 
effects on behavioural intentions through perceived threat (H4) when biospheric value 
was significant at the mean level or a standard deviation below the mean level of 
biospheric value, whereas there was no significant indirect effect of the imagined flood 
experience manipulation on behavioural intentions through perceived threat when 
biospheric value was at a standard deviation above the mean (Table 4.3).  
 
Figure 12. Effect of imagined flood experience and biospheric value on perceived threat 
from climate change. 
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Table 4.3. Multiple regression of imagined flood experience, biospheric value and the 
control variables on climate change perceptions and behavioural intentions 
Mediator Variable Model 
IV Perceived 
Threat 
Concern 
Perceived 
Efficacy 
B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) 
Imagined Experience .39(.18)* .52(.29) † -.40(.26) 
Biospheric value .45(.09)*** .30(.15)* .14(.13) 
Imagined 
Experience*Biospheric value 
-.47(.18)* -.13(.30) -.21(.26) 
Past flood experience .10(.18) .35(.30) -.15(.27) 
Gender .39(.21)† .71(.35)* -.06(.31) 
Age .04(.03) .00(.06) .00(.05) 
F 5.58*** 1.90† 0.75 
R2 .30 .13 .05 
N 86 
 
Dependent Variable Model 
 Behavioural Intentions 
Perceived Threat .53(.11)*** 
Concern .24(.08)** 
Perceived Efficacy .21(.08)* 
Imagined Experience -.22(.20) 
Past flood experience .08(.19) 
Gender .69(.23)** 
Age -.04(.04) 
F 12.09*** 
R2 .52 
N 86 
Conditional Indirect Effects of Imagined flood experience on behavioural intentions 
at Biospheric value = Mean and ± 1SD 
Mediator Biospheric 
value 
Effect 95% CI 
Perceived Threat - 1SD .47 [.18, .90] 
M .21 [.04, .43] 
+ 1SD -.05 [-.29, .20] 
Index of moderated mediation -.25 [-.55, -.09] 
Concern - 1SD .16 [-.01, .45] 
M .13 [-.00, .38] 
+ 1SD .09 [-.08, .40] 
Index of moderated mediation -.03 [-.19, .09] 
Perceived Efficacy - 1SD -.04 [-.21, .07] 
M -.08 [-.24, .00] 
99 
 
+ 1SD -.13 [-.36, .01] 
Index of moderated mediation -.04 [-.21, .02] 
Cell entries are unstandardized regression estimates with standard errors in parentheses. *p<.05, 
**p<.01, ***p<.001. Effect = Bootstrap estimate of effect. Confidence intervals are bias-
corrected and based on 1,000 resamples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). 
These results suggest that the participants with high biospheric values do not report a 
significant change in their attitudes following the imagined experience task; plausibly 
because they already have a high level of intrinsic value-driven motivation to address 
climate change. Whereas, for participants with low biospheric values, consciousness of 
climate change consequences may also be relatively low and among this group. Thus, 
the imagined experience manipulation was able to significantly increase perceptions of 
the threat posed by climate change and through this process also increase intentions to 
engage in mitigation behaviour.  
However, the imagined flood experience manipulation did not have a significant effect 
on concern or perceived efficacy even after controlling for biospheric values, past flood 
experience, gender and age. Further, the imagined experience manipulation did not 
have significant indirect effects on behavioural intentions through concern (H5) or 
perceived efficacy (H6), there was no significant interaction between biospheric value 
and concern (H8) not between biospheric value and perceived efficacy (H9) in their 
effects on behavioural intentions (Table 4.3).   
This study demonstrated that a mentally simulated experience of flooding may 
effectively increase perceived threat of climate change, especially among individuals 
with a weak endorsement of biospheric values who might only have a low 
consciousness of climate change. However, the manipulation did not have significant 
effects on concern and perceived efficacy. There were two key limitations in this study 
that may have influenced the effectiveness of the manipulation. Firstly, participants in 
the imagined flood experience condition were provided with images of scenes of people 
affected by the 2014 UK floods. Research suggests that more vivid mental images may 
be formed when people are given an opportunity to construct their own images. For 
example, when asked to form mental images based on a verbal report describing the 
aftermath of a road accident, Krans et al. (2010) found that the emotional effect of 
forming one’s own images was stronger than that reported by participants who viewed 
video footage on which the verbal report was based. Participants in this study may have 
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found the supplied images less relatable than that which they may have generated on 
their own, thereby reducing the effect of the imagined flood experience.  
A second limitation of the study pertains to the fact that a link between climate change 
and the flooding was implied in the textual description provided to participants in the 
imagined flood experience condition. Although attribution was found to be 
significantly correlated with perceived threat and behavioural intentions, further 
exploration of these results revealed that the mean levels of perceived threat between 
the group of participants who thought the flooding might be due to climate change (M 
= 5.49, SD = 0.70, N = 25), those who did not think the flooding was linked to climate 
change (M = 4.86, SD = 0.77, N = 15), and those in the control condition (M = 4.99, 
SD = 1.03, N = 46) was not statistically different (F (2, 79) = 3.10, p = .051). Similarly, 
the mean behavioural intentions scores across the groups of participants who thought 
the flooding might be linked to climate change (M = 5.26, SD = 0.82, N = 25), those 
who did not think the flooding may be linked to climate change (M = 4.32, SD = 1.33, 
N = 15) and those in the control condition (M = 5.07, SD = 1.26, N = 46) was not 
significantly different (F (2, 79) = 1.90, p = .157). Nonetheless, this flaw in the 
experimental design makes it difficult to definitively isolate the effects of merely 
imagining a flood from the interpretive context of climate change as a probable cause. 
These limitations were addressed in a subsequent experiment.   
Study 5 
 Aims and hypotheses 
The aim of Study 5 of was to test the effect of a mentally simulated experience of 
flooding on climate change perceptions and behavioural intentions and address some 
of the limitations of Study 4. Specifically, the imagined flood experience task only 
involved a textual description with no reference to climate change. I also employed a 
multi-item measure of perceived efficacy and a measure of actual pro-environmental 
behaviour.  
I tested the same hypotheses in Study 4 as were tested in Study 5: participants with an 
imagined flood experience were expected to report increased perceived threat (H1), 
concern (H2) and perceived efficacy (H3). Further, the imagined flood experience was 
expected to have an indirect effect on pro-environmental behaviour through perceived 
threat (H4), concern (H5) and perceived efficacy(H6). Lastly, biospheric value was 
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expected to modulate the effect of imagined flood experience on the climate change 
perceptions such that the indirect effects on pro-environmental behaviour mediated by 
perceived threat (H7), concern (H8) and perceived efficacy (H9) will be significantly 
moderated by biospheric value. 
Method 
Participants and procedure 
255 undergraduate students (40 males, 214 females; Mage = 19.59, SDage = 2.74) at the 
University of Leicester were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: a control (N 
= 130) or imagined experience condition (N = 125). Participants were recruited with 
advertisements placed within the School of Psychology. They were informed about the 
nature of the study, including the fact that they would be required to answer questions 
regarding their attitudes toward extreme weather and climate change, prior to the start 
of the experiment. Each subject received course credit and was entered into a raffle for 
a £50 shopping voucher for taking part in the study.  
As in Study 1, participants in the control condition were asked to imagine an outdoor 
scene and make a list of the different things they saw in the scenario they imagined. 
However, the imagined flood experience task was modified in two ways. Firstly, only 
a description of the 2013/2014 floods was provided, with no accompanying images. 
This was done so that participants could generate their own mental imagery of the flood 
scene. Secondly, to separate the effect of the imagined flood experience from the effect 
of attributing the event to climate change, no reference was made to climate change in 
the descriptive text. The message presented was as follows:  
“In February 2014, the UK Met Office confirmed that England and Wales had 
experienced the wettest winter since records began in 1766. Downpours totalling 
435mm of rain broke the 250-year old England and Wales precipitation records. Heavy 
rainfall from late 2013 into early 2014 resulted in severe flooding around the UK, 
affecting thousands of homes and farms, cutting off critical transport routes, and 
disrupting social and economic activities across large parts of the country”.  
After reading this message, participants were presented the following instruction:  
“For the next two minutes, please imagine yourself as a victim of the flooding described 
above. Imagine watching your home and property being extensively damaged by 
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floodwater, and being unable to get access to nearby shops for food and groceries, or 
get to work/school as most roads in the vicinity are now submerged. In the space 
provided below, please describe as many aspects of the scenario you just imagined as 
possible”.  
Participants were also asked to indicate how easy it was for them to imagine being in 
the flooding situation (response: 1 = very difficult, 7 = very easy), how vivid their 
mental imagery of being in the situation was (response: 1 = not vivid, 7 = very vivid), 
and how likely they thought it was that the flooding that occurred across the UK in 2014 
is linked to climate change (response: 1 = not likely, 7 = very likely). After completing 
the tasks, participants in either condition were directed to complete the dependent 
measures before being thanked and debriefed. The experiment was administered using 
an online survey platform and participants were free to complete the study at any time 
and place of their choosing. 
Measures 
Past flood experience was measured using the same measure employed in Study 4. 
Approximately a third of the total sample of participants indicated that they had 
previously experienced unusually intense rainfall and flooding (32.1%).   
Biospheric value orientation (α = .87, M = 5.38, SD = 1.07). This was also measured 
using the same measure used in Study 1 (adopted from de Groot & Steg, 2008).  
Perceived threat (α = .86, M = 4.75, SD = 1.00). This was measured with seven items 
addressing the perceived severity and likelihood of being affect by the threat posed by 
climate change. Participants were asked to rate the seriousness of the rate posed by 
climate change to: them personally, people around the world, the natural environment 
and the area they currently live in. Responses to this half of the measure were recorded 
with a 7-point scale (1 = not serious at all, 7 = very serious). Next, they were asked to 
rate the likelihood that climate change will have harmful long-term effects on society, 
the likelihood that they would personally experience threats to their health and 
wellbeing as a consequence of climate change, and the likelihood that the natural 
environment will be severely affected by climate change impacts. Responses to the 
latter half of the measure were also recorded with a 7-point format (1 = very unlikely, 
7 = very likely). Although perceived threat severity (Eigenvalue = 3.80, variance 
explained = 54.3%, α = .79) and threat likelihood (Eigenvalue = 1.20, variance 
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explained = 17.1%, α = .70) emerged as separate factors in factor analysis, the scale 
was retained as a unitary measure due to the strong correlation of the two factors (r 
(255) = .74, p<.001).  
Concern (M = 4.67, SD = 1.56). This was measured with a single item: “Thinking about 
the seriousness of climate change right now, and its potential impacts, how strongly do 
you feel the following emotions? – concern”. Responses were recorded as 1 = not at 
all, 7 = very strongly. 
Perceived efficacy (α = .87, M = 3.73, SD = 1.36). I measured this by asking participants 
how confident they were that the following can make a difference in addressing climate 
change: “personally changing your behaviour and lifestyle (e.g., purchasing practices 
and energy use)” and “efforts made by you as an individual to address climate change”. 
Responses to these items were recorded with a 7-point format (1 = not confident, 7 = 
very confident).  
Pro-environmental behaviour. I measured this by asking participants if they would like 
to donate a fraction of their remuneration to an environmental group if they were 
selected to receive the £50 shopping voucher. They were given an option to donate up 
to 50% of the value of the voucher. Responses were recorded using a yes/no format. 
Overall, 122 participants (47.8%) elected to donate part of their reward to an 
environmental group. 
There were other measures in the questionnaire that are not considered in this chapter. 
These include measures of pro-environmental self-identity, perceived social norms, 
acceptance of responsibility for addressing climate change, objective and self-rated 
climate change knowledge, and emotional responses to climate change: anger, fear, 
guilt and worry (see Appendix 7). 
 Results and discussion 
Preliminary analyses 
Qualitative analyses of participants’ description of their mental visualization of the 
flood experience revealed similar key themes as those observed in Study 1: physical 
dynamics of the flooding (e.g., “flood water coming [in] under the door”, “there is 
water everywhere, swashing (sic) around my feet”, “flood water coming down my 
sloped drive”), personal losses incurred due to the flooding (e.g., “devastation of my 
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home, loss of my grounding memories (i.e. photo albums, my books, family heirlooms)”, 
“my house slowly deteriorating due to the excess amounts of water”, “belongings 
ruined, home ruined, insurance providers refusing to pay out so a lot of debt”) and 
emotional responses to the effects of the flood (“I feel vulnerable and lost”, “feeling 
helpless and not being able to do anything to save my home”, “shock, distress, unsure 
of the future and how to resolve the issue of not having a home and losing my 
possessions”).  
Similar to Study 4, previous flood experience had no significant relationship with the 
vividness of participants’ mental imagery of experiencing the imagined flood (r (250) 
= -.07, p = .430). Interestingly, biospheric value was significantly related to the 
vividness of participants’ mental imagery of experiencing the flood (r (250) = .26, p = 
.004), and their perception of a possible link between the 2013/2014 UK flooding and 
climate change (r (250) = .36, p<.001). However, the vividness of their mental imagery 
was not significantly related to perceived likelihood of a link between the 2013/2014 
UK flooding and climate change (r (250) = .16, p = .071). Zero-order correlations 
among the measured variables are presented in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4. Zero-order intercorrelations among the variables addressed in Study 2 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Imagined Experience -.08 -.00 -.03 .08 .01 -.09 
2. Past Flood Experience  .01 .04 .03 -.01 .05 
3. Biospheric Value   .48*** .35*** .42*** .21** 
4. Perceived Threat    .54*** .48*** .22*** 
5. Concern     .36*** .16* 
6. Perceived Efficacy      .07 
7. Donation      - 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, N = 255 (except correlations with Past flood Experience N = 250). 
Tests of hypotheses 
I found no support for my hypotheses as participants in the imagined flood condition 
did not report significantly greater perceived threat (H1), concern (H2), perceived 
efficacy (H3) than those in the control condition (Table 4.5). 
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Table 4.5. Participants’ mean scores on the dependent variables across the experimental 
conditions 
DV Condition 
t 
Control 
(N = 130) 
Imagined 
Experience  
(N = 125) 
 M(SD) 
Perceived Threat 4.78(1.03) 4.73(1.06) .45 
Concern 4.55(1.50) 4.79(1.63) -1.22 
Perceived Efficacy 3.71(1.24) 3.75(1.47) -.21 
Would you like to donate a 
part of your remuneration 
to [environmental group]? 
52.31% yes 43.2% yes 
χ2 (1) = 2.12, p 
= .146 
 
I further assessed the effect of the imagined experience manipulation using multiple 
regression with the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013). This analysis showed that neither 
perceived threat (H4: B = -.01, SE = .03, 95% CI: [-.10, .04], N = 245), concern (H5: 
B = .02, SE = .04, 95% CI: [-.02, .14], N = 245), nor perceived efficacy (H6: B = -.00, 
SE = .03, 95% CI: [-.09, .03], N = 245) significantly mediated the effect of the imagined 
flood experience on willingness to donate to an environmental group. Contrary to 
expectation, biospheric value did not moderate any indirect effects of the imagined 
flood experience mediated by perceived threat (H7), concern (H8) or perceived efficacy 
(H9) (Table 4.6). 
Table 4.6. Test of moderated mediation hypotheses 
 
Mediator Variable Model 
IV Perceived 
Threat 
Concern 
Perceived 
Efficacy 
B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) 
Imagined Experience -.46(.58) -1.08(.96) -.24(.82) 
Biospheric value .43(.08)*** .41(.13)** .52(.11)*** 
Imagined 
Experience*Biospheric value 
.08(.11) .25(.18) .05(.15) 
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Past flood experience .04(.06) .07(.10) .01(.09) 
Gender .00(.01) -.02(.02) .01(.01) 
Age -.03(.02) -.06(.03) -.06(.03) 
F 13.91*** 8.03*** 9.62*** 
R2 .26 .17 .19 
N 250 
 
Dependent Variable Model 
 Donation behaviour 
Perceived Threat .39(.17)* 
Concern .12(.11) 
Perceived Efficacy -.02(.11) 
Imagined Experience -.36(.27) 
Past flood experience .10(.15) 
Gender -1.10(.40) 
Age .02(.05) 
Model χ2 19.40** 
R2 .08 (Cox & Snell), .10 (Nagelkerke) 
N 250 
Conditional Indirect Effects of Imagined flood experience on donation behaviour at 
Biospheric value = Mean and ± 1SD 
Mediator Biospheric 
value 
Effect 95% CI 
Perceived Threat - 1SD -.05 [-.26, .08] 
M -.01 [-.14, .07] 
+ 1SD .02 [-.11, .17] 
Index of moderated mediation .03 [-.06, .16] 
Concern - 1SD .00 [-.09, .11] 
M .03 [-.02, .16] 
+ 1SD .07 [-.04, .25] 
Index of moderated mediation .03 [-.02, .16] 
Perceived Efficacy - 1SD .00 [-.01, .07] 
M -.00 [-.06, .03] 
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+ 1SD -.00 [-.10, .05] 
Index of moderated mediation -.00 [-.05, .03] 
Cell entries are unstandardized regression estimates with standard errors in parentheses. *p<.05, 
**p<.01, ***p<.001. Effect = Bootstrap estimate of effect. Confidence intervals are bias-
corrected and based on 1,000 resamples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). 
Considering the fact that the imagined flood experience manipulation had a significant 
effect on perceived threat when the descriptive text linked the 2013/2014 UK flooding 
to climate change in Study 4, I explored the data in Study 5 for evidence of a moderating 
role of attribution. I found that the perceived likelihood of the flooding being linked to 
climate change was positively correlated with perceived threat (r = .40, p<.001, N = 
125), and concern (r = .32, p<.001, N = 125). However, perceived likelihood of the 
flooding being linked to climate change was not significantly related to perceived 
efficacy (r = .15, p =.107, N = 125).  
These correlations could only be computed for the participants in the imagined flood 
experience condition as those in the control did not receive any information about the 
flooding. To assess the moderating effect of attribution on the imagined flood 
experience manipulation, I used a median-split to categorize participants in the 
imagined flood experience condition into weak/no attribution and strong attribution 
groups; meaning groups of those who rated a link between the flood and climate change 
as being unlikely or of very low likelihood and those who rated it as being very likely 
respectively.  
I found that participants in the weak/no attribution group reported significantly lower 
levels of perceived threat (p = .011) than those in the control condition (Table 4.7). On 
the other hand, participants in the strong attribution group reported higher levels of 
perceived threat (p = .011) and concern (p<.001) than those in the control condition 
(Table 4.7). However, the imagined experience manipulation did not have a significant 
effect on perceived efficacy or willingness to donate to an environmental group among 
both the weak/no attribution and strong attribution groups (Table 4.7). 
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Table 4.7. Participants mean scores on the dependent variables across experimental 
groups categorized by attribution level in Study 2 
DV Condition 
F 
Imagined 
experience – 
Weak/No 
Attribution 
(N = 75) 
Control 
(N = 130) 
Imagined 
experience – 
Strong 
Attribution 
(N = 50) 
M(SD) 
Perceived threat 4.38(1.04) 4.78(1.03) 5.25(0.88) 12.69*** 
Concern 4.33(1.80) 4.55(1.50) 5.48(1.04) 9.40*** 
Perceived efficacy 3.59(1.38) 3.71(1.24) 3.99(1.58) 1.35 
Would you like to 
donate a part of your 
remuneration to 
[environmental 
group]? 
40% yes 52.31% yes 48% yes 
χ2 (2) = 2.89, p 
= .236 
 ***p<.001 
Interestingly, the imagined experience manipulation did not have a significant indirect 
effect on willingness to donate to an environmental group through perceived threat (B 
= .06, SE = .08, 95% CI: [-.06, .25], N = 245), concern (B = .08, SE = .10, 95% CI: [-
.07, .29], N = 245), or perceived efficacy (B = -.00, SE = .04, 95% CI: [-.12, .06], N = 
245) among participants who strongly attributed the flooding to climate change. 
Similarly, perceived threat (B = -.05, SE = .07, 95% CI: [-.22, .05], N = 245), concern 
(B = .01, SE = .04, 95% CI: [-.13, .04], N = 245), and perceived efficacy (B = -.00, SE 
= .03, 95% CI: [-.09, .04], N = 245), did not mediate any indirect effects of the imagined 
flood experience manipulation on willingness to donate to an environmental group 
among participants who weakly attributed or did not see a link between climate change 
and the flooding. Further, there was no significant interaction between biospheric value 
and the imagined flood experience (at the different levels of attribution) in their effect 
on perceived threat (F (2, 241) = 0.17, p = .842), concern (F (2, 241) = 2.05, p = .131), 
or perceived efficacy (F (2, 241) = 1.43, p = .242).  
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Although, the findings of Study 4 were not replicated in Study 5, the findings from 
Study 5 indicate that mentally simulating an experience of flooding can produce 
increased perceived threat and concern about climate change if individuals attribute the 
flooding to climate change. Interestingly, although biospheric value was positively 
correlated with vividness of participants mental imagery and the extent to which they 
perceived the imagined flood to be linked to climate change, it did no significantly 
moderate the effect of the imagined experience manipulation on perceived threat or 
concern. A key limitation of this study pertains to the fact that the participants in the 
control condition did not receive any information about the flooding nor were they 
asked about how they might have attributed the event so it was impossible to account 
for their varying levels of attribution. Further, as discussed in Chapter 3, pre-existing 
levels of climate scepticism may reduce the effect of extreme weather experiences on 
climate change attitudes particularly with regard to willingness to engage in climate 
change mitigation behaviour. Therefore, in a subsequent experiment, I explicitly 
addressed the role of attribution in the link between the imagined flood experience and 
climate change attitudes while accounting for pre-existing levels of scepticism.  
Study 6 
Aims and hypotheses 
The aim of Study 6 was to examine the interaction between attribution and a mentally 
simulated experience of flooding in predicting climate change perceptions and 
behavioural intentions. This study was designed to improve on some of the limitations 
of the previous studies and more accurately determine the effect of the imagined flood 
experience manipulation by accounting for pre-existing levels of climate change 
scepticism. In Chapter 3, I argued that high-levels of pre-existing climate change 
scepticism among right-leaning voters may explain the reduced effect of flood 
experience on climate change attitudes observed among that demographic. 
Consequently, in this study, I shifted my focus from biospheric values and on to 
scepticism, as a potential factor in understanding the effectiveness of the imagined flood 
experience task. 
Additionally, I measured the attribution of the flooding event used in the manipulation 
across both the control and imagined flood experience conditions. I hypothesized that 
individuals subjected to a mentally simulated experience of flooding will report higher 
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perceived threat (H1), concern (H2), and perceived efficacy (H3). I also hypothesized 
that individuals’ attribution of the flooding event will significantly moderate the effect 
of a mentally simulated experience of flooding on perceived threat (H4), concern (H5), 
and perceived efficacy (H6). Lastly, I hypothesized that attribution will significantly 
mediate any indirect effects of the imagined flood experience on behavioural intentions 
mediated by perceived threat (H7), concern (H8) and perceived efficacy (H9).  
 Method 
Participants 
I recruited 250 members of the general British public, through an online survey panel 
provider, to participate in an internet based experiment. The data provided by 5 
participants who failed an attention check embedded in the questionnaire were omitted 
from analysis, leaving a final sample (N = 245) comprising 44.1% males and 55.9% 
females with a mean age of 49.9 years (SD = 13.07). The participants were informed 
that they would be required to answer questions regarding their attitudes toward 
extreme weather and climate change prior to the start of the experiment. 
Procedure 
At the start of the experiment, participants were presented with a set questions 
measuring their demographic profile (gender, age, political affiliation) and the control 
variables (pre-test scepticism and past flooding experience). Subsequently, they were 
randomly assigned to either a control or imagined flood experience condition.  
Participants in the imagined flood experience condition were presented with the 
following message: “Beginning on Saturday, 4th December 2015, Storm Desmond 
brought exceptionally heavy rainfall to large parts of northern England, southern 
Scotland and north Wales. The rainfall resulted in record-breaking flooding in Cumbria, 
Northumberland and the Scottish Borders. In the course of the following three days, 
45,700 homes across the UK were left without power, over a thousand people were 
evacuated from their homes, and three people lost their lives due to the severity of the 
wind and rainstorms. Further, the storm also caused extensive disruption to critical road, 
rail and air transport services across the country. According to Met Office Chief 
Scientist, Professor Dame Julia Slingo, the “extraordinary amounts of water” dumped 
by the storm broke precipitation records going back to the 1800s.”  
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After reading this message, they were then presented the following instruction:  
“For the next two minutes, please imagine yourself as a victim of the floods described 
above. Imagine watching your home and property being extensively damaged by 
floodwater, being unable to get access to nearby shops for food and groceries, and being 
unable to go to work as most roads in the vicinity are now submerged. In the space 
provided below, please describe as many aspects of the scenario you just imagined as 
possible”.  
Following the same procedure as Study 1 and Study 2, participants were also asked to 
indicate how easy it was for them to imagine being in the flooding situation (response: 
1 = very difficult, 7 = very easy), how vivid their mental imagery of being in the 
situation was (response: 1 = not vivid, 7 = very vivid), and how likely they thought it 
was that Storm Desmond and the extreme flooding it caused are linked to climate 
change (response: 1 = not likely, 7 = very likely). After completing the task, participants 
were directed to complete the dependent measures. 
Participants in the control condition were directed to complete the dependent measures 
right after the initial questionnaire measuring their demographic information and the 
control variables. After completing the dependent measures, they were presented with 
the description of Storm Desmond outlined above and simply asked to rate the 
likelihood that Storm Desmond and the extreme flooding it caused are linked to climate 
change (response: 1 = not at all likely, 7 = very likely). The experiment was 
administered using an online survey platform and participants were free to complete 
the study at any time or place of their choosing. 
Measures 
Pre-test scepticism (M = 3.28, SD = 1.16). This was measured with six items adopted 
from a measure developed by Whitmarsh (2011). These include: “I do not believe 
climate change is a real problem”, “the evidence for climate change is unreliable”, 
“recent floods and heatwaves in this country are due to climate change”, “floods and 
heatwaves are not increasing, there’s just more reporting of it in the media these days”, 
“it is impossible to link a single event such as a flood to climate change”, “claims that 
human activities are changing the climate are exaggerated” (response: 1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree; α = .81). 
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Attribution (M = 4.62, SD = 1.41) was measured with a single item: “how likely do you 
think it is that Storm Desmond and the flooding it caused are linked to climate change?” 
(1 = not at all likely, 7 = very likely). 
Perceived threat (M = 4.65, SD = 1.26, α = .94). Perceived threat was measured with 
eight items reflecting the perceived seriousness and likelihood of adverse climate 
change impacts. Perceived seriousness was measured with four items: “how serious of 
a threat do you believe climate change is to you personally?”, “how serious of a threat 
do you think climate change impacts are for the area you currently live in?”, “how 
serious do you estimate the impacts of climate change are for the natural 
environment?”, “how serious of a threat do you think the impacts of climate change are 
across the world?” (response: 1 = not serious at all, 7 = very serious). Perceived 
likelihood was also measured with four items: “in your judgment, how likely do you 
think it is that climate change will have harmful effects on your local area?”, “how 
likely do you think it is that you will experience serious threats to your health or overall 
well-being, sometime during your lifetime, as a result of climate change?”, “how likely 
do you think it is that the natural environment (including wildlife and biodiversity) will 
be affected adversely by climate change?”, “how likely do you think it is that British 
society as a whole will experience adverse long-term consequences from climate 
change?” (response: 1 = not likely, 7 = very likely). 
Concern (M = 4.74, SD = 1.68) and perceived efficacy (M = 3.80, SD = 1.43, α = .80) 
were measured with the same items used in Study 5. 
Behavioural intentions (M = 4.12, SD = 1.22, α = .78) was measured with six items. I 
asked participants how likely they were to engage in the following behaviours in the 
next four weeks: Mostly walk, cycle or use public transport when commuting; launch 
or sign a petition calling on the government to make stronger commitments to lowering 
carbon emissions and investing in renewable energy; join or volunteer in an 
organization involved with climate change; donate to or raise funds for an 
environmental group involved with climate change; purchase and consume only locally 
sourced produce; conserve energy by switching off lights in unoccupied rooms and 
turning off unused appliances at home/work. Factor analysis revealed that the last item: 
switching off lights in unoccupied rooms, emerged as a separate factor (Eigenvalue = 
1.11, variance explained = 18.53%) while the others loaded on one factor (Eigenvalue 
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= 3.00, variance explained = 50%, α = .78). Nonetheless, the scale was used as unitary 
measure since the ‘switching off lights’ item had an acceptable item-total correlation in 
the combined scale (r = .32). 
There were other measures included in the questionnaire that are not considered in this 
chapter. These include measures of education, a six-item version of the New Ecological 
Paradigm (NEP) scale, acceptance of responsibility, self-rated and objective climate 
change knowledge, perceived social norms and emotional responses to climate change: 
anger, fear and worry (see Appendix 8). 
Results and discussion 
Preliminary analyses 
Participants’ description of their mental visualization of the imagined flood experience 
produced similar themes as those observed in the previous studies. Most descriptions 
were related to emotional responses to the consequences of the flood (e.g., “pretty 
scared many valuables lost, will insurance cover all aspects?”, “worry, concern for 
family, friends, animals”, “feeling fear, despair, panic”) and visualization of damage 
caused by the flood (“a scene of utter devastation – everything under water and people 
clambering to be rescued”, “stone buildings being washed away, cars submerged in 
water, damage to businesses, children unable to attend school”). 
There was no significant correlation between previous flood experience and the 
vividness of participants’ mental imagery of experiencing the imagined flood (r (117) 
= .08, p = .407) or their likelihood of seeing a link between the flooding caused by 
Storm Desmond and climate change (r (241) = .01, p = .907). However, the vividness 
of participants’ mental imagery of experiencing the imagined flood was positively 
correlated with their likelihood of seeing a link between climate change and the 
flooding caused by Storm Desmond (r (121) = .28, p =.002), and negatively correlated 
with pre-existing climate change scepticism (r (121) = -.19, p =.035). Zero order 
correlations among the measured variables are presented in Table 4.8. 
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Table 4.8. Zero-order intercorrelations among the variables addressed in Study 3 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Imagined 
Experience 
-.06 .02 .09 .08 .12† -.03 .03 
2. Past flood 
Experience 
 -.06 .01 .10 .08 .05 .11† 
3. Pre-test 
Scepticism 
  
-
.71*** 
-
.72*** 
-
.68*** 
-
.53*** 
-
.51*** 
4. Attribution    .70*** .64*** .50*** .48*** 
5. Perceived Threat     .80*** .62*** .59*** 
6. Concern      .56*** .57*** 
7. Perceived 
Efficacy 
      .58*** 
8. Behavioural 
Intentions 
      - 
†p<.10, ***p<.001, N = 245 (except correlations with Past Flood Experience, N = 241). 
Tests of hypotheses 
I found no support for my hypotheses as participants in the imagined flood condition 
did not report significantly higher levels of perceived threat (H1), concern (H2) or 
perceived efficacy (H3) (Table 4.9). 
I tested the mediation and moderated mediation hypotheses using the PROCESS macro 
for SPSS (Hayes, 2013), with prior flood experience, pre-test scepticism, gender, and 
age controlled. Contrary to expectation, there was no significant interaction between 
attribution and the imagined flood experience manipulation in their effect on perceived 
threat (H4: B = -.05, SE = .07, 95% CI: [-.19, .10]), concern (H5: B = .03, SE = .11, 
95% CI: [-.18, .25]), and perceived efficacy (H6: B = -.04, SE = .12, 95% CI: [-.27, 
.21]). The imagined flood experience manipulation had a significant indirect effect on 
behavioural intentions through concern (B = .05, SE = .03, 95% CI: [.00, .14]) but not 
perceived threat (B = .03, SE = .03, 95% CI: [-.01, .10]), or perceived efficacy (B = -
.05, SE = .04, 95% CI: [-.14, .03]). 
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Table 4.9. participant mean scores on the dependent variables across the experimental 
conditions 
DV Condition 
t 
Control 
(N = 124) 
Imagined 
experience 
(N = 121) 
 M(SD) 
Perceived Threat 4.55(1.23) 4.75(1.28) -1.26 
Concern 4.55(1.68) 4.93(1.66) -1.81† 
Perceived Efficacy 3.85(1.34) 3.76(1.51) .52 
Behavioural 
Intentions 
4.09(1.21) 4.15(1.23) 
-.39 
†p<.10 
However, attribution did not significantly moderate any indirect effects of the imagined 
flood experience mediated by perceived threat (H7: IMM11 – B = -.01, SE = .02, 95% 
CI: [-.06, .01]), concern (H8: IMM – B = -.01, SE = .02, 95% CI: [-.05, .02]) or 
perceived efficacy (H9: IMM – B = .01, SE = .03, 95% CI: [-.06, .06]). 
The results of this experiment failed to replicate the previously observed effects of the 
imagined flood experience manipulation on perceived threat or concern. Contrary to 
expectation, there was also no significant interaction between the imagined flood 
experience and attribution in their effects on perceived threat, concern or perceived 
efficacy. It is not clear why the manipulation had no effect on the dependent variables 
in this experiment. The level of perceived threat and concern may have been already so 
high among the participants that exposure to the imagined flood experience could not 
raise it further. The effects of the manipulation are unlikely to have been suppressed by 
pre-existing scepticism12 as this was controlled for. Nonetheless, given that attribution 
significantly predicted perceived threat, concern and perceived efficacy, I conducted a 
subsequent experiment examining the extent to which a direct manipulation of 
participants’ attribution of the imagined flood event would impact the effect of the 
imagined flood experience manipulation on climate change attitudes. 
                                                 
11 IMM refers to the index of moderated mediation. This value represents the slope of the line relating 
an indirect effect to values of a moderator (see Hayes, 2015). 
12 I also explored potential interactions between pre-test scepticism and the imagined experience 
manipulation, as well as three-way interactions between pre-test scepticism, attribution and the 
imagined experience manipulation. Neither of these had any significant effects on the perceived threat, 
concern, perceived efficacy or behavioural intentions. 
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Study 7 
Aims and hypotheses 
The aim of Study 7 was to assess how a direct manipulation of the attribution of an 
imagined flood would interact with the imagined flood experience in influencing 
climate change perceptions and behavioural intentions. The manipulation of the 
attribution of the imagined flood experience was to be achieved by citing scientific 
statements suggesting that the flood was/was not linked to climate change. Therefore, 
I also explored the extent to which trust in scientists as a source of information on 
climate change moderated the effectiveness of the manipulation on climate change 
attitudes. Additionally, to address possible ceiling effects created by high levels of pre-
existing concern about climate change in Study 6, I controlled for the effects of pre-test 
concern. 
Public distrust of authorities and experts is a major barrier to climate change mitigation 
and adaptation (Gifford, 2011). When people lose trust in science or scientists as a 
source of climate change information, they become more sceptical and less likely to 
engage in actions that help address climate change (Gifford, 2011; Gifford et al., 2011; 
Matthews, 2015). Visual information is often used in the popular media, and in 
communication by NGOs, to illustrate reports of scientific research concerning climate 
change (see O’Neill & Smith, 2014). Research in the US shows that people who 
actively choose to watch climate change films generally have a higher level of trust in 
scientists and environmental groups than those who don’t (Leiserowitz, 2004), 
suggesting that trust may play a role in the way people engage with external climate 
change imagery. Consequently, it seems likely that the effects of mental imagery on 
climate change perceptions may be modulated by trust in scientists; especially when 
the events simulated are framed in the context of scientific perspectives on the link 
between extreme weather and climate change.  
I hypothesized that individuals who attribute their mentally simulated flood experience 
to climate change will be more likely to report increased perceived threat (H1), concern 
(H2), and perceived efficacy (H3) compared with individuals who have not had a 
mentally simulated flood experience. Further, I hypothesized that trust in scientists 
would have a significant interaction with the manipulation whereby the effect of 
attributing or not attributing a mentally simulated flood experience on perceived threat 
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(H4), concern (H5), efficacy (H6) will be significantly stronger among individuals with 
higher levels of trust in scientists than those with lower levels of trust. Lastly, I 
hypothesized that trust in scientists as a source of climate change information will 
moderate the indirect effects of the imagined experience manipulation on behavioural 
intentions mediated by perceived threat (H7), concern (H8) and perceived efficacy 
(H9), whereby the indirect effects of attributing or not attributing the imagined flood 
experience to climate change will be strongest at the lowest and highest levels of trust 
in scientists as a source of information on climate change. 
 Method 
Participants and procedure 
I recruited 230 UK residents to participate in an online experiment through adverts 
placed on social media (Facebook, Reddit) and circulated through a national 
psychology postgraduate student mailing list. The sample comprised 62 males (27%) 
and 158 females (68.7%)13 with a mean age of 29.73 years (SD = 12.27). Entry in a 
raffle for two £25 shopping vouchers was offered as an incentive for participation. In 
the information sheet provided to participants prior to the start of the experiment, they 
were informed that they would be required to answer questions pertaining to their 
attitudes toward extreme weather and climate change. 
Procedure 
 At the start of the experiment, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire 
measuring their demographic profile (gender, age, and political affiliation) and the 
control and independent variables (pre-test scepticism, past flood experience and trust 
in scientists). Subsequently, participants were randomly allocated to one of three 
conditions: an attributed imagined flood condition (N = 77), a dis-attributed imagined 
flood condition (N = 71) or the control condition (N = 82). 
Participants in the attributed imagined flood condition were presented with the 
following message: 
“Beginning on Saturday, 4th December 2015, ‘Storm Desmond’ brought exceptionally 
heavy rainfall to large parts of northern England, southern Scotland and north Wales. 
The rainfall resulted in record-breaking flooding in Cumbria, Northumberland and the 
                                                 
13 10 participants (4.3%) declined to report their gender or reported their gender as ‘other’ 
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Scottish Borders. In the course of the following three days, 45,700 homes across the 
UK were left without power, over a thousand people were evacuated from their homes, 
and three people died as a result of the severity of the wind and rainstorms. The storm 
also caused extensive disruption to critical road, rail and air transport services across 
the country. According to Met Office Chief Scientist, Professor Dame Julia Slingo, the 
“extraordinary amounts of water” dumped by the storm broke precipitation records 
going back to the 1800s”. Scientists at the Center for Atmospheric Sciences also added 
that “the characteristics of Storm Desmond appear to be consistent with the pattern of 
extreme weather events that are expected to become more likely as a consequence of 
global climate change.” (Sources: BBC News; Met Office). 
After reading this message, they were instructed to imagine being a victim of the 
flooding using the same prompt employed in the previous experiments, and asked to 
describe as many aspects of their imagined scenario as possible. 
Participants in the dis-attributed imagined flood were presented with the following 
message:  
“Beginning on Saturday, 4th December 2015, Storm Desmond brought exceptionally 
heavy rainfall to large parts of northern England, southern Scotland and north Wales. 
The rainfall resulted in record-breaking flooding in Cumbria, Northumberland and the 
Scottish Borders. In the course of the following three days, 45,700 homes across the 
UK were left without power, over a thousand people were evacuated from their homes, 
and three people lost their lives due to the severity of the wind and rainstorms. The 
storm also caused extensive disruption to critical road, rail and air transport services 
across the country. According to Met Office Chief Scientist, Professor Dame Julia 
Slingo, the “extraordinary amounts of water” dumped by the storm broke precipitation 
records going back to the 1800s. However, scientists at the Center for Atmospheric 
Sciences also added that “the characteristics of Storm Desmond do not appear to be 
consistent with the pattern of extreme weather events that are expected to result from 
global climate change”. 
After reading this message, they were prompted to imagine themselves as victims of 
the flooding using the same prompt employed in the previous experiments and asked to 
describe as many aspects their imagined scenario as possible. 
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Following the same procedure as the preceding studies, participants in the attributed 
and dis-attributed imagined flood conditions were also asked to indicate how easy it 
was for them to imagine being in the flooding situation (response: 1 = very difficult, 7 
= very easy), how vivid their mental imagery of being in the situation was (response: 1 
= not vivid, 7 = very vivid), and how likely they thought it was that Storm Desmond 
and the extreme flooding it caused are linked to climate change (response: 1 = not at all 
likely, 7 = very likely). After completing the task, participants were directed to 
complete the dependent variable measures. 
Participants in the control condition were presented only with a description of Storm 
Desmond and its impacts, excluding the statement regarding its link to climate change. 
This description was presented after participants in this condition had already 
completed the dependent variable measures. They were then asked to indicate how 
likely they thought it was that the storm and consequent flooding are linked to climate 
change (response: 1 = not at all likely, 7 = very likely). The experiment was 
administered using an online survey platform and participants were allowed to complete 
the study at any time or place of their choosing. 
Measures 
Trust in scientists (M = 4.31, SD = 0.62, α = .61) was measured with two items. I asked 
participants to indicate how much trust they have in the following to provide the public 
with information on climate change: “Scientists” and “Meteorologists”. Responses 
were recorded with a 5-point scale (1 = no trust, 5 = a lot of trust). 
Pre-test climate change concern (M = 3.27, SD = 0.71) was measured with a single 
item: “how concerned are you about global climate change?” (response: 1 = not 
concerned, 5 = very concerned). 
Pre-test scepticism (M = 1.77, SD = 0.71, α = .84), perceived threat (M = 5.20, SD = 
1.07, α = .90), concern (M = 5.66, SD = 1.31) and perceived efficacy (M = 4.08, SD = 
1.53, α = .80) were measured using the same scales employed in Study 6. 
Behavioural intentions (M = 4.46, SD = 1.15, α = .71) were measured with six items. I 
asked participants how likely they were to engage in the following behaviours in the 
future (within next four weeks): “mostly walk, cycle or use public transport when 
commuting”, “launch or sign a petition calling on the government to make stronger 
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commitments to lowering carbon emissions and investing in renewable energy”, 
“donate to, or raise funds for, an environmental group involved with climate change”, 
“purchase and consume only locally sourced produce”, “conserve energy by switching 
off lights in unoccupied rooms and turning off unused appliances”. Responses were 
recorded with a 7-point scale (1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely). Principal axis factor 
analysis with oblimin rotation revealed that that two of the items (‘mostly walk, cycle 
or use public transport when commuting” and “switch off lights in unoccupied rooms 
and turn off unused appliances”) load on one factor (Eigenvalue = 1.28, variance 
explained = 21.36%, α = .41), while the remaining items load on another (Eigenvalue 
= 2.55, variance explained = 42.51%, α = .65). However, considering that the two items 
did not constitute a reliable scale, the combined measure was retained in the analysis.  
Other measures were included in the questionnaire that are not considered in this 
chapter. These include belief in anthropogenic climate change, perceived social norms 
regarding engagement in pro-environmental behaviour, acceptance of responsibility for 
acting on climate change, and emotional responses to climate change: anger, fear, worry 
(see Appendix 9). 
 Results and discussion 
Preliminary analyses 
Participants’ descriptions of their mental visualizations of the flood yielded similar 
themes as the previous studies: the physical dynamics of the flood (e.g., “floods of dirty 
water inundating every part of the ground floor of my house”, “water running under 
the doors, up through the toilets and sinks”), personal loss incurred due to the floods 
(e.g., “floodwater has done extensive damage to my home and property”, “I have lost 
all my worldly possessions”) and emotional reactions to the effects of the flood (e.g., “I 
feel a mixture of emotions, from terror to depression and shock to see my local area so 
damaged”, “feeling helpless, stressed, trapped”). However, there was also a handful of 
responses (<20%) suggesting that some participants were unable to engage with the 
task (e.g., “?”, “sorry but I’m terrible at creative writing, I’m a maths student” “this is 
quite a strange exercise I think”, “fairly rubbish”).  
Nonetheless, I determined the effectiveness of the manipulation by comparing the 
extent to which participants attributed Strom Desmond and the flooding it caused to 
climate change (Table 4.10). In this regard there was significant difference in levels of 
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attribution across the conditions (F (2, 229) = 7.22, p = .001), with participants in the dis-
attributed imagined flood experience condition (Table 10) significantly rating the 
likelihood that Storm Desmond and the consequent flooding are linked to climate 
change lower than those in the control (p = .042) and attributed imagined flood 
experience (p = .001) conditions. However, the difference between the control and the 
attributed imagined flood experience condition was not significant (p = .399). The lack 
of a significant difference in levels of attribution between participants in the control 
condition and those in the attributed imagined flood experience condition may be due 
to the fact that people are more likely to attribute flooding to climate change 
spontaneously (see Capstick et al., 2015), thereby making it difficult to improve on this 
default position.  
Similar to the previous studies, there was no significant relationship between previous 
flood experience and vividness of participants’ mental imagery of experiencing the 
imagined flood (r (147) = .08, p = .321). There was also no significant relationship 
between vividness of participants’ mental imagery and attribution (r (147) = .154, p = 
.063), perceived threat (r (147) = .08, p = .328), concern (r (147) = .10, p =. 247) or 
perceived efficacy (r (147) = .09, p = .277). Zero-order correlations among the 
measured variables are presented in Table 4.11. 
Table 4.10. Participants mean scores on the dependent variables across experimental 
conditions 
DV Experimental Condition 
F 
 Imagined 
experience dis-
attributed 
(N = 71) 
Control 
(N = 82) 
Imagined 
experience 
attributed 
(N = 77) 
 M(SD) 
Attribution 5.11(1.41) 5.63(1.20) 5.87(1.09) 7.22** 
Perceived Efficacy 4.26(1.42) 4.44(1.40) 4.40(1.44) .59 
Concern 5.68(1.26) 5.62(1.26) 5.67(1.42) .04 
Perceived Threat 5.09(1.04) 5.20(1.10) 5.28(1.07) .45 
Behavioural 
Intentions 
4.47(1.01) 4.41(1.24) 4.51(1.19) 
.16 
**p<.01 
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Table 4.11. Zero-order intercorrelations among the variables addressed in Study 4. 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Imagined 
Experience  
(Dis-attributed) 
-.47 -.01 .00 .04 -.05 -.07 .01 -.06 .00 
2. Imagined 
Experience 
(Attributed) 
 -.06 .04 -.07 -.03 .06 .01 .02 .03 
3. Trust   -.27 .26 .06 .14 .21 .15 .08 
4. Pre-test Scepticism    -.55 -.09 -.34 -.17 -.08 -.17 
5. Pre-test Concern     .08 .37 .40 .19 .37 
6. Past flood 
Experience 
     .06 .09 -.03 .03 
7. Perceived Threat       .58 .36 .46 
8. Concern        .28 .49 
9. Perceived Efficacy         .43 
10. Behavioural 
Intentions 
        - 
Cell entries in boldface are significant at α = .05. N = 229. 
Tests of hypotheses 
I found no support for my hypotheses as participants in the control condition did not 
report significantly different mean levels of perceived threat (H1), concern (H2), or 
perceived efficacy (H3) than those in either of the attributed or dis-attributed imagined 
experience conditions (Table 4.10). However, there was a significant interaction 
between experimental condition and trust in scientists as a source of climate change 
information as predictors of perceived threat (H4) (Table 4.12), whereby the attributed 
imagined flood experience condition produced significantly increased levels of 
perceived threat (B = .39, SE = .14, 95% CI: [.12, .66], N = 229) and the dis-attributed 
imagined flood experience condition produced significantly reduced perceived threat 
(B = -.44, SE = .14, 95% CI: [-.71, -.17], N = 229) among participants with a high level 
of trust in scientists14. Among participants with a low level of trust in scientists as a 
source of climate change information, there was no significant effect of either the 
                                                 
14 These estimates were derived using the control condition as the reference category. 
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attributed (B = -.10, SE = .13, 95% CI: [-.35, .16], N = 229) nor the dis-attributed (B = 
.22, SE = .14, 95% CI: [-.05, .49], N = 229) imagined flood experience on perceived 
threat (Figure 13). 
Table 4.12. Test of moderated mediation hypotheses for Study 7.15 
Mediator Model 
 
Threat Concern Efficacy 
Imagined experience 
(Dis-attributed) -.11(.10) .01(.12) -.12(.14) 
Imagined experience 
(Attributed) .15(.09) .08(.12) .13(.14) 
Trust .05(.11) .26(.14)† .25(.17) 
Imagined experience  
(Dis-attributed) x Trust -.53(.16)** -.63(.19)** -.80(.23)** 
Imagined experience 
(Attributed) x Trust .40(.15)* .42(.19)* .35(.23) 
Pre-test Scepticism -.25(.12)* .24(.14)† .17(.18) 
Pre-test Concern .44(.12)*** .87(.15)*** .53(.18)** 
Past flood experience .07(.10) .16(.12) -.01(.14) 
Gender -.13(.15) .09(.18) .20(.22) 
Age .00(.11) -.00(.01) -.01(.01) 
R2 .22 .23 .12 
F 5.73*** 6.17*** 2.71** 
N   229  
Dependent Variable Model 
 Behavioural Intentions 
Perceived Threat .13(.08) 
Concern .23(.06)*** 
Perceived Efficacy .23(.05)*** 
Imagined experience (Dis-
attributed) 
.12(.16) 
Imagined experience 
(Attributed) 
.11(.15) 
Pre-test Scepticism .02(.11) 
                                                 
15 29% of cases were ineligible to vote in the UK, would not vote or preferred not to say. Only 7.4% of 
cases identified with right-leaning parties (e.g., Conservatives, UKIP). Consequently, political 
affiliation was not included as a control variable in the analyses to preserve the sample size. 
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Pre-test Concern .24(.12)* 
Past flood experience .01(.09) 
Gender -.18(.14) 
Age .01(.01) 
R2 .38 
F 12.37*** 
N  217  
Conditional indirect effects of Imagined experience (Attributed) on 
Behavioural Intentions at Trust = Mean and Mean ± 1SD 
Mediator Trust Effect 95% CI 
Perceived Threat -1SD -.02 [-.15, .03] 
Mean .02 [-.01, .11] 
+1SD .07 [-.01, .21] 
Index of moderated mediation .07 [-.01, .26] 
Concern -1SD -.05 [-.23, .05] 
 Mean .03 [-.04, .13] 
 +1SD .12 [.02, .28] 
Index of moderated mediation .14 [.02, .35] 
Perceived Efficacy -1SD .07 [-.21, .07] 
 Mean .06 [-.08, .14] 
 +1SD .09 [-.06, .28] 
Index of moderated mediation .11 [-.04, .34] 
Conditional indirect effects of Imagined experience (Dis-attributed) on 
Behavioural Intentions at Trust = Mean and Mean ± 1SD 
Perceived Threat -1SD .06 [-.00, .21] 
 Mean -.00 [-.07, .05] 
 +1SD -.06 [-.22, .00] 
Index of moderated mediation -.10 [-.30, -.00] 
Concern -1SD .16 [.03, .33] 
 Mean .03 [-.07, .05] 
 +1SD -.10 [-.31, .01] 
Index of moderated mediation -.21 [-.46, -.06] 
Perceived Efficacy -1SD .14 [.02, .35] 
 Mean -.02 [-.13, .09] 
 +1SD -.19 [-.39, -.04] 
Index of moderated mediation -.27 [-.53, -.09] 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Confidence intervals are bias-corrected and based on 1,000 
resamples 
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There was also a significant interaction between trust and experimental condition in 
predicting concern (H5). Here, I found that the attributed imagined flood experience 
had a significant positive effect (B = .34, SE =.17, 95% CI: [.01, .67], N = 229) and the 
dis-attributed imagined flood experience had a negative effect (B = -.38, SE = .17, 95% 
CI: [-.71, -.05], N= 229) on concern among individuals with a high level of trust in 
scientists as a source of climate change information (Figure 14). Interestingly, among 
individuals with a low level of trust in scientists, the dis-attributed imagined flood 
experience condition had a significant positive effect on concern (B = .39, SE = .17, 
95% CI: [.07, .72], N = 229) but the attributed imagined flood experience had no 
significant effect (B = -.18, SE = .16, 95% CI: -.49, .14], N = 229). 
 
Figure 13. Effect of experimental condition on perceived threat at varying levels of trust 
in scientists as a source of climate change information. 
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Figure 14. Effect of experimental condition on concern at varying levels of trust in 
scientists as a source of climate change information. 
Lastly, there was also a significant interaction effect of trust and experimental condition 
on perceived efficacy (H6). Among participants with a high level of trust in scientists 
as a source of climate change information, the dis-attributed imagined flood experience 
condition had a significant negative effect on perceived efficacy (B = -.62, SE = .21, 
95% CI: [-1.02, -.21], N = 229) but the attributed imagined flood experience condition 
had no significant effect (B = .35, SE = .21, 95% CI: [-.06, .75], N = 229) on perceived 
efficacy (Figure 15). There was no significant effect of either the attributed (B = .38, 
SE = .20, 95% CI: [-.03, .78], N = 229) nor the dis-attributed imagined flood condition 
(B = -.08, SE = .20, 95% CI: [-.47, .30], N = 229) on perceived efficacy among 
individuals with a low level of trust in scientists as a source of information about climate 
change. 
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Figure 15. Effects of experimental condition on perceived efficacy at varying levels of 
trust in scientists as a source of climate change information. 
With regard to my hypotheses regarding the moderating influence of trust in scientists 
on the indirect influence of the imagined experience manipulation on behavioural 
intentions (Table 4.12), I found that trust in scientists did not significantly moderate the 
indirect influence of either the attributed or dis-attributed imagined experience 
manipulation on behavioural intentions mediated by perceived threat (H7). However, 
in partial support of my prediction (H8), the attributed imagined experience 
manipulation had a significant positive indirect effect on behavioural intentions 
mediated by concern at high levels of trust. Similarly, the dis-attributed imagined 
experience manipulation had a significant positive indirect influence on behavioural 
intentions mediated by concern at low levels of trust in scientists. I also found partial 
support for hypothesis (H9) as the dis-attributed imagined experience manipulation had 
significant positive indirect effects on behavioural intentions mediated by perceived 
efficacy at low levels of trust and significant negative indirect effects on behavioural 
intentions mediated by perceived efficacy at high levels of trust. On the other hand, the 
attributed imagined experience manipulation did not have significant indirect effects on 
behavioural intentions mediated by perceived efficacy at any level of trust in scientists 
(Table 4.12).  
Overall, the results of this experiment shed light on the role of trust as a moderator of 
the relationship between attribution, imagined experience of flooding and climate 
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change perceptions. Previous research has suggested that experiences with extreme 
weather are most likely to have an effect on climate change engagement when the 
events are attributed to climate change (Reser et al., 2012). Building on this, the 
findings in this study suggest that the extent and nature of the effect of attribution on 
climate change perceptions, when the imagined flood event is framed in the context of 
scientific statements regarding the involvement of climate change, is dependent on the 
extent to which individuals see scientists as a trustworthy source of information. When 
individuals have a high level of trust in scientists, the effect of attribution (or lack of) 
may be significantly more pronounced than when trust in scientists is low. The positive 
indirect effects of the dis-attributed imagined flood condition on behavioural intentions 
mediated by concern and perceived efficacy at low levels of trust in scientists is also an 
interesting observation. This suggests that the mentally simulated experience of 
flooding may boost concern and perceived efficacy, and lead to the formation of pro-
environmental behaviour intentions, plausibly as a consequence of individuals’ intrinsic 
inclination to act on climate change, irrespective of a lack of trust in scientists or an 
established link being drawn between the flooding event and climate change. This 
intrinsic inclination may be rooted in individuals’ knowledge or general pre-existing 
attitude toward climate change (Ortega-Egea, García-de-Frutos, & Antolín-López, 
2014).  
General discussion 
Researchers have repeatedly argued that public perception of climate change as a 
psychologically distant phenomenon – i.e., temporally, spatially and socially removed 
from our everyday experiences, is a key barrier to substantive climate change 
engagement (Brügger et al., 2015; Lorenzoni et al., 2007; McDonald et al., 2015; 
Spence et al., 2012). Extreme weather events such as flooding which may be linked to 
climate change can serve to provide concrete indications of plausible climate change 
impacts and thus highlight the reality and immediacy of the threat posed. On this basis, 
highlighting the link between local weather events and global climate change has been 
advocated as a potentially effective strategy to galvanize public action on climate 
change (Spence et al., 2011; Taylor et al., 2014). The aim of this research was to explore 
the effects of intervening factors – values and attribution, that modulate the effects of 
flood experiences on climate change attitudes using a mentally simulated experience of 
flooding. 
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As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, both direct and vicarious experiences 
contribute to the imageability of plausible climate change impacts and the mental 
imagery derived from personal experience significantly overlaps with individuals’ 
imaginative representation of climate change (Nicholson-Cole, 2005). Further, mental 
imagery and simulation mimic perception and evoke cognitive and affective 
associations, making the likely consequences of being in a specific situation or 
performing a specific action more accessible and explicit (Ji et al., 2016). On this basis, 
it seems plausible that mentally simulating an experience of flooding could trigger 
similar cognitive and affective responses as actual flood experiences. The experiments 
presented in this chapter provide some evidence that support the notion that a mentally 
simulated experience of flooding can significantly influence factors such as perceived 
threat, concern and efficacy, which have previously been shown to be subject to the 
influence of actual experiences with flooding. 
In Study 4, I found that people who were instructed to imagine themselves as victims 
of a severe flood reported significantly higher levels of perceived threat from climate 
change than those who were instructed to imagine a neutral outdoor scene. 
Additionally, the direct effect of the imagined flood experience task on perceived threat 
and indirect effect on behavioural intentions was only significant among individuals 
with a weak or average endorsement of biospheric values (i.e., those who place 
relatively lower priority on environmental protection and pro-environmental 
outcomes). Presuming that individuals with strong biospheric values typically possess 
a high level of awareness of adverse environmental trends (Hansla, 2011; Pereira & 
Forster, 2015), this finding suggests that individuals with weak biospheric values and 
possibly lower levels of intrinsic pro-environmental motivation are more likely to 
benefit from an imagined experience of a plausible consequence of climate change. In 
other words, the imagined flood experience can be interpreted as mimicking the 
capacity of actual [flood] experiences to serve as a ‘teachable moment’ (Kerr, 2013) 
and increase risk perceptions (Demski et al., 2017). 
However, in Study 5 the main effect of the imagined flood experience task was not 
replicated; plausibly because the description of the flooding did not explicitly link the 
event to climate change. When I took account of whether participants perceived the 
flood to be linked to climate change, I found that those who attributed the flooding to 
climate change reported significantly greater perceived threat and concern than 
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participants in the control condition. On the other hand, participants who did not think 
the flooding was likely to be linked to climate change reported lower levels of perceived 
threat than those in the control condition.  
Understandably, people have to see a link between extreme weather and climate change 
for their experiences of extreme weather to have any bearing on their attitudes toward 
climate change (Reser et al., 2014). While the observation that those who attributed the 
imagined flood to climate change also reported more positive engagement with climate 
change is in line with prior observations that extreme weather experiences can promote 
concern by entrenching pre-existing beliefs or providing new experiential information 
about the immediacy of the problem (Myers et al., 2013), the observation that those 
who did not think the flooding was linked to climate change reported lower threat 
perception is interesting and deserving of further investigation.  
On one hand, one could argue that pre-existing levels of scepticism caused a fraction 
of participants to reject the attribution of the flooding to climate change and that the 
lower level of perceived threat reported is merely a reflection of this pre-existing 
scepticism. Indeed, I did not control for prior levels of scepticism in Study 5, so it is 
impossible to completely discount this explanation. However, I accounted for the 
strength of individuals’ biospheric values in the analysis and this should address some 
of the variation in scepticism to an extent. This therefore raises the a more problematic 
possibility that providing a narrative for the mental simulation of a flood experience in 
the absence of an explicit attribution of the flood event may have caused some 
individuals to rationalize the imagined experience in a way that reduced their sense of 
perceived threat. Such outcomes have been addressed in prior research on the use of 
extreme weather experiences as an avenue for proximizing climate change, and scholars 
have counselled that caution be exercised in the use of this strategy due to the potential 
for ‘backfire’ effects such as denial and apathy (Brügger et al., 2015). 
The importance of attribution, especially the negative effects of not attributing the flood 
experience to climate change, is further reiterated in Study 7 where I found that 
participants who did not see a link between the imagined flood and climate change 
reported lower perceived threat, concern and perceived efficacy than those in the 
control group if they had a high level of trust in scientists as a source of climate change 
information. The findings in Study 7 are more robust because I controlled for pre-
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existing levels of climate change concern and scepticism. The results of Study 7 also 
speak to the need to build and maintain a high level of public confidence in the role of 
scientists as climate change ‘experts’ and purveyors of trustworthy information. 
Additionally, the dissemination of information about extreme weather events and 
climatic incidents as part of climate change discourse must be firmly married with the 
scientific consensus that all of contemporary global weather and climate is subject to 
the influence of anthropogenic climate change (Trenberth, 2012), and that concerted 
mitigation action is necessary to avert future negative impacts. 
Overall, the results of Study 4, Study 5 and Study 7 suggest that the imagined flood 
experience task has some potential as a means of promoting perceived threat and 
concern about climate change depending on people’s values, and whether they perceive 
the flood to be linked with climate change, and whether they have trust in scientists as 
a source of climate change information. However, the manipulation did not have a 
significant main effect on perceived threat or perceived efficacy in Study 6. Although, 
there was a significant indirect effect of the manipulation on behavioural intentions 
mediated by concern. There was also no significant interaction between the imagined 
flood experience manipulation and attribution in their effects on the dependent 
variables.   
There are a number of reasons why the imagined flood manipulation may fail to 
produce a significant effect. Firstly, prior applications of mental simulation techniques 
in other fields indicate that mental simulation may not be powerful enough to 
independently change strong or intractable attitudes (e.g., Dermody, Jones, & 
Cumming, 2013). It is possible that the perceptions of climate change among the sample 
involved in Study 6 was so strong as to be impervious to the imagined flood experience 
task regardless of whether the subjects attributed the flooding to climate change. 
Secondly, looking at the mean differences between the participants in the control 
condition and the imagined flood experience condition, those in the imagined flood 
experience condition reported greater concern and perceived threat as expected but 
perhaps the sample size was insufficient to detect the effect of the imagined experience 
manipulation. Lastly, the influence of the imagined flood experience on perceived 
threat, concern, and perceived efficacy may have been masked by a ceiling effect. All 
the subjects across the four experiments volunteered freely to participate in the research. 
It is possible that a large proportion of individuals with relatively strong interest or 
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attitudes regarding climate change self-selected into the studies. Therefore, if this 
means that they also already have high levels of climate change consciousness and 
concern then there would be little room to significantly change their attitudes for the 
better regardless of the strength of the manipulation. 
Nonetheless, there are important questions regarding the use of the imagined flood 
experience as an instrument for influencing attitudes and perceptions that can be 
explored in further research. For example, the description of the flood event and 
instructions for the imagined scenario only focused on adverse impacts of the flood on 
victims. Other applications of mental simulation techniques such as in imagined contact 
research have emphasized the role of mental simulation as a source of a behavioural 
script to guide future action (Crisp, Stathi, Turner, & Husnu, 2009). On this basis, it 
might be worthwhile to include a script prompting individuals to imagine themselves 
engaging in mitigation actions as part of their response to the imagined flood and see if 
this affects their perceived instrumentality in addressing climate change as well as their 
inclination to perform these actions in real-life. As suggested by Spence et al. (2011), 
extreme weather experiences influence perceived efficacy and instrumentality by 
providing a concrete representation of the likely consequences of individual actions. 
Additionally, further research could investigate whether the spatial proximity of the 
flooding event used in the manipulation has an impact on imageability and the 
consequent effects of the imagined experience manipulation. The scenarios employed 
in my four studies were high profile, widely publicised events that most participants 
would either have directly experienced or seen in the news. It would be informative to 
determine if the effectiveness of the manipulation depends on the accessibility of the 
actual event detailed in the research material or whether individuals draw on their own 
previous direct and indirect experiences with flooding in constructing their mental 
imagery of the imagined flood. 
It is also possible that the imagined experience manipulation had limited effectiveness 
in motivating action because the flood event was quite removed from the behavioural 
outcomes measured, in the sense that there are intervening steps that need to take place 
between the experience and the consequent action (this consideration also applies to 
actual flood experience). First, participants needed to link the experience of the flooding 
to climate change. Then they had to evaluate the seriousness of the threat posed and 
their own capability to address the threat. Lastly, they had to be aware that the 
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behaviours specified would be effective in addressing climate change before they could 
decide to engage in the behaviours or at least form intentions to do so. Therefore, the 
direct impact of the manipulation may be largely limited to more proximate beliefs and 
affective responses such as perceived threat and concern. 
I primarily focused on the effects of the manipulation in my experiments. The process 
through which the imagined flood experience manipulation might affect climate change 
perceptions was assumed based on prior arguments that mental imagery of climate 
change impacts and other salient environmental problems can significantly affect 
attitudes and behaviour by increasing the availability of climate change information 
(Leiserowitz, 2004, 2006) and acting as a trigger for engagement in pro-environmental 
behaviour (Boomsma et al., 2016). However, in subsequent research, it would be 
worthwhile to establish through experimental methods that these processes are also 
engaged by imagined experiences of flooding or other extreme weather events.   
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Chapter 5 
The interplay between descriptive and injunctive social norms as influences on climate 
change perceptions and pro-environmental behaviour 
Introduction 
In the last two chapters, I have addressed the influence of real and imagined experiences of the 
physical world on individuals’ responses to climate change. Here, I focus on how individuals’ 
attitudes and behaviour are shaped by their experience of their social environment. An 
extensive body of evidence suggests that people care greatly about what others do and think, 
and social norm dynamics can be instrumental in achieving societal outcomes (Farrow, 
Grolleau, & Ibanez, 2017; Miller & Prentice, 2016; Nyborg et al., 2016). A prominent 
contemporary example of the efficacy of social norms as motivation for behaviour change is 
the dramatic reduction in tobacco use due to changing social attitudes toward smoking in many 
parts of the world (Alamar & Glantz, 2006; Stuber, Galea, & Link, 2008). Such examples are 
a basis for optimism that social norms-based strategies also hold promise for curbing 
environmentally unsustainable social practices. 
In subsequent sections of this chapter, I discuss how the actions and expectations of other 
individuals in our environment inform our beliefs, trigger our emotions, and guide our actions 
through processes of social influence. Building on conceptualizations of social norms, and 
theorizing about social influence, from different social psychological traditions, I develop 
hypotheses concerning the way interactions between unwritten social rules about what is done 
and what ought to be done in specific situations affect individuals’ behavioural responses to 
climate change. These hypotheses were tested in two studies using correlational and 
experimental methods. The purpose of this research is to tackle unresolved questions in our 
current understanding of how environmental behaviour is shaped by influences deriving from 
our social context, particularly how individuals are affected by congruence and incongruence 
in the actions and expectations of important social referents.    
Explicating social norms 
Social life is characterized by social norms i.e. shared patterns of thought, feeling and 
behaviour among people (Hogg & Reid, 2006; Hogg & Vaughan, 2008), or ‘normative social 
similarities and differences between people’ (Turner, 1991). An alternative conception of social 
norms is that they are rules and standards that are understood by members of a group or society, 
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and that guide or constrain behaviour without the force of laws (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Social 
norms emerge from interpersonal interactions, and can include general societal expectations 
for our behaviour (injunctive norms), the expectations of valued others for our behaviour 
(subjective norms), our own expectations for our behaviour (personal norms) and the standards 
that develop from our observations of others’ behaviour (descriptive norms) (Cialdini & Trost, 
1998). Through processes of social influence16, norms modulate individuals’ perceptions, 
attitudes and behaviour by eliciting compliance or conformity (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; 
Hogg & Vaughan, 2008). In other words, people may align their attitudes and behaviour with 
prevailing social norms because they yield to (or comply with) direct or indirect pressure from 
an individual or group, or they may choose to conform with prevailing social norms because 
they are genuinely persuaded that the norms are appropriate and socially desirable.  
A key prerequisite of compliance is that the source of social influence is perceived by the target 
of social influence to have power (Moscovici, 1976). Such power might be related to the 
target’s belief that the influencer has more information than themselves (informational power), 
is authorized by a recognised power structure to command and make decisions (legitimate 
power), or has greater expertise than themselves (expert power). The target may also comply 
due to identification with, attraction to, or respect for the source of influence (referent power), 
or because they believe the source of influence has the ability to offer rewards for compliance 
(reward power) or give or threaten punishment (coercive power) (Hogg & Vaughan, 2008; 
Raven, 1965). However, because compliance does not reflect internal change, it typically 
persists only when behaviour is under surveillance.  
On the other hand, the subjective validity of social norms plays a greater role than power in 
eliciting conformity. People often look to the behaviours of others (descriptive norms) for 
evidence of what is likely to be an effective or adaptive action in a given circumstance 
(Cialdini, 1988). The greater the number of people who respond to the situation in a given way, 
the more correct the behaviour is perceived to be (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Thibaut & Kelley, 
1959). The ‘social proof’ provided by the popularity of the behavioural response serves a 
decision-making heuristic that helps save cognitive effort and time while providing an outcome 
with a high probability of being effective (Cialdini, 2001; Cialdini & Trost, 1998). This mode 
of acquiescence to social norms arises from a desire to make correct decisions (Cialdini & 
                                                 
16 Raven (1965) defines social influence as a change in an individual’s cognition, attitude or behaviour that has 
its origin in another person or group. 
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Trost, 1998); it leads to conformity through ‘an influence to accept information from other 
individuals as evidence of reality’(Deutsch & Gerard, 1955), otherwise known as informational 
social influence.  
Conformity may also arise from a desire to build and maintain satisfactory social relationships 
with others. According to Cialdini and Trost (1998), social norms have power to influence 
because they help clarify the behaviours expected of us by others in our social world. Social 
expectations about what ought to be done in a given situation (injunctive norms) characterize 
the perception of what most people approve or disapprove of; they also prescribe the ‘moral 
code’ of the group (Cialdini et al., 1991). Through a process of normative social influence, the 
need to gain social acceptance and maintain a sense of belonging in one’s social group (or in 
society) drives people to conform with the positive expectations of others and avoid acting in 
ways that will be met with disapproval (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955).  
The effects of both informational and normative social influence are contingent on the 
similarity of the source of reference (Festinger, 1954). People do not indiscriminately imitate 
other individuals in their environment (Allison, 1992). Rather, they are more likely to look to 
similar individuals (such as in-group members), who show visible signs of success (e.g., status, 
power or wealth), for evidence of the most effective course of action. Likewise, considering 
that social approval is one of the goals that underlies conformity with injunctive norms, similar 
individuals are more likely to have a marked effect on our felt obligation to act in line with 
social expectations than dissimilar individuals (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). For example, college 
students are more likely to consider the norms of their fellow students than the norms of their 
parents when deciding whether, and how much, to drink (Perkins, 2002).  
From a social identity perspective, the motivation to conform may also be contingent on the 
extent to which the social normative referent is seen to be prototypical of a social group with 
which the target of social influence strongly identifies (Glynn, 1997; Hogg & Reid, 2006; 
Rimal & Real, 2005). People cognitively represent social categories as prototypes that capture 
similarities between people within the same group and differences between groups. Prototypes 
maximise the ratio of intergroup differences to intragroup differences and serve to enhance the 
perceived entitativity17 of a group (D. L. Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Hogg & Reid, 2006). In 
                                                 
17 Entitativity refers to the property of a group that makes it appear to be a coherent and distinct entity that is 
homogenous, well structured, has clear boundaries and whose members have a common fate (D. T. Campbell, 
1958; D. L. Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Hogg & Reid, 2006) 
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the process of categorizing people, we perceive them through the lens of the relevant group 
prototype and represent them in terms of how well they embody the prototype. Since group 
prototypes specify how people, feel, think and behave, social categorization generates 
stereotypical expectations and encourages stereotype-consistent interpretation of ambiguous 
behaviours (Hogg & Reid, 2006). Additionally, social categorization generally involves the 
self or is typically in reference to oneself; thus, we also categorize ourselves in the same way 
we categorise others (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987b). Through this 
process, social categorization transforms self-conception, generates group identification, and 
governs how we feel and behave to conform to the group prototype. The individual’s 
representation of group norms is described by the group prototype and the prescriptive force 
of the prototype is dependent on the centrality of the in-group identity to the individual’s self-
concept (in other words the extent to which they identify with the group) (Abrams & Hogg, 
1990). On this basis, prototypical group members are likely to be a strong source of social 
influence18 because they embody the group prototype and are consequently liked by fellow 
group members; they are the focus of conformity and attention for information about the group 
norm; they tend to act in group-serving ways due to their strong identity with the group; and 
they elicit trust from other group members because their behaviour benefits the group as a 
whole (Hogg & Reid, 2006; van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, De Cremer, & Hogg, 2004).   
The importance of social norms in shaping behaviour is widely emphasized across the social 
and natural sciences (Bicchieri, 2006; Ehrlich & Levin, 2005; Ostrom, 2000; Schultz, Nolan, 
Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007). However, as reflected in the preceding discussion, 
there are several different theoretical perspectives on the mechanisms through which social 
influence operates. In the next section, I proceed to discuss the focus of this research: the 
interaction between descriptive and injunctive norms. Specifically, I present a brief review of 
empirical evidence regarding how individuals’ behaviour and perceptions are affected by the 
interplay between the two types of norms.  
                                                 
18 Note that the social identity perspective on social influence diverges from norm focus theory in viewing 
adherence to normative behaviour and conformity to in-group prototypes as arising from the process of 
depersonalization based on self-categorization (i.e., the extent to which individuals define themselves in terms 
of group membership) rather than simple reference to other group members as sources of appropriate/adaptive 
behaviour or fear of social sanctions for norm violation (Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Hogg & Reid, 2006).  
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The interaction between descriptive and injunctive social norms 
Conforming to social norms is often the best course of action because collective wisdom tends 
to serve the individual and the group well, and people are most likely to look to others for 
guidance on how to behave in situations that are novel, uncertain or ambiguous (Cialdini, 2001; 
Lapinski & Rimal, 2005). People may look to others to know what they are doing 
(informational dependence) or they may be concerned about others’ evaluation of their 
behaviours (effect dependence) (E. E. Jones & Gerard, 1967). Social norms serve to help 
people define a certain situation, and this definition enables them to understand specific events 
within that situation (Fazio, 1990). People might look to their referents to determine the 
prevailing norms regarding a specific behaviour, but if they believe that their behaviours will 
not be known to others, they may choose to defy the norms. On the other hand, if informational 
dependence is coupled with a credible threat of social sanctions for violating the norm, 
conformity may be driven by injunctive norms, or a combination of descriptive and injunctive 
norms (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005).    
Until recently, the relationship between descriptive and injunctive norms was not clearly 
addressed in the literature (see Lapinski & Rimal, 2005; Smith & Louis, 2008, for comments 
on this issue). One could presume that when people observe many others engaging in a 
behaviour, they likely conclude that the behaviour is socially acceptable and few or no social 
sanctions will be evoked by engaging in the behaviour. Yet, the perceived similarity between 
oneself and the actors, and observations about whether the actions are subsequently sanctioned 
or rewarded for their behaviours, can also determine whether specific behaviours are perceived 
as being socially acceptable or deviant in nature (Bandura, 1973). Given that descriptive and 
injunctive norms can exercise different influences on behaviour, and may be communicated 
through different mechanisms, it is necessary to address the interaction between the two types 
of norms in any attempt to model the motivational effects of social influence (Lapinski & 
Rimal, 2005; J. R. Smith et al., 2012). 
Some authors have argued that norms are meaningless unless their violation invokes some form 
of sanction (Bendor & Swistak, 2001). On this basis, Rimal and Real (2003) proposed that 
injunctive norms moderate the effects of descriptive norms, such that the influence of 
descriptive norms on behaviours is amplified when injunctive norms are also strong and 
reduced when injunctive norms are weak. In other words, when people perceive a certain 
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behaviour to be widespread among their peers, they are more likely to conform if they also 
believe that social sanctions will be incurred for violating the norm.  
However, Rimal and Real (2003, 2005) failed to find support for this hypothesis in two studies 
addressing the link between social norms and drinking behaviour on US college campuses. In 
one study, they found that the perceived social approval of alcohol consumption did not 
significantly interact with the perceived prevalence of drinking on campus in predicting 
students’ intentions to drink (Rimal & Real, 2005). In another study, they found the opposite 
of their hypothesis to be true – college students who perceived that society disapproves of 
alcohol consumption, and concurrently believed that most of their peers drink, were most likely 
to drink (Rimal & Real, 2003). The results of the second study were interpreted as an indication 
that societal disapproval of students’ drinking is not a meaningful deterrent to alcohol 
consumption on college campuses19. Drawing on psychological reactance theory (Brehm, 
1966), they argued that students may perceive societal disapproval as a threat to their freedom 
to drink alcohol and consequently cling tightly to that freedom, with the result that alcohol 
consumption is construed in an even more positive light (Rimal & Real, 2003). 
Another plausible reason for Rimal and Real's (2003) failure to find support for their hypothesis 
may be the social distance of ‘society’ as a referent for norms regarding drinking among college 
students. As discussed in the previous section, individuals are less likely to be influenced by 
the actions and expectations of socially distal or non-group-prototypical referents (Cialdini & 
Trost, 1998; Festinger, 1954; van Knippenberg et al., 2004). It follows that the social 
expectations of dissimilar others are also less likely to have an impact on whether we choose 
to conform with the actions of more proximate social referents20 (e.g., Jetten, Spears, & 
Manstead, 1996). When both descriptive and injunctive norms were derived from more 
proximate social referents (close friends), the relationship between perceived descriptive norms 
and personal alcohol consumption was stronger among students who also perceived their 
friends as approving of drinking (C. M. Lee, Geisner, Lewis, Neighbors, & Larimer, 2007). 
                                                 
19 An interpretation of this from a social identity perspective is that being a ‘student’ is a more relevant social 
category than being ‘a member of society’ in the context of drinking among college students. Therefore, the 
social norms of the latter category are less likely to have an influence on students’ behaviour in this context.  
20 In relation to college drinking, Halim, Hasking and Allen (2012) found that social motives are also implicated 
in the interaction between descriptive norms and distal injunctive norms, whereby people with strong social 
motives for drinking are more likely to increase drinking in response to perceived prevalence among their peers 
and disapproval by distal social referents. People with other motives for drinking were not affected by distal 
injunctive norms; they only increased their drinking in line with descriptive norms. The two-way interaction 
between descriptive and proximal injunctive norms was not significant. 
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Smith and Louis (2008) found a significant interaction between descriptive and injunctive 
norms in the context of students’ attitudes toward the introduction of full-fee places for 
Australian undergraduate students. Places for undergraduate students have been historically 
funded through a combination of government funding and student contribution, but at the time 
of the study, the Australian government had introduced changes that would allow universities 
to offer full-fee places to students who did not meet the criteria to get government-supported 
places; this was seen by many as a betrayal of the country’s meritocratic values (J. R. Smith & 
Louis, 2008). In this study, descriptive norms had no significant independent effect on students’ 
attitudes toward signing a petition on this issue or willingness to sign a petition. However, 
supportive injunctive norms were predictive of more positive attitudes toward the target 
behaviour and greater willingness to engage in the behaviour. Further, attitudes and willingness 
to engage in the behaviour remained high among students who perceived a supportive 
injunctive norm even when the descriptive norm was non-supportive. These results were 
interpreted as indicating that injunctive norms exert a stronger motivational influence than 
descriptive norms. 
In the environmental domain, Göckeritz et al. (2010) found that high injunctive normative 
beliefs strengthened the link between descriptive normative belief and engagement in 
conservation behaviour among a sample of California residents. Although engagement in 
conservation behaviour was highest when both descriptive and injunctive normative beliefs 
were high, descriptive normative beliefs still had a significant positive link with conservation 
behaviour when injunctive normative beliefs were low. Descriptive and injunctive normative 
beliefs about conservation behaviour were only modestly correlated, and Göckeritz et al. 
(2010) highlighted the fact that while there was a level of covariance between the prevalence 
and approval of a given behaviour there was also a considerable degree of misalignment. They 
concluded that inconsistency in normative beliefs reduce the pressure to conform.  
This conclusion was subsequently backed up by Smith et al. (2012) in two experimental studies 
showing that conflicting descriptive and injunctive norms produced weaker intentions to act 
pro-environmentally, even after controlling attitudes and perceptions of control. This effect 
was replicated in Australia, China and the UK. In line with Rimal and Real's (2003) hypothesis, 
they found that supportive descriptive norms had no effect on intentions to conserve energy 
among the British sample when injunctive norms were unsupportive but supportive descriptive 
norms were associated with stronger intentions to conserve energy when injunctive norms were 
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also supportive. Similarly, among the Chinese sample, they found that supportive descriptive 
norms were linked to stronger intentions to conserve energy when injunctive norms were also 
supportive but descriptive norms had no effect on intentions when injunctive norms were 
unsupportive. Interestingly, the reverse was also the case among the Chinese sample: 
supportive injunctive norms were only associated with increased intentions to conserve energy 
when descriptive norms were supportive. Across both experiments, intentions to conserve 
energy were at their highest when supportive descriptive and injunctive norms were aligned. 
Intentions to conserve energy reduced significantly when the norms were misaligned, and were 
at their lowest when unsupportive descriptive and injunctive norms were aligned.  
However, McDonald, Fielding, and Louis (2013) have challenged the notion that norm-conflict 
can only result in lowered intentions to act. They argue, from a social identity perceptive, that 
given individuals hold multiple group memberships and are often exposed to conflicting in-
group norms, if norm-conflict only reduced the perceived effectiveness of a given behaviour, 
then, we would be paralyzed by the diversity of our social environment (pg. 59). They proposed 
that some group members (presumably high-identifiers) may be motivated to perform a 
behaviour by information that not everyone is acting, because such information is interpreted 
as an indication of the need for them to personally act. Further, they suggested that individuals’ 
attitude toward the issue in question is key to determining whether they are energized or de-
motivated by norm-conflict. These arguments were supported by findings from three studies. 
In one correlational and one experimental study, they found that norm-conflict was positively 
related to the perceived effectiveness of a range of pro-environmental behaviours among 
individuals with strong pro-environmental attitudes and negatively related to perceived 
effectiveness among individuals with weak pro-environmental attitudes. Additionally, 
perceived effectiveness significantly mediated an indirect effect of norm conflict on 
behavioural intentions. In a second experimental study, they found that perceived effectiveness 
also moderates the effect of norm conflict on behavioural intentions, such that norm conflict 
only influences intentions when perceived effectiveness is high. 
Based on the studies reviewed here, it seems clear that the nature of the interaction between 
descriptive and injunctive norms is yet to be clarified by empirical evidence. The popular 
notion that injunctive norms have a stronger influence on behaviour than descriptive norms 
(Cialdini et al., 1991; Kallgren, Reno, & Cialdini, 2000), and that the effectiveness of 
descriptive norms depends on prospective social sanctions invoked by supporting injunctive 
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norms (Bendor & Swistak, 2001; Rimal & Real, 2003), has received inconsistent empirical 
support. Misalignment between descriptive and injunctive norms may, or may not, reduce 
motivation to perform behaviours depending on individual characteristics. Therefore, one can 
conclude that the interactive influence of descriptive and injunctive norms on behaviour is still 
very much a question demanding further research.        
The current research: revisiting the interplay between descriptive and injunctive social 
norms in the context of climate change-related behaviour 
As discussed in Chapter 1, there is a considerable amount of evidence that individuals derive 
motivation to engage in pro-environmental behaviours from the actions and expectations of 
relevant social referents. Focusing people on descriptive and injunctive norms has been shown 
to have significant effects on a variety of behaviours and behavioural intentions including those 
relating to composting, littering, electricity use, sustainable holiday choices, energy 
conservation in hotels and public bathrooms, recycling etc. (Andersson & von Borgstede, 2010; 
Bergquist & Nilsson, 2016; Cialdini et al., 1991, 1990; Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 
2008; Hardeman, Font, & Nawijn, 2017; Schultz et al., 2007; White & Simpson, 2013). 
Overall, the literature suggests that social norms can elicit pro-environmental behaviour 
directly (Farrow et al., 2017), and also indirectly through their effects on attitudes, awareness 
of the negative consequences of environmental problems, responsibility attribution, perceived 
efficacy and behavioural intentions (Klöckner, 2013; McDonald et al., 2013). The purpose of 
the current research is to build on this body of work by examining the interactive effect of 
descriptive and injunctive norms on climate change-related intentions and behaviour, and 
assessing how the independent and interactive influence of the two types of norms are 
conveyed via perceived efficacy, perceived threat and concern.   
One of the reasons people look to the behaviours of others for guidance in a given situation is 
to determine what is likely to be the most effective course of action (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). 
If a certain behaviour is seen to be popular among one’s peers, then it is reasonable to conclude 
that it must be effective. Additionally, seeing that other similar individuals successfully 
perform the behaviour and achieve the desired outcome is likely to contribute to our own sense 
of efficacy to achieve the same outcome by performing the behaviour. This argument is 
supported by evidence that perceived efficacy mediates the influence of social norms on 
environmental and health behaviours (Stok, Verkooijen, de Ridder, de Wit, & de Vet, 2014; 
Thøgersen, 2014). With regard to global environmental problems like climate change, 
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McKenzie-Mohr and Smith (1999) indicate that a sense of community impacts significantly on 
individuals’ sense of control. In other words, a belief that one is acting in concert with others 
increases perceived personal efficacy and reduces individuals’ propensity to resort to denial 
and other forms of maladaptive coping (Frantz & Mayer, 2009). Based on this rationale, we 
can hypothesize that perceived efficacy mediates the effect of descriptive and injunctive norms 
on behavioural responses to climate change (H1).  
However, norm-conflict can have significant negative effects on the perceived effectiveness of 
specific behaviours (e.g., McDonald et al., 2013), and this may also impact individuals’ 
perceived efficacy in achieving the desired outcome by performing the behaviour. If a 
behaviour appears to be commonplace among fellow group members or similarly important 
social referents, but there is no indication that any social sanctions will be incurred for failing 
to conform with this norm, this may suggest that the behaviour or the outcomes associated with 
performing the behaviour are not important to the group. After all, from some perspectives, 
one of the functions of social norms is to maintain a balance between self-oriented personal 
desires and collective outcomes (e.g., Sunstein, 1996; Triandis, 1994). On the other hand, if 
fellow group members approve of a specific behaviour but only a minority are seen to perform 
the behaviour, this may signal that the behaviour is not an effective means to achieve the 
desired outcome, or that group attitudes21 toward the issue/outcome is weak, or that group 
members lack effectiveness to perform the behaviour. The latter process, in particular, can 
plausibly lead to reduced motivation to engage in normative behaviour (c.f. Smith et al., 2012) 
by reducing perceived personal efficacy. These considerations naturally lead to a hypothesis 
that the interactive effect of descriptive and injunctive norms on behaviour are significantly 
mediated by perceived personal efficacy; whereby descriptive norms significantly moderate 
the indirect effects of injunctive norms on behaviour (and behavioural intentions) that is 
mediated by perceived efficacy (H2). 
The previously established link between social norms and awareness of consequences 
(Klöckner, 2013), and social norms and climate change risk perceptions (van der Linden, 
2015), suggests that the effects of social influence extends to the processes through which 
individuals evaluate the significance of environmental threats. Given that environmental 
problems typically pose a general/collective threat, rather than target specific individuals, it 
                                                 
21 The conceptualization of attitude by Kaiser, Byrka and Hartig (2010) as a measure of the amount of difficulty 
or costs that individuals are willing to accept in order to achieve an outcome or attitudinal goal is particularly 
relevant in this case. 
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makes sense to look to the behaviours of others for what is an appropriate response. If most 
group members or important social referents are performing a behaviour in response to a salient 
issue (e.g., global climate change), and approve of fellow group members performing this 
behaviour, this should indicate that the issue in focus has significant implications for an 
outcome that is important to the group. In this way, social norms provide information, not only 
about the behaviour that is being executed, but also the issue to which the behaviour is 
performed in response to. Taking a problem like climate change for example, if other group 
members are seen to be taking mitigation action and express approval for such behaviour, this 
suggests that climate change is an issue that has important implications for the group and that 
mitigation behaviours are an effective way to address the issue.  
Some authors have suggested that perceptions of climate change as a social/collective threat, 
rather than a personal threat, is reflective of a conscious ‘psychological distancing’ of the 
problem, and thus may be associated with lower motivations to act pro-environmentally (e..g, 
Bord, Fisher, & Connor, 1998). However, an experimental study conducted by Spence and 
Pidgeon (2010) revealed that people expressed more positive attitudes toward climate change 
mitigation when it was framed as a social, as opposed to a personal, benefit. They suggest that 
this may be explained by the fact that although personal engagement with climate change may 
entail little intrinsic benefit to individuals, the societal benefits also encompasses benefits to 
individuals who are, themselves, a part of society. A subsequent study by Bolsen, Druckman, 
and Cook (2014) also found that messages that emphasize collective environmental benefits 
have significant positive effects in motivating people to act pro-environmentally in the energy 
conservation domain.  
A cynical interpretation of the influence of descriptive and injunctive norms on individual 
responses to collective threats such as climate change is that individuals need not necessarily 
see the issue as a threat to themselves (or even accept the implied significance for the group), 
but if descriptive and injunctive norms are aligned on the issue, they are likely to conform with 
the actions of the majority in order to gain the personal benefit of social approval (or avoid 
social disapproval). From this perspective, they will be acting in a way that serves the interests 
of the group purely out of a motivation to serve their personal interests. 
A less cynical interpretation is that people are motivated to achieve shared social/collective 
benefits and take personal action to mitigate collective threats because they internalize 
collective (group) goals and interests; thus, eliminating the distinction between personal and 
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collective benefits or threats. Based on the social identity perspective on social influence, we 
understand that people conform to group norms through a process of depersonalization 
(Abrams & Hogg, 1990) i.e. they define themselves in terms of a salient group membership 
and the group norms become internalized. A key argument of the social identity theory of 
influence is that conformity and normative behaviour represent internal cognitive change in a 
specific context rather than superficial compliance (Hogg & Reid, 2006; Turner, 1991). In other 
words, individuals will be motivated to act in ways that favour the group, not just because other 
group members act that way or expect them to act that way, but because group interests become 
internalised and are consequently represented cognitively as personal interests. By extension, 
this also means that if the behavioural norms regarding an issue indicate that the issue 
represents a threat to the group, then group members should also cognitively represent the issue 
as a personal threat and act accordingly. From this interpretation we can hypothesize that the 
influence of descriptive and injunctive on behavioural responses to problems like climate 
change are significantly mediated by perceived threat (H3).   
The link between perceived threat and perceived social approval of acting in a way that 
mitigates a collective threat may be strengthened by a belief that most group members are also 
acting to mitigate the threat. In this regard, the descriptive norm may become more strongly 
associated with individuals’ representation of prototypical group attitudes and behaviour, 
consequently heightening their perception of the threat posed by the focal issue and the 
likelihood that they will act in line with social expectations. On this basis, we can hypothesize 
that the interaction effect of descriptive and injunctive norms on behavioural responses to 
climate change are mediated by perceived threat; whereby unsupportive descriptive norms 
reduce the effect of supportive injunctive norms on perceived threat, and consequently reduce 
the indirect effect of injunctive norm on behaviour mediated by perceived threat (H4).  
According to Böhm (2003), collective environmental threats like climate change have a high 
potential to elicit feelings of individual responsibility because they engender both ethical and 
consequence-based evaluations. Ethical-based evaluations are linked to shared values and 
consequence-based evaluations reflect perceived threats to the self and other social group 
members (Böhm, 2003). Both evaluative paths are associated with strong emotional responses 
including concern, worry and anger (e.g., Sundblad, Biel, & Gärling, 2007); and depending on 
other intervening factors such as causal representations of the perceived threat, they may also 
give rise to a range of responses including punishment, rehabilitation and remedying (Böhm & 
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Pfister, 2000). These perspectives suggest that collective threat do not only motivate 
individuals to act, but they also elicit strong emotional responses, which may serve to further 
strengthen the motivation to act in ways that serve group interests.  
Research in the social identity perspective shows that a variety of emotions including sadness, 
anger, worry and happiness may spread among groups of individuals through processes of 
emotional contagion such as mimicry, perspective-taking, conditioning and social appraisal 
(see van Kleef & Fischer, 2016 for a review). The emotions and affective dispositions of salient 
prototypical group members, such as group leaders, can also have a significant influence on 
the feelings of other group members (e.g., Barsade, 2002). When prototypical group members 
act in ways that signal a perceptible affective response to a given issue (such as signalling 
concern about climate change by choosing to cycle instead of drive, even when this involves 
considerable personal costs, or directly communicating their concern to fellow group 
members), other group members may use this information in their evaluation of the collective 
significance of the issue and regulate their emotional reactions accordingly.  
The dynamics of shared emotions are particularly interesting because, on one hand individuals’ 
level of group identification and commitment determines the extent to which their emotions 
converge with that of other group members (e.g., Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Tanghe, 
Wisse, & van der Flier, 2010). On the other hand, the similarity of emotional responses to 
shared issues and events can also enhance self-categorization as a group member and motivate 
individuals to seek out further interactions with emotionally similar others (e.g., Livingstone, 
Shepherd, Spears, & Manstead, 2016). Research suggests that emotions play a functional role 
in groups. They help in the negotiation of members’ roles and responsibilities, aid in the 
resolution of problems relating to defection and deviance, facilitate the coordination of 
collective efforts to achieve shared goals and, most importantly in the current context, signal 
the degree to which certain behaviours are approved or disapproved in light of prevailing norms 
or group goals (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Spoor & Kelly, 2004; van Kleef & Fischer, 2016). 
Given the significance of emotions for group functioning, it is reasonable to expect that 
effective group functioning is at least partly contingent on the extent to which group members 
are able to regulate their emotions in the service of group goals (Côté, 2007; Elfenbein, 2006). 
In support of this idea, several studies have linked successful team performance with group 
member emotional intelligence (e.g., Chang, Sy, & Choi, 2012; Jordan & Troth, 2004). 
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From the foregoing discussion, we can rationally expect that the actions and expectations of 
salient social referents will have an influence on the affective reactions that individuals express 
in response to a collective threat like climate change. Further, based on evidence linking 
individual concern to both private and collective climate change mitigation intentions and 
actions (e.g., Semenza et al., 2008; Spence, Poortinga, Butler, & Pidgeon, 2011), we can also 
hypothesize that concern significantly mediates the relationship between climate change-
related behaviour and descriptive and injunctive social norms (H5). There are no clear 
indications in the literature of how the interaction between descriptive and injunctive norms 
might influence climate change concern. However, drawing on the same rationale that 
supportive descriptive norms regarding climate change mitigation may bolster the effect of 
injunctive norms on perceived threat and consequent behaviour, I hypothesized that the 
interactive influence of descriptive norm and injunctive norm on climate change-related 
behaviour is mediated by concern. In this regard, I expect that unsupportive descriptive norms 
reduce the indirect influence of supportive injunctive norm on behaviour mediated by concern 
(H6). 
I tested my hypotheses in two studies (one correlational and one experimental). In Study 8, I 
examined the mediated influence of descriptive and injunctive norms on climate change-related 
self-reported behaviour and behavioural intentions through perceived efficacy, perceived threat 
and concern. I also examined the moderating influence of descriptive norms on the indirect 
influence of injunctive norms on behaviour and behavioural intentions through perceived 
efficacy, perceived threat and concern. Study 9 was designed to address some of the limitations 
of Study 8. In this regard, I took account of the effects of individuals’ identification with the 
normative referent and the strength of their biospheric values as potential intervening factors 
in the link between social norms and climate change-related behavioural intentions. 
Study 8 
Method 
Participants and procedure 
I gathered data from respondents in seven countries (Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, United Kingdom and United States)22 using a self-administered questionnaire 
                                                 
22 The rationale for gathering data from multiple countries was to enable cross-cultural comparative analysis. 
However, due to the small size of samples obtained from the majority of countries represented, the data was 
pooled and treated as a single sample. 
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(Appendix 10). In Brazil and Colombia, the questionnaire was translated and back translated 
to Brazilian Portuguese and Spanish respectively with help from native speakers of the 
languages. Further, due to technological constraints, the questionnaire was administered to 
respondents in Colombia and Nigeria in paper and pencil format while it was administered to 
participants in the other countries through an internet-based platform. 
Participants in Brazil were recruited from the human subject pool at the Federal University of 
Paraίba (UFPB). In Colombia, the questionnaire was administered to a class of undergraduates 
at the Universidad de los Andes (Uniandes), Bogotá. Participants in Indonesia were university 
students recruited through a snowball sampling strategy. In Nigeria, participants were students 
recruited to complete the questionnaire on the main campus of the University of Ibadan. In 
Pakistan, participants were recruited to complete the questionnaire through adverts circulated 
at the University of Karachi. Participants in the United Kingdom were recruited from the 
human subject pool at the University of St Andrews and participants in the United States were 
recruited from the human subject pool at the California State University, San Marcos 
(CSUSM). The criteria for participation in the study were age (≥ 18 years) and voluntary 
consent. A summary of sample size information and demographic details for participants in 
each country is presented in Table 5.1. Across all locations, participants were informed that 
they would be required to answer questions pertaining to their attitudes toward climate change 
prior to being asked to provide consent to participate in the study. 
Table 5.1. Demographic profiles of respondent samples obtained 
Country Gender (%) Age 
N 
Male Female M(SD) 
Brazil 29 (31.5) 63 (68.5) 30.8 (9.92) 92 
Colombia 47 (49.0) 49 (51.0) 22.1 (2.03) 96 
Indonesia 79 (52.3) 72 (47.7) 23.2 (4.40) 151 
Nigeria 55 (51.9) 51 (48.1) 24.2 (4.14) 106 
Pakistan 52 (32.1) 109 (67.3) 25.2 (2.88) 162 
UK 63 (24.7) 192 (75.3) 24.2 (6.67) 255 
USA 83 (35.8) 148 (63.8) 33.2 (14.68) 232 
Total 408 (37.3) 684 (62.5) 26.6 (9.36) 1094 
 
Measures 
Descriptive norm was measured with five items: “your friends/relatives think climate change 
is a serious threat”, “most people you know are already trying to do something about climate 
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change”, “some people you know are trying to reduce the negative impact of their lifestyle”, 
“some people close to you have volunteered in, or contributed money to, environmental 
groups”, and “some people you know are members of environmental groups”. Responses to 
these items were recorded using a 7-point response format (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly 
agree). 
Injunctive norm was measured with two items: “your close friends and relatives think you 
ought to personally do something to address climate change” and “your friends and family 
expect you to be concerned about climate change”. Responses to these items were recorded 
using a 7-point response format (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
Perceived threat was measured with six items. I asked participants to rate the extent to which 
they agreed that climate change poses a threat to their: “lifestyle”, “health”, “livelihood”, 
“family”, “community” and “society in general”. Ratings were recorded using a 7-point 
response format (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).  
Concern was measured with a single item: “when you think about the threat posed by climate 
change, how strongly do you experience the following emotion – Concern?”. Responses were 
provided with a 7-point format (1 = not at all, 7 = very strongly). 
Perceived efficacy was measured with two items: “your personal efforts can significantly help 
reduce the threat of climate change in your country” and “you can make lifestyle changes that 
will significantly help reduce the threat of climate change in your area”. Participants rated their 
confidence that each of these statements was accurate using a 7-point format (1 = not at all 
confident, 7 = very confident). 
Lastly, I measured self-reported pro-environmental behaviour and behavioural intentions by 
asking participants to indicate if they had engaged in, or if they intended to engage in the 
following behaviours in the future: ”talk to friends/relatives about climate change”, “attend a 
seminar or public lecture about climate change”, “try to learn about climate change from books, 
websites and television programs”, “boycott products that have a negative impact on the 
environment”, “try to do more things that minimize your environmental impact”, “join an 
environmental group”, “volunteer in or donate money to an environmental group”, “participate 
in a climate change-related public sensitization campaign” and “take up a climate-friendly 
lifestyle”. Responses to these items were provided using a yes/no format and the respective 
variables were constituted by summing the number of yes responses. provided by each 
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participant. Country-specific reliability estimates and descriptive statistics for each measure 
used in the study are provided in Table 5.2.  
There were other measures included in the questionnaire which are not considered in this 
chapter. These include measures of acceptance of responsibility for acting on climate change, 
awareness of the consequences of climate change and fatalistic attitudes toward climate change 
(see Appendix 10). 
 
Results 
I tested the indirect effects of descriptive and injunctive norms on past behaviour and 
behavioural intentions using the PROCESS macro for testing mediation, moderation and 
conditional process (Hayes, 2013). Country, gender and age were included in the analyses as 
control variables. Being a polychotomous nominal variable, six dummy categories were created 
to represent each country in the regression analyses (k-1) with the USA representing the 
reference category. Partial correlations between the measured variables was calculated with 
participants’ country controlled (Table 5.3). This showed moderate inter-correlations among 
the variables. 
Tests of hypotheses 
H1: Perceived efficacy significantly mediates the effect of descriptive and injunctive norms on 
behavioural responses to climate change. Both descriptive (B = .10, SE = .05, p = .037) and 
injunctive norms (B = .27, SE = .04, p<.001) were significantly related with perceived efficacy. 
As expected, descriptive (B = .01, SE = .01, 95% CI: [.00, .03]) and injunctive norms (B = .03, 
SE = .01, 95% CI: [.01, .06]) also had significant indirect links with self-reported behaviour 
mediated by perceived efficacy. Similarly, descriptive (B = .01, SE = .01, 95% CI: [.00, .04]) 
and injunctive norms (B = .04, SE = .02, 95% CI: [.01, .08]) had significant indirect links with 
behavioural intentions mediated by perceived efficacy. 
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Table 5.3. Partial correlations among the measured variables controlling for country 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Descriptive Norm .66*** .25*** .28*** .33*** .44*** .41*** 
2. Injunctive Norm  .33*** .28*** .36*** .33*** .33*** 
3. Perceived Efficacy   .36*** .34*** .25*** .27*** 
4. Perceived Threat    .52*** .31*** .35*** 
5. Concern     .41*** .38*** 
6. Self-reported Behaviour      .65*** 
7. Behavioural Intentions      - 
N = 1056, ***p<.001 
H2: Descriptive norms significantly moderate the indirect effects of injunctive norms on 
behaviour mediated by perceived efficacy. This hypothesis was not supported by the data 
(Table 5.4). The interaction between descriptive norm and injunctive norm had no significant 
effect on perceived efficacy, and the indirect relationship between injunctive norm and self-
reported behaviour, and behavioural intentions, was significant at both high and low levels of 
descriptive norm.  
H3: Perceived threat significantly mediates the effects of descriptive and injunctive norm on 
behavioural responses to climate change. Both descriptive (B = .19, SE = .04, p<.001) and 
injunctive norm (B = .15, SE = .04, p<.001) were significantly related to perceived threat. In 
support of my hypothesis, descriptive (B = .03, SE = .01, 95% CI: [.01, .07]) and injunctive 
norms (B = .03, SE = .01, 95% CI: [.01, .06]) had significant indirect links with self-reported 
behaviour mediated by perceived threat. Perceived threat also significantly mediated an 
indirect link between behavioural intentions and both descriptive (B = .05, SE = .02, 95% CI: 
[.02, .09]) and injunctive norm (B = .05, SE = .01, 95% CI: [.02, .08]). 
H4: Descriptive norms significantly moderate the indirect effects of injunctive norms on 
behaviour mediated by perceived threat. The interaction between descriptive norm and 
injunctive norm had no significant effect on perceived threat. Further descriptive norm did not 
significantly moderate the indirect link between self-reported behaviour or behavioural 
intentions mediated by perceived threat (Table 5.4). Therefore, this hypothesis was not 
supported. 
H5: Concern significantly mediates the effect of descriptive and injunctive norms on 
behavioural responses to climate change. Descriptive (B = .21, SE = .05, p<.001) and 
injunctive norm (B = .27, SE = .04, p<.001) were positively related with concern. Both 
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descriptive (B = .06, SE = .02, 95% CI: [.03, .12]) and injunctive norms (B = .09, SE = .02, 
95% CI: [.06, .13]) had an indirect link with self-reported behaviour mediated by concern. 
Further, concern significantly mediated an indirect link between behavioural intentions and 
both descriptive (B = .06, SE = .02, 95% CI: [.02, .10]) and injunctive norm (B = .08, SE = .02, 
95% CI: [.05, .12]). 
H6: Descriptive norms significantly moderate the indirect effects of injunctive norms on 
behaviour mediated by concern. This hypothesis was not supported by the data. The interaction 
between descriptive and injunctive norm had no significant relationship with concern. 
Additionally, descriptive norm did not moderate the indirect link between either self-reported 
behaviour or behavioural intentions mediated by concern (Table 5.4).  
Table 5.4. Regression results for conditional indirect effects of injunctive norm on self-reported 
behaviour and behavioural intentions at different levels of descriptive norm 
IV  
Mediator Variable Model 
Perceived Efficacy Perceived Threat Concern 
B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) 
Injunctive Norm .28(.04)*** .15(.04)*** .27(.04)*** 
Descriptive Norm .10(.05)* .19(.04)*** .21(.05)*** 
Injunctive*Descriptive .01(.02) .02(.02) .01(.02) 
F 19.34*** 18.81*** 20.85*** 
R2 .17 .17 .18 
N 974 
 Dependent Variable Model 
Past Behaviour Behavioural Intentions 
Injunctive Norm -.03(.03) .04(.06) 
Descriptive Norm .59(.07)*** .50(.07)*** 
Injunctive*Descriptive .03(.03) -.06(.03)† 
Perceived Threat .15(.06)** .27(.06)*** 
Concern .32(.05)*** .26(.05)*** 
Perceived Efficacy .12(.05)* .15(.05)** 
F 37.55*** 36.19*** 
R2 .34 .33 
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N 974 968 
Conditional indirect effects of injunctive norm on self-reported behaviour at Descriptive 
Norm = Mean ± 1SD 
Mediator Descriptive Norm Effect 95% CI 
Perceived Efficacy - 1SD .03 [.01, .06] 
+ 1SD .03 [.01, .07] 
Index of moderated mediation .00 [-.00, .01] 
Perceived Threat - 1SD .02 [.00, .05] 
+ 1SD .03 [.01, .06] 
Index of moderated mediation .00 [-.00, .01] 
Concern - 1SD .08 [.05, .13] 
+ 1SD .09 [.05, .14] 
Index of moderated mediation .00 [-.01, .02] 
Conditional indirect effects of injunctive norm on behavioural intentions at Descriptive 
Norm = Mean and ± 1SD 
Mediator Descriptive Norm Effect 95% CI 
Perceived Efficacy 
 
- 1SD .04 [.01, .08] 
+ 1SD .04 [.02, .08] 
Index of moderated mediation .00 [-.01, .01] 
Perceived Threat - 1SD .04 [.01, .07] 
+ 1SD .05 [.02, .09] 
Index of moderated mediation .01 [-.01, .02] 
Concern - 1SD .07 [.03, .11] 
 + 1SD .08 [.04, .12] 
Index of moderated mediation .00 [-.01, .02] 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, Effect = Bootstrap estimate of indirect effect. Confidence intervals are 
bias-corrected and based on 1,000 bootstrap resamples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Country of residence, 
gender and age were controlled. 
Discussion 
The results of this study provide support for the notion that the actions and expectations of 
relevant social referents such as friends and family independently inform individuals’ beliefs 
regarding climate change and their emotional and behavioural responses. Contrary to my 
hypotheses (H2, H4 and H6), perceived injunctive norms had significant positive links with 
perceived efficacy, threat and concern; and also had significant indirect links with self-reported 
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behaviour and behavioural intentions, regardless of the level of descriptive norm. This 
suggests, in line with previous research by Smith and Louis (2008), that people may engage in 
normative behaviour regarding collectively important issues even when other group members 
are not seen to be engaging in the relevant behaviour.  
Alternatively, the absence of a significant interaction between descriptive and injunctive norms 
in this study may be indicative of the methodological difficulty of disentangling the two types 
of norms (see Thøgersen, 2008). Descriptive and injunctive norms regarding environmental 
issues are usually significantly and positively correlated (Cialdini, 2003; Thøgersen, 2006). 
Intuitively, this is because what most people approve is usually what most people do (Bicchieri, 
2006). The two types of norm may converge at the individual-level because the behaviours of 
others serve as a cue for what is expected of the individual or because individuals expect that 
most others conform to the injunctive norm (Bicchieri, 2006; Rimal & Real, 2003; Thøgersen, 
2008). Therefore, experimental designs that directly manipulate norms may be better suited for 
testing hypotheses regarding their interaction.  
Additionally, a key factor that may influence the effects of social norms was not considered in 
this study. The internalization of group norms to the extent that group interests are cognitively 
represented as personal interests depend on the extent to which individuals identify with the 
group. A number of studies have shown that the level of identification with the referent group 
has a significant influence on the extent to which people are motivated to conform with the 
group norms (e.g., Christensen, Rothgerber, Wood, & Matz, 2004; Rinker & Neighbors, 2014). 
The strength of identification with the referents used in this study may modulate the effects of 
social influence, such that strong identifiers may be more strongly affected by the injunctive 
and descriptive norms and the interaction between the two. Whereas, low identifiers may be 
less affected by inconsistencies between the descriptive and injunctive norms. 
Lastly, the strength of people’s attitudes towards the issue also play a role in determining how 
they are affected by social norms (McDonald et al., 2013). People with strong environmental 
attitudes may not only respond positively to supportive injunctive and descriptive norms, they 
may also be motivated to act by conflicting norms. Considering that we did not measure 
participants’ general environmental attitudes in this study, it is not clear how much this may 
have played a role in their responses to the perceived descriptive and injunctive norms. These 
considerations were addressed in Study 9.  
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Study 9 
Aims and hypotheses 
The purpose of Study 9 was to address some of the limitations of Study 8. This study employed 
an experimental design to directly manipulate perceived descriptive and injunctive norms. I 
also accounted for the effects of social identification and biospheric values on the link between 
social norms and climate change-related behaviour. Biospheric values were measured in place 
of environmental attitude partly because of the difficulty in obtaining a short and validated 
measure of the environmental attitude in the literature, and also the fact that previous research 
addressing the interaction between social norms and attitudes (e.g., McDonald et al., 2013) 
have actually employed a measure of attitude (the New Ecological Paradigm scale) that is also 
considered to be a measure of environmental values in other research (e.g., Whitmarsh & 
O’Neill, 2010).  
Based on an understanding that the extent to which individuals identify with the referent group 
determines the extent to which they are influenced by the group’s norms (Abrams & Hogg, 
1990; Rimal, 2008), I hypothesized that social identification significantly moderates the 
indirect effect of descriptive and injunctive norms on climate change behaviour mediated by 
perceived efficacy, perceived threat and concern; such that descriptive (H7) and injunctive 
norms (H8) will have a stronger indirect link with behaviour through perceived efficacy, 
perceived threat and concern among high identifiers. Further, I hypothesized that the indirect 
influence of the interaction between descriptive and injunctive norms on climate change-related 
behaviour mediated by perceived efficacy, perceived threat and concern will be significantly 
greater among individuals with stronger identification with the referent group (H9). 
Considering prior evidence that people with stronger attitudes toward the issue in focus may 
be more responsive to social norms regarding he issue (McDonald et al., 2013), I also 
hypothesized that biospheric values significantly moderate the indirect influence of descriptive 
(H10) and injunctive (H11) norms on climate change-related behaviour conveyed by perceived 
efficacy, perceived threat and concern. I anticipated that the indirect influence of the interaction 
between descriptive and injunctive norms on climate change-related behaviour conveyed by 
perceived efficacy, perceived threat and concern would also be moderated by biospheric value 
(H12).   
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Method 
Participants 
334 participants were recruited from the human subject pool at the university of St Andrews to 
take part in an online study assessing perceptions of self and others’ engagement with 
environmental issues in the town. The study employed a 2 (descriptive norm: positive vs. 
negative) x 2 (injunctive norm: positive vs. negative) between-subjects design. The data 
provided by 33 participants who answered the manipulation checks incorrectly were omitted 
from the analysis, leaving a final sample (N = 301) comprising 87 male (28.9%) and 209 female 
(69.4%) participants with a mean age of 21.6 years (SD = 4.96). Entry into a raffle for a £50 
shopping voucher was offered as an incentive for participation. 
Procedure 
The study was presented to participants as an online questionnaire which they were free to 
complete at any place or time of their choosing. The first part of the questionnaire contained 
measures of demographic information (gender, age, subject and year of study) and the control 
variables: social identification with other students at the university and biospheric value 
orientation. After completing these measures, participants were randomly allocated to one of 
four treatment conditions in which they were presented with the norm manipulations.  
The norm manipulations were presented as a memory exercise requiring participants to read 
and memorize the main facts in an excerpt from a magazine article summarizing the findings 
from a survey of students’ engagement with environmental issues that had been conducted as 
part of the university’s program to achieve carbon neutrality. Participants were told they would 
need to recall the information presented in the article excerpt when answering questions in a 
subsequent section of the questionnaire. The introductory paragraph in the excerpt stated that 
the university aimed to become carbon neutral for energy consumption and highlighted the fact 
that effective communication of environment and sustainability issues to staff and students was 
a primary target in the university’s plan to achieve its aim. The second paragraph summarized 
findings from a recent survey of student engagement with environmental issues across the 
university. Two aspects of engagement were conveyed as between subject variables: the 
proportion of students who reported that they had engaged in six named pro-environmental 
behaviours in the preceding year (descriptive norm manipulation: high [74% performance] or 
low [47% performance]) and the proportion of students who expressed support for the notion 
that every student and staff member should be personally involved in the effort to achieve a 
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cleaner and healthier environment (injunctive norm manipulation: high [83% approval] or low 
[42% approval]). The behaviours named in the manipulation were recycling; walking, cycling 
or using public transport as primary means of transportation; turning out lights and appliances 
in unoccupied rooms to save energy; purchasing locally sourced produce when possible; 
supporting an environmental campaign with donations or time volunteered; and reducing meat 
consumption or switching to an environment-friendly diet. As a manipulation check, 
participants were required to answer two questions (one for each variable manipulated) 
regarding the proportion of students reported to have performed pro-environmental actions in 
the preceding year and the proportion who expressed approval of the expectation that students 
and staff members be personally involved in achieving a healthier and cleaner environment 
(the exact manipulations used are presented in Appendix 11).  
The final part of the questionnaire comprised measures of the dependent variables: perceived 
efficacy, perceived threat, concern, intentions to engage in pro-environmental behaviour and a 
pro-environmental behaviour measure. Participants were thanked and debriefed after 
completing these measures. 
Measures 
Background variables 
Social identification (α = .86, M = 4.87, SD = 1.13) with other students at the university was 
measured with five items: “I identify with University of St Andrews students”, “I have a lot in 
common with other students at the University of St Andrews”, “being a student at the 
University of St Andrews is an important part of how I see myself”, I feel personally criticised 
when someone who is not a student here criticizes University of St Andrews students”, and “I 
feel strong ties with other University of St Andrews students”. Responses to these items were 
recorded using a 7-point format (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
Biospheric value orientation (α = .89, M = 5.60, SD = 1.12). Following the same procedure  
detailed in Chapter 4, biospheric value was measured with a scale adopted from (de Groot & 
Steg, 2008). 
Dependent variables 
Perceived descriptive norm (α = .70, M = 3.47, SD = 1.01) was measured with four items: 
“most students at the University of St Andrews are personally doing something to help reduce 
the risk of climate change”, “most students at the University of St Andrews are involved in a 
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charity or society that addresses environmental issues including climate change”, addressing 
climate change is not a priority for most students at the University of St Andrews - reversed”, 
and “most students at the University of St Andrews are not personally doing anything to help 
address climate change - reversed” (Response: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
Perceived injunctive norm (α = .6023, M = 4.80, SD = 0.89) was also measured with four items: 
“most students at the University of St Andrews would support me if I decided to change my 
behaviour to help reduce climate change”, “my colleagues and other students at the University 
of St Andrews generally do not expect me to do anything personally to help address climate 
change - reversed”, “most students at the University of St Andrews approve of donating to, or 
fundraising for, environmental groups that focus on climate change”, and “most students at the 
University of St Andrews would not support me if I decided to change my behaviour to help 
reduce climate change - reversed” (Response: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
Perceived threat (α = .88, M = 5.15, SD = 1.08) was measured with seven items. The first four 
items required participants to rate the seriousness of the threat posed by climate change to them 
personally, the seriousness of climate change impacts around the world, the seriousness of 
climate change impacts for the natural environment, and the seriousness of climate change 
impacts for their country (Response: 1 = not serious at all, 7 = very serious). The next three 
items required participants to judge the likelihood that climate change will have harmful long-
term effects on society, on the natural environment, and on their personal health and wellbeing 
in the course of their lifetime (Response: 1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely).  
Concern (M = 5.42, SD = 1.41) was measured with a single item: “thinking about the 
seriousness of climate change and its potential impacts, how strongly do you feel the following 
emotions – Concern?” 
Perceived efficacy (α = .78, M = 5.87, SD = 0.99) was measured with two items. Participants 
were asked to rate their level of confidence that the following can make a difference in 
addressing climate change: “personally changing your behaviour and lifestyle (e.g., purchasing 
                                                 
23 Excluding the two reverse-worded items increased the reliability of the perceived injunctive norms scale (α = 
.76). However, I chose to use the full set of items, as originally intended, because using the shortened scale did 
not produce dissimilar results and the reliability of the 4-item scale achieved the minimum threshold considered 
acceptable for theory testing (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). 
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practices and energy use)” and “efforts made my you as an individual to address climate 
change” (Response: 1 = not confident, 7 = very confident). 
Behavioural intentions (α = .78, M = 4.14, SD = 1.15) were measured with eight items. 
Participants were asked to rate their likelihood engaging in the following behaviours in the near 
future: (1) turn off lights in unoccupied rooms at home/work; (2) walk, cycle or use public 
transport only when commuting; (3) purchase and consume only locally sourced produce; (4) 
increase current levels of waste-sort and recycling; (5) reduce meat consumption or switch to 
a meat free diet; (6) sign a petition calling on the government to make stronger commitments 
to renewable energy and lowering carbon emissions; (7) join or volunteer in an organization 
involved with climate change; (8) and donate to or raise funds for an environmental group or 
charity involved with climate change. Factor analysis with oblimin rotation revealed that these 
items load on to two factors representing consumption behaviours (items 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5: 
Eigenvalue = 1.21, variance explained = 15.14%, α = .67, M = 4.87, SD = 1.21) and 
environmental citizenship and activist behaviours (items 6, 7 and 8: Eigenvalue = 3.28, 
variance explained = 41.05%, α = .75, M = 2.89, SD = 1.51). The correlation between these 
factors was moderate (r = .49, p<.001). They were consequently treated as separate variables. 
Pro-environmental behaviour. I measured this by asking participants if they would like to 
donate a fraction of their remuneration to an environmental group in the event that they were 
selected to receive the £50 shopping voucher. They were given an option to donate up to 50% 
of the value of the voucher. Responses were recorded with a yes/no format. Overall, 48.2% of 
participants elected to donate a fraction of their reward. 
The questionnaire also contained other measures that are not considered in this chapter. These 
include the impression management sub-scale of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable 
Responding (BIDR), pro-environmental self-identity, identification with the environmental 
movement, objective climate change knowledge, objective pro-environmental behaviour and 
emotional responses to climate change: anger, fear, worry and guilt (see appendix 11). 
Results 
Preliminary analyses 
To verify the effectiveness of the norm manipulation, I compared levels of perceived 
descriptive and injunctive norms reported by participants in the different experimental 
conditions. A 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed while injunctive norm manipulation only had an effect 
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on perceived injunctive norms (F(1, 297) = 16.34, p<.001) and not perceived descriptive norms 
(F(1, 297) = 3.21, p = .074), the descriptive norm manipulation had significant effect on both 
perceived injunctive (F(1, 297) = 9.62, p = .002) and descriptive norms (F(1, 297) = 88.64, p<.001). 
However the interaction between the two norm manipulations had no significant effect on 
either perceived descriptive (F(1, 297) = 0.00, p = .997) or injunctive norm (F(1, 297) = 0.42, p = 
.519). Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables across the experimental conditions are 
presented in Table 5.4. Zero-order correlations among the measured variables are reported in 
Table 5.5. The tests of hypotheses were conducted with the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 
2013), gender and age controlled. The confidence intervals associated with the estimates 
reported are bias-corrected and based on 1,000 resamples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). 
Table 5.4. Means and standard deviations for Study 9 
DV Low Injunctive 
(N = 141) 
High Injunctive 
(N = 160) 
Low 
Descriptive 
(N = 76) 
High 
Descriptive 
(N = 65) 
Low 
Descriptive 
(N = 79) 
High 
Descriptive 
(N = 81) 
Perceived Efficacy 5.97(1.00) 5.89(1.00) 5.94(0.95) 5.70(1.04) 
Perceived Threat 5.31(1.13) 5.15(1.00) 5.15(1.08) 5.05(1.06) 
Concern 5.46(1.45) 5.54(1.40) 5.21(1.53) 5.59(1.18) 
Intentions 
(Consumption) 
4.77(1.29) 5.01(1.16) 4.80(1.20) 4.96(1.22) 
Intentions (ECA) 3.04(1.63) 2.92(1.43) 2.70(1.41) 2.92(1.55) 
Donation (% Yes) 51.32 50.63 52.31 41.03 
 
Tests of hypotheses 
H1: Perceived efficacy significantly mediates the effect of descriptive and injunctive norms on 
behavioural responses to climate change. This hypothesis was not supported by the data. The 
descriptive and injunctive norm manipulation did not have a significant effect on perceived 
efficacy (Table 5.6). Further, neither the descriptive (B = -.00, SE = .01, 95% CI: [-.02, .01]) 
nor injunctive norm (B = .00, SE = .01, 95% CI: [-.01, .01]) manipulation had a significant 
indirect influence on intentions to engage in pro-environmental consumption behaviours 
mediated by perceived efficacy. The descriptive (B = .00, SE = .01, 95% CI: [-.01, .03]) and 
injunctive norm (B = .00, SE = .01, 95% CI: [-.01, .02]) manipulation also had no indirect 
influence on intentions to engage in pro-environmental citizenship and activist behaviour 
mediated by perceived efficacy. Lastly, there was no significant indirect influence of the 
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descriptive (B = .01, SE = .02, 95% CI: [-.01, .06]) or injunctive norm (B = .00, SE = .01, 95% 
CI: [-.01, .05]) manipulation on participants’ choice to donate to an environmental group 
mediated by perceived efficacy 
H2: Descriptive norms significantly moderate the indirect effects of injunctive norms on 
behaviour mediated by perceived efficacy. This hypothesis was not supported. Perceived 
efficacy did not significantly mediate a link between the injunctive norm manipulation and 
intentions to engage in pro-environmental consumption behaviours, engage in pro-
environmental citizenship and activist behaviours or choice to donate to an environmental 
group at either low or high levels of descriptive norm (Table 5.6).  
H3: Perceived threat significantly mediates the effects of descriptive and injunctive norm on 
behavioural responses to climate change. I found no support for this hypothesis. The 
descriptive and injunctive norm manipulation had no significant effect on perceived threat 
(Table 5.6). There was also no significant indirect influence of the descriptive (B = -.01, SE = 
.01, 95% CI: [-.05, .00]) or injunctive norm (B = -.01, SE = .01, 95% CI: [-.04, .01]) 
manipulation on intentions to engage in pro-environmental consumption behaviours mediated 
by perceived threat. Similarly, there was no significant indirect influence of the descriptive (B 
= -.01, SE = .01, 95% CI: [-.05, .00]) and injunctive norm (B = -.01, SE = .01, 95% CI: [-.04, 
.01]) manipulation on intentions to engage in pro-environmental citizenship and activist 
behaviours mediated by perceived threat. Lastly, perceived threat did not significantly mediate 
the indirect influence of the descriptive (B = -.01, SE = .02, 95% CI: [-.07, .01]) or injunctive 
(B = -.01, SE = .02, 95% CI: [-.06, .01]) norm manipulation on participants’ choice to donate 
to an environmental group.  
H4: Descriptive norms significantly moderate the indirect effects of injunctive norms on 
behaviour mediated by perceived threat. Perceived threat did not significantly mediate an 
indirect link between the norm manipulation and intentions to engage in pro-environmental 
consumption behaviour, environmental citizenship and activist behaviours or choice to donate 
to an environmental group (Table 5.6). Thus, this hypothesis was not supported. 
H5: Concern significantly mediates the effect of descriptive and injunctive norms on 
behavioural responses to climate change. This hypothesis was not supported not by the data. 
The descriptive and injunctive norm manipulation did not have a significant effect on concern 
(Table 5.6). I found that concern did not significantly mediate an indirect influence of the 
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descriptive (B = .02, SE = .02, 95% CI: [-.01, .07]) or injunctive (B = -.01, SE = .02, 95% CI: 
[-.05, .01]) norm manipulation on intentions to engage in pro-environmental consumption 
behaviours. I also found that concern did not significantly mediate an indirect influence of the 
descriptive (B = .02, SE = .02, 95% CI: [-.00, .07]) or injunctive (B = -.01, SE = .02, 95% CI: 
[-.06, .01]) norm manipulation on intentions to engage in pro-environmental citizenship and 
activist behaviours. Lastly, neither the descriptive (B = .00, SE = .02, 95% CI: [-.03, .05]) nor 
injunctive (B = -.00, SE = .01, 95% CI: [-.04, .02]) norm manipulation had a significant indirect 
influence on participants’ choice to donate to an environmental group mediated by concern. 
H6: Descriptive norms significantly moderate the indirect effects of injunctive norms on 
behaviour mediated by concern. I found no support for this hypothesis. Concern did not 
mediate an indirect link between the injunctive norm manipulation and intentions to engage in 
pro-environmental consumption behaviours, environmental citizenship and activist behaviours 
or participants’ choice to donate to an environmental group (Table 5.6). 
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Table 5.6. Tests of moderated mediation hypotheses 
Mediator Variable Model 
IV Perceived 
Efficacy 
Perceived 
Threat 
Concern 
B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) 
Injunctive Norm (Manipulation) -.05(.06) -.06(.06) -.05(.07) 
Descriptive Norm 
(Manipulation) 
-.08(.06) -.07(.06) .11(.07) 
Injunctive*Descriptive -.02(.06) .06(.06) .13(.07)† 
Social Identification .05(.05) .08(.05) .17(.07)* 
Biospheric Value .13(.05)* .42(.05)*** .52(.07)*** 
Gender .25(.11)* .20(.11)† .30(.14)* 
Age -.01(.01) .00(.01) .01(.02) 
F 2.64* 12.64*** 12.81*** 
R2 .06 .23 .24 
N 297 
Dependent Variable Model 
 
Intentions (C) 
Intentions 
(ECA) 
Donate 
Perceived Efficacy .01(.06) -.01(.08) -.10(.13) 
Perceived Threat .17(.08)* .12(.10) .17(.16) 
Concern .20(.06)*** .17(.08)* .03(.12) 
Injunctive Norm 
(Manipulation) 
.02(.06) -.07(.08) -.10(.12) 
Descriptive Norm 
(Manipulation) 
.07(.06) .00(.08) -.09(.13) 
Injunctive*Descriptive -.03(.06) .11(.08) -.10(.12) 
Social Identification .02(.05) .13(.07)† .08(.11) 
Biospheric Value .34(.06) .37(.08)*** .29(.13)* 
Gender .26(.11)* .29(.15)† .70(.25)** 
Age -.02(.01) .02(.02) -.02(.03) 
F 16.39*** 9.06*** χ2 = 27.01** 
R2 
.36 .49 
Cox & Snell 
(.09), 
Nagelkereke 
(.12) 
N 297 
Conditional indirect Effects of Injunctive Norm on Behavioural Intentions 
(Consumption) at low and high Descriptive Norm 
Mediator Descriptive 
Norm 
Effect 95% CI 
Perceived Efficacy Low .00 [-.02, .01] 
High .00 [-.02, .01] 
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Index of moderated mediation .00 [-.02, .02] 
Perceived Threat Low -.02 [-.07, .00] 
High -.00 [-.03, .03] 
Index of moderated mediation .02 [-.01, .09] 
Concern Low -.04 [-.10, .00] 
High .02 [-.02, .06] 
Index of moderated mediation .05 [.00, .14] 
Conditional indirect Effects of Injunctive Norm on Behavioural Intentions 
(Environmental Citizenship and Activist) at low and high Descriptive Norm 
Mediator Descriptive 
Norm 
Effect 95% CI 
Perceived Efficacy Low .00 [-.01, .02] 
High .01 [-.01, .03] 
Index of moderated mediation .00 [-.02, .02] 
Perceived Threat Low -.02 [-.07, .01] 
High -.00 [-.03, .02] 
Index of moderated mediation .01 [-.01, .08] 
Concern Low -.03 [-.10, .00] 
 High .01 [-.01, .06] 
Index of moderated mediation .04 [.00, .13] 
Conditional indirect Effects of Injunctive Norm on Donation at low and high 
Descriptive Norm 
Mediator Descriptive 
Norm 
Effect 95% CI 
Perceived Efficacy Low .00 [-.01, .06] 
 High .01 [-.01, .09] 
Index of moderated mediation .00 [-.02, .07] 
Perceived Threat Low -.02 [-.11, .01] 
 High -.00 [-.06, .03] 
Index of moderated mediation .02 [-.01, .12] 
Concern Low -.01 [-.09, .04] 
 High .00 [-.02, .06] 
Index of moderated mediation .01 [-.05, .12] 
C = Consumption, ECA = Environmental Citizenship and Activist, †p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, 
***p<.001. Confidence intervals are bias-corrected and based on 1,000 resamples (Preacher & 
Hayes, 2008). 
H7: Social identification significantly moderates the indirect effect of descriptive norms 
on climate change behaviour mediated by perceived efficacy, perceived threat and 
concern24. The interaction between social identification and the descriptive norm 
                                                 
24 The interaction between social identification and the norm manipulations, as well as the interaction 
between biospheric values and the norm manipulations, were tested in separate regression analyses 
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manipulation did not have a significant effect on perceived efficacy (B = .06, SE = .05, 
p = .293), perceived threat (B = .04, SE = .05, p = .508) or concern (B = -.06, SE = .07, 
p = .258). Further, the descriptive norm manipulation did not have a significant indirect 
influence on intentions to engage in pro-environmental consumption behaviours 
mediated by perceived efficacy (IMM25 - B = .00, SE = .01, 95%CI: [-.01, .02]), 
perceived threat (IMM - B = .01, SE = .01, 95%CI: [-.01, .03]) or concern (IMM - B = 
-.01, SE = .02, 95%CI: [-.05, .01]) at any level of social identification. Similarly, the 
descriptive norm manipulation did not have a significant indirect influence on 
intentions to engage in pro-environmental citizenship and activist behaviours mediated 
by perceived efficacy (IMM - B = -.00, SE = .01, 95%CI: [-.02, .01]), perceived threat 
(IMM - B = .00, SE = .01, 95%CI: [-.01, .04]) or concern (IMM - B = -.01, SE = .02, 
95%CI: [-.07, .01]) at any level of social identification. Lastly, the descriptive norm 
manipulation did not have a significant indirect influence on whether participants chose 
to donate to an environmental group mediated by perceived efficacy (IMM - B = -.01, 
SE = .01, 95%CI: [-.05, .01]), perceived threat (IMM - B = .01, SE = .01, 95%CI: [-.01, 
.07]) or concern (IMM - B = -.00, SE = .01, 95%CI: [-.04, .02]) at any level of social 
identification. This hypothesis was, therefore, not supported by the data.   
H8: Social identification significantly moderates the indirect effect of injunctive norms 
on climate change behaviour mediated by perceived efficacy, perceived threat and 
concern. This hypothesis was not supported. The interaction between social 
identification and the injunctive norm manipulation did not have a significant effect on 
perceived efficacy (B = .04, SE = .05, p = .492), perceived threat (B = -.01, SE = .05, p 
= .777) or concern (B = -.04, SE = .07, p = .570). The injunctive norm manipulation 
also did not have a significant indirect influence on intentions to engage in pro-
environmental consumption behaviours mediated by perceived efficacy (IMM - B = 
.00, SE = .00, 95%CI: [-.01, .01]), perceived threat (IMM - B = -.00, SE = .01, 95%CI: 
[-.04, .01]) or concern (IMM - B = -.01, SE = .02, 95%CI: [-.04, .02]) at any level of 
social identification. Likewise, the injunctive norm manipulation did not have a 
significant indirect influence on intentions to engage in pro-environmental citizenship 
and activist behaviours mediated by perceived efficacy (IMM - B = .00, SE = .01, 
                                                 
controlling for the other variables because PROCESS has no function for testing hypotheses regarding 
moderated mediation being conditional on multiple variables within the same test. 
25 IMM refers to the index of moderated mediation. This value represents the slope of the line relating 
an indirect effect to values of a moderator (see Hayes, 2015). 
168 
 
95%CI: [-.02, .01]), perceived threat (IMM - B = -.00, SE = .01, 95%CI: [-.04, .01]) or 
concern (IMM - B = -.01, SE = .02, 95%CI: [-.05, .02]) irrespective of participants level 
of social identification. Finally, the injunctive norm manipulation did not have a 
significant indirect influence on whether participants chose to donate to an 
environmental group mediated by perceived efficacy (IMM - B = -.00, SE = .01, 
95%CI: [-.05, .01]), perceived threat (IMM - B = -.00, SE = .01, 95%CI: [-.05, .02]) or 
concern (IMM - B = -.00, SE = .01, 95%CI: [-.04, .02]) at any level of social 
identification. 
H9: The indirect influence of the interaction between descriptive and injunctive norms 
on climate change-related behaviour mediated by perceived efficacy, perceived threat 
and concern will be significantly moderated by social identification. This hypothesis 
was not supported. The three-way interaction between social identification, the 
descriptive norm manipulation and the injunctive norm manipulation did not have a 
significant effect on perceived efficacy (B = -.02, SE = .05, p = .673), perceived threat 
(B = .01, SE = .05, p = .821) or concern (B = -.02, SE = .07, p = .809). Further, the 
indirect effects of the injunctive norm manipulation, moderated by the descriptive norm 
manipulation, on intentions to engage in pro-environmental consumption behaviour, 
intentions to engage in pro-environmental citizenship and activist behaviour and 
donation to an environmental group, mediated by perceived efficacy, perceived threat 
and concern were not significant at any level of social identification26.   
H10: Biospheric values significantly moderate the indirect effect of descriptive norms 
on climate change behaviour mediated by perceived efficacy, perceived threat and 
concern. This hypothesis was not supported by the data. The interaction between 
biospheric values and the descriptive norm manipulation did not have a significant 
effect on perceived efficacy (B = -.05, SE = .05, p = .357), perceived threat (B = .03, 
SE = .05, p = .579) or concern (B = -.02, SE = .07, p = .717). The descriptive norm 
manipulation also did not have a significant indirect influence on intentions to engage 
in pro-environmental consumption behaviours mediated by perceived efficacy (IMM - 
B = -.00, SE = .01, 95%CI: [-.01, .01]), perceived threat (IMM - B = .01, SE = .02, 
95%CI: [-.02, .04]) or concern (IMM - B = -.01, SE = .02, 95%CI: [-.05, .03]) at any 
                                                 
26 The statistics supporting this result are not reported here due to the extensiveness of the output 
generated by probing the effects of the independent variable at each level of the descriptive norm 
manipulation and the social identification at mean and mean ± 1SD. 
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level of biospheric values. Similarly, the descriptive norm manipulation did not have a 
significant indirect influence on intentions to engage in pro-environmental citizenship 
and activist behaviours mediated by perceived efficacy (IMM - B = .00, SE = .01, 
95%CI: [-.01, .02]), perceived threat (IMM - B = .01, SE = .02, 95%CI: [-.02, .04]) or 
concern (IMM - B = -.01, SE = .02, 95%CI: [-.05, .04]) irrespective of participants level 
of biospheric value endorsement. Lastly, the descriptive norm manipulation did not 
have a significant indirect influence on whether participants chose to donate to an 
environmental group mediated by perceived efficacy (IMM - B = .00, SE = .01, 95%CI: 
[-.01, .04]), perceived threat (IMM - B = .01, SE = .02, 95%CI: [-.02, .07]) or concern 
(IMM - B = -.00, SE = .01, 95%CI: [-.04, .02]) at any level of biospheric values. 
H11: Biospheric values significantly moderate the indirect effect of injunctive norms 
on climate change behaviour mediated by perceived efficacy, perceived threat and 
concern. The interaction between biospheric values and the injunctive norm 
manipulation did not have a significant influence on perceived efficacy (B = -.07, SE = 
.05, p = .188), perceived threat (B = .06, SE = .05, p = .234) or concern (B = -.01, SE = 
.07, p = .922). Further, the injunctive norm manipulation did not have a significant 
indirect effect on intentions to engage in pro-environmental consumption behaviours 
mediated by perceived efficacy (IMM - B = -.00, SE = .01, 95%CI: [-.02, .01]), 
perceived threat (IMM - B = .02, SE = .02, 95%CI: [-.01, .06]) or concern (IMM - B = 
-.00, SE = .02, 95%CI: [-.04, .04]) at any level of biospheric values. Likewise, the 
injunctive norm manipulation did not have a significant indirect influence on intentions 
to engage in pro-environmental citizenship and activist behaviours mediated by 
perceived efficacy (IMM - B = .00, SE = .01, 95%CI: [-.01, .02]), perceived threat 
(IMM - B = .01, SE = .02, 95%CI: [-.01, .06]) or concern (IMM - B = -.00, SE = .02, 
95%CI: [-.04, .04]) irrespective of participants level of biospheric values. Finally, the 
injunctive norm manipulation did not have a significant indirect influence on whether 
participants chose to donate to an environmental group mediated by perceived efficacy 
(IMM - B = .01, SE = .01, 95%CI: [-.01, .04]), perceived threat (IMM - B = .02, SE = 
.02, 95%CI: [-.01, .08]) or concern (IMM - B = -.00, SE = .01, 95%CI: [-.03, .02]) at 
any level of biospheric values. Thus, this hypothesis was not supported. 
H12: The indirect influence of the interaction between descriptive and injunctive norms 
on climate change-related behaviour mediated by perceived efficacy, perceived threat 
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and concern will be significantly moderated by biospheric values. This hypothesis was 
partially supported by the data. The three-way interaction between biospheric values, 
the descriptive norm manipulation and the injunctive norm manipulation did not have 
a significant effect on perceived efficacy (B = -.08, SE = .05, p = .146), perceived threat 
(B = -.06, SE = .05, p = .252), but it had a significant effect on concern (B = -.18, SE = 
.07, p = .008). Additionally, the indirect effects of the injunctive norm manipulation, 
moderated by the descriptive norm manipulation, on intentions to engage in pro-
environmental consumption behaviour, intentions to engage in pro-environmental 
citizenship and activist behaviour and donation to an environmental group, mediated 
by perceived efficacy and perceived threat were not significant at any level of 
biospheric values27.  
Further investigation of the three-way effect of biospheric values, the descriptive norm 
manipulation and the injunctive norm manipulation on concern revealed that the 
injunctive norm manipulation had a positive indirect effect on intentions to engage in 
pro-environmental consumption behaviour, mediated by concern, when descriptive 
norm was high and biospheric value was low28 (B = .09, SE = .05, 95% CI: [.00, .21]), 
but it also had a negative indirect influence, mediated by concern, on intentions to 
engage in pro-environmental consumption behaviour when both descriptive norm and 
biospheric value were low (B = -.10, SE = .06, 95%CI: [-.24, -.01]). This demonstrates 
that the indirect effect of the interaction between the descriptive and injunctive norm 
conditions on intentions to engage in pro-environmental consumption behaviour 
conveyed via concern was moderated by biospheric value (ICMM29 - B = -.10, SE = 
.05, 95%CI: [-.21, -.03]). Similarly, the injunctive norm manipulation had a significant 
positive indirect effect on intentions to engage in environmental citizenship and activist 
behaviours, mediated by concern, when descriptive norm was high and biospheric value 
was low (B = .08, SE = .05, 95%CI [.00, 20]). However, the injunctive norm 
manipulation had significant negative effects on intentions to engage in environmental 
citizenship and activist behaviours, mediated by concern, when descriptive norm was 
low and biospheric value was low (B = -.09, SE = .05, 95%CI: [-.23, -.01]), as well as 
                                                 
27 The statistics supporting this result are not reported here due to the extensiveness of the output 
generated by probing the effects of the independent variable at each level of the descriptive norm 
manipulation and biospheric values at mean and mean ± 1SD. 
28 A low level of biospheric values is represented as the mean -1SD. 
29 ICMM refers to the index of conditional moderated mediation (see Hayes, 2014). 
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when descriptive norm was low and biospheric norm was at the mean level (B = -.05, 
SE = .03, 95%CI: [-.13, -.00]). Again, this shows that the effect of the interaction 
between the descriptive and injunctive norm manipulation mediated by concern was 
moderated by biospheric value (ICMM – B = -.09, SE = .04, 95%CI: [-.20, -.02]). The 
indirect influence of the interaction between descriptive and injunctive norm 
manipulation, mediated by concern, on donation to an environmental group was not 
significant at any level of biospheric value (ICMM – B = -.02, SE = .05, 95%CI: [-.15, 
.06]).  
Discussion 
The findings in Study 8 were not wholly replicated in Study 9. Here I found no 
significant indirect links between the two types of social norms and behaviour or 
behavioural intentions mediated by perceived efficacy and perceived threat. Further, 
contrary to prior findings (Rimal, 2008; Terry & Hogg, 1996), participants’ level of 
identification with the referent group did not moderate the influence of the descriptive 
and injunctive norms on climate change perceptions, nor their mediated influence on 
behaviour and behavioural intentions. However, this study produced an intriguing, and 
novel finding concerning the role of biospheric value as a moderator of the mediated 
influence of the interaction between descriptive and injunctive norms on participants’ 
intentions to act pro-environmentally.  
I found that injunctive norms had a significant positive influence on pro-environmental 
behavioural intentions, conveyed via concern, when descriptive norms are high and 
biospheric value is low. This suggests that, given a belief that most other group 
members are acting pro-environmentally, people with a low level of intrinsic value-
driven motivation, may be significantly influenced to engage in pro-environmental 
behaviour by perceived social expectations. This finding is somewhat related to my 
observation in Chapter 4 (Study 4) that people with low biospheric values were more 
likely to exhibit a change in their perception of the threat posed by climate change as a 
consequence of imagining an experience of flooding.  
On the other hand, among participants who had low biospheric values, and who were 
exposed to the low descriptive norm manipulation, the indirect influence of injunctive 
norm on behavioural intentions mediated by concern was negative. In other words, the 
perception that others are not acting pro-environmentally, combined with a low level 
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of intrinsic value-driven motivation to act, resulted in people expressing less concern 
about climate change and lower intentions to act pro-environmentally in response to 
perceived social expectations. There is a considerable amount of pre-existing evidence 
that people are likely to act in ways that violate the injunctive norm when they perceive 
the majority of others to be doing the same (i.e. when descriptive norm is unsupportive) 
(e.g., Keizer, Lindenberg, & Steg, 2011; Smith, Louis, & Abraham, 2017). Some 
authors have explained this as an indication that injunctive norms are more easily 
disrupted than descriptive norms because a greater degree of self-regulation may be 
required to conform with injunctive norms (Jacobson, Mortensen, & Cialdini, 2011; 
Jacobson, Mortensen, Jacobson, & Cialdini, 2015; J. R. Smith et al., 2017). In line with 
this view, the results of the current study also suggest that the extent to which people 
personally prioritize environmental issues play a role in determining their responses to 
conflicting social norms regarding environmental actions. Although, previous studies 
have linked the moderating effects of self-regulation on norm-compliance directly to 
behaviour (Jacobson et al., 2015), the findings of the current study show that the 
moderating effect of biospheric values on the influence of the interaction between 
descriptive and injunctive norms on behavioural intentions is conveyed via affective 
engagement with climate change (concern). It appears that for people with low 
biospheric values, unsupportive descriptive norm does not simply reduce the effect of 
injunctive norm conveyed by concern as I predicted (H9); rather, it inverts the indirect 
influence of the injunctive norm, causing people to be de-motivated to act. 
However, there is a key methodological issue that must be taken into account in 
interpreting these findings. Although the descriptive and injunctive norm manipulations 
successfully shifted participants’ perception of the prevailing descriptive and injunctive 
norm, there was also a level of dependence in the effect of the manipulations insofar 
that the descriptive norm manipulation also had a significant effect on perceived 
injunctive norms. Therefore, it is not possible to completely disentangle the effects of 
the injunctive norm on concern, behaviour and behavioural intentions from those of the 
descriptive norm; as individuals may plausibly have been responding to the effects of 
the descriptive norm conveyed through their perception of the injunctive norm. This 
harks back to Thøgersen's (2008) observation on the methodological difficulty inherent 
in isolating the effects of the two types of norm. Further research employing alternative 
methods of manipulating and measuring descriptive norms (e.g., anchoring; see 
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Bohner, Siebler, & Schmelcher, 2016; Eyssel, Bohner, & Siebler, 2006) will be 
necessary to substantiate the findings of this study.  
A second consideration pertains to the absence of a significant interaction between 
social identification and social norms in their influence on climate change perceptions 
and behaviour or behavioural intentions. Previous studies in which social/group 
identification has been found to have a moderating effect on the link between social 
norms and behaviour have typically invoked a reference group that is clearly relevant 
to the specific behaviour(s), such as ‘students’ and ‘drinking on campus’ (e.g., Rimal, 
2008). However, in the current context, there are no clear grounds to assume that 
identification as a ‘student’ is necessarily a salient social category regarding 
participants’ evaluation of climate change or environmental issues in general. 
Considering that the implications and politics of climate change transcend the 
participants’ situation as ‘students’ and may include other roles and categories such as 
being ‘a young adult’ or ‘a British citizen’ or ‘a member of society’ or a ‘political 
liberal’; each with its own unique set of associated norms and expectations, there are a 
variety of plausible social referents that may be more relevant to participants’ 
judgments and actions concerning climate change than ‘other students at St Andrews’. 
Therefore, social identification may have had no effect on participants’ perceptual and 
behavioural responses to the perceived norms because the referent group may not have 
been particularly salient in the context of the focal issue. Nonetheless, as described 
above, the interplay between descriptive and injunctive norms may still have influenced 
behaviour and intentions through concern to the extent that individuals did, or did not, 
already have a level of intrinsic disposition to engage with environmental issues.   
General discussion 
The purpose of this research was to examine the effect of the interaction between 
descriptive and injunctive norms with regard to climate change perceptions and 
behaviour. Drawing from the existing literature on the role of social influence in 
shaping behaviour across a variety of domains, I developed a number of hypotheses 
regarding how the independent and interactive influence of descriptive and injunctive 
norms on climate change-related behaviour are conveyed via perceived efficacy, 
perceived threat and concern. I also hypothesized that the independent and interactive 
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indirect influence of the two types of norms on behaviour is moderated by identification 
with the referent group and biospheric values. I tested these hypotheses in two studies.  
The empirical literature addressing the direct effects of social norms on behaviour and 
intentions is extensive (see Abrahamse & Steg, 2013; Allcott, 2011; Farrow et al., 2017; 
Rivis & Sheeran, 2003 for reviews), but empirical research engaging with mediators of 
the effects of social norms is less so. In the environmental domain, perceived 
efficacy/effectiveness or control beliefs are the most commonly considered mediators 
of the effect of social norms on behaviour and intentions (e.g., McDonald et al., 2013; 
Thøgersen, 2014). To my knowledge, the current research is first to consider how 
perceived threat and concern may also convey the indirect influence of descriptive and 
injunctive norms on behaviour. 
In Study 8, I found that perceived efficacy, perceived threat and concern significantly 
mediated indirect links between descriptive and injunctive norms and self-reported pro-
environmental behaviour and intentions in a large cross-national student sample. This 
supports my hypotheses (H1, H3, H5), that the actions and expectations of key social 
referents significantly affect people’s perceptions and feelings regarding climate 
change, and through this process, they also affect behavioural responses to the issue. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, people often look to the actions of others for 
guidance on what is the appropriate course of action in a given situation (Cialdini & 
Trost, 1998). The findings from Study 8 suggest that the information gleaned from 
perceived prevailing social norms do not only have a direct link with intentions and 
behavioural responses to climate change, but they also contribute to a sense of the threat 
posed by climate change, affective responses, and beliefs about individual capacity to 
engage in mitigation action, with these beliefs and affective responses in turn 
contributing to a motivation to act.  
However, contrary to my hypotheses (H2, H4, H6), the interaction between descriptive 
and injunctive norms was not significantly linked with perceived efficacy, perceived 
threat or concern, nor did these beliefs and affective response mediate an indirect link 
between the interaction of the two types of norm and behaviour or intentions in Study 
8. This finding could be interpreted as an indication that descriptive and injunctive 
norms exert independent influences on climate change perceptions and behaviour; 
whereby people may be motivated to act by the perception that key social referents are 
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doing the same, even if such action is not associated with the prospect of social approval 
or disapproval, or people may also act in line with social expectations irrespective of a 
belief that key social referents are not conforming with the injunctive norm. As 
indicated by prior research (McDonald et al., 2013), the latter is particularly likely 
among people who have strong attitudes toward the issue and interpret the lack of action 
by others as a need for them to take personal action.  
Study 9 was designed to address some of the shortfalls in Study 1. Here, I addressed 
how identification with the referent group, and personal biospheric values, may 
moderate the effect of descriptive and injunctive norms, and their interaction, on 
perceived efficacy, perceived threat, concern and behavioural responses. In contrast to 
Study 8, there were no significant effects of the descriptive and injunctive norms, or 
their interaction, on the beliefs and concern regarding climate change nor were there 
any significant indirect effects on intentions and behaviour in Study 9. Further, my 
hypotheses regarding the moderating effects of social identification on the influence of 
descriptive norms on climate change beliefs, concern and behaviour were not supported 
(H7, H8, H9). A key consideration for the lack of an effect of the social norm 
manipulations, and their interaction with social identification, on beliefs, concern and 
behavioural responses to climate change pertains to the nature of participants’ 
relationship with the reference group.  
As discussed above, the ‘student’ category may not be the most relevant norm referent 
for the participants in the context of climate change. If this was the case, then it would 
explain why the actions and expectations of this group would likely not have a strong 
effect on how the participants evaluate and act in response to climate change, regardless 
of the extent to which they identify with the group. In addition to this, research by 
Masson and Fritsche (2014) suggests that different dimensions of  identification can 
have different moderating effects on norm adherence. In this regard, they showed that 
self-investment (i.e. the importance of, and satisfaction with, the group) in the group 
significantly moderated the link between perceived group norms and climate change-
related behavioural intentions, while self-definition (i.e. perceived similarities with 
other members of the group) did not. Individuals who were more self-invested in the 
group adhered more strongly to climate change-related group norms than those who 
were less self-invested. Considering different aspects of identification with the 
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‘student’ category in Study 9 may have helped better elucidate how identification 
moderates the effects of descriptive and injunctive norms on climate change-related 
beliefs, concern and behavioural responses. 
The three-way interaction effect between descriptive and injunctive norms and 
biospheric values on concern, and the conditional moderated mediation effect on 
behavioural intentions revealed in Study 9 are an intriguing and novel finding. It 
appears that congruence between descriptive and injunctive norms supportive of pro-
environmental behaviour are a potent source of motivation for individuals with low 
intrinsic value-driven motivation to act. Whereas, incongruence between the two types 
of norms - particularly when descriptive norms are perceived to be negative, had a 
negative indirect effect on pro-environmental intentions, mediated by concern, when 
intrinsic value-driven motivation was average or low. As discussed in the introduction 
to this chapter, norm incongruence might indicate to individuals that group attitudes30 
toward the issue are weak, and thereby have a de-motivating effect. The results of Study 
9 suggest that individuals who personally place a high priority on pro-environmental 
outcomes (as represented by the strength of their biospheric values) may be more 
impervious to this de-motivating influence of norm incongruence, while those who 
place a low priority on pro-environmental outcomes may respond to norm incongruence 
with reduced concern about climate change and lower motivation to act pro-
environmentally. It is important to note, however, that this effect did not extend to 
participants’ decision to donate to an environmental group. 
Overall, the studies detailed in this chapter indicate that descriptive and injunctive 
norms can exert significant indirect influences on climate change-related behaviours 
and behavioural intentions through their influence on personal beliefs and affective 
responses to the issue. Incongruence between the two types of norms may also have a 
de-motivating indirect effect among individuals who do not personally have strong pro-
environmental values. However, further research addressing how different dimensions 
of identification with the referent group affect norm adherence, and moderate the effects 
of incongruent social norms, is needed to shed more light on the conditions in which 
individuals are most likely to be motivated by social influence to act pro-
                                                 
30 Here, again, the notion of attitude as the degree of difficulty or costs individuals are willing to accept 
in order to achieve an outcome or attitudinal goal is most relevant (Kaiser et al., 2010). 
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environmentally. Additionally, as discussed earlier, the independent effects of 
descriptive and injunctive norms cannot be absolutely disentangled in Study 9. While 
the injunctive norm manipulation only had an effect on perceived injunctive norms, the 
descriptive norm manipulation affected both perceived descriptive and injunctive 
norms. Quite reasonably, people often infer the prevailing social expectations from 
what is commonly done by relevant others. This means that the effects of injunctive 
norms on perceptions and behaviour may also partially reflect indirect effects of 
descriptive norm mediated by injunctive norm. Therefore, it is necessary to attempt 
replications of the findings from Study 9 in subsequent research using methods that can 
more reliably ensure the independence of the manipulation of the two types of norms.
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Chapter 6 
General discussion and conclusion 
Through activities such as fossil fuel consumption, agriculture and industrial processes 
that release greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, humanity has effected 
unprecedented changes in the global climate system. As discussed in Chapter 1, global 
climate change is associated with a variety of environmental phenomena including sea 
level rise, loss of polar ice, ocean acidification and an increase in the frequency of 
extreme weather events (IPCC, 2007b; Swim et al., 2009). Together, these 
manifestations of adverse environmental change pose a severe threat to continued 
human prosperity, security and wellbeing, as well as the ecological systems that support 
life on earth. However, while the implications of global climate change may seem 
overwhelming, there are great opportunities for developing effective solutions to the 
problem in tackling the underlying causal human actions. 
Over the last few decades, psychologists have made a remarkable degree of progress in 
uncovering some of the key factors that facilitate and impede active public engagement 
with issues relating to environmental change (Nickerson, 2003). The purpose of this 
thesis was to draw on this accumulated body of knowledge in examining the way 
attitudinal and behavioural responses to global climate change are determined by 
intrapersonal psychological factors, and influences arising from the external social and 
physical environment. Although it is widely recognized that environmental behaviour 
is influenced by external (e.g., sanction, prompts), interpersonal (e.g., social 
comparison), and personal influences (e.g., values, beliefs) (Gifford et al., 2011), only 
a minority of research in psychology has addressed the interactions between these 
different spheres of influence. The current research was conceived to contribute to 
addressing this shortfall by assessing the way information emanating from the external 
environment in the form of information campaigns, extreme weather events and social 
norms interact with individuals’ values, beliefs and emotions in predicting their 
behavioural responses to global climate change. 
I articulated the relationships between the external and internal psychological 
influences on behavioural engagement with global climate change within an integrative 
framework based on Bandura's (1986) model of triadic reciprocal determinism. The 
179 
 
studies reported in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 of this thesis examined different aspects of 
this framework with a specific focus on how externally generated climate change 
information, experiences with extreme weather and perceived social norms exert 
indirect influences on climate change-related actions and intentions. In subsequent 
sections of this chapter, I present summaries of the key findings from each chapter, and 
follow this with a general discussion of the contributions of the thesis, the limitations 
of the current research and directions for future research.  
Chapter 2: Summary of results 
In Chapter 2, I revisited the effect of knowledge and information campaigns as a source 
of motivation for engagement in pro-environmental behaviour. Several authors have 
previously argued that knowledge is only weakly linked to behaviour (Abrahamse et 
al., 2005; Mckenzie-Mohr, 2000), and that informational strategies often fail to produce 
significant changes in environmental attitudes (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; Steg & 
Vlek, 2009). However, there are number of reasons why this should not necessarily be 
taken as an indication that the role of knowledge in the causal antecedence of pro-
environmental behaviour is negligible.  
Firstly, individuals need to be aware of environmental problems and have a knowledge 
of potential response options before they can act. On this basis, some authors have 
argued that it is not just the amount of knowledge, but the convergence of different 
forms of knowledge, that determines behaviour (Kaiser & Fuhrer, 2003). Secondly, 
knowledge delivered through awareness campaigns may be crucial for alerting the 
public when the evidence of environmental problems is not readily perceptible to the 
lay observer, as is the case with historical weather patterns and anthropogenic climate 
change (Rasool & Ogunbode, 2015). Thirdly, problematic conceptualizations of 
knowledge and a pervasive focus on its direct links with behaviour may have 
contributed to a systematic neglect of the ways in which knowledge contributes 
indirectly to environmental behaviour through its influence on individuals’ beliefs and 
affective responses to environmental problems (Carmi et al., 2015; Kaiser & Fuhrer, 
2003). Lastly, the observed weak links between knowledge and pro-environmental 
behaviour have been largely based on studies of European and North American 
societies. Whereas, there is yet to be a systematic assessment of the effects of 
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knowledge on environmental behaviour in other parts of the world where awareness of 
environmental problems may be generally lower than in western societies.  
Advancing from this background, I conducted three studies designed to examine the 
link between exposure to climate change information and behavioural engagement with 
climate change in two sub-Saharan African countries. Drawing from the knowledge-
deficit and threat and coping appraisal approaches, I hypothesized that exposure to 
climate change information exerts an indirect influence on intentions to engage in 
climate change-related pro-environmental behaviour that is serially mediated by 
knowledge of the causes and consequences of climate change and perceived threat. I 
also hypothesized that the indirect link between exposure to information and 
behavioural intentions is serially mediated by knowledge and concern about climate 
change. 
In Study 1, I found support for both hypotheses in a sample of Nigerians. While 
exposure to information did not have a significant indirect link with willingness to 
protest against government inaction on climate change or willingness to pay higher 
taxes to address climate change, it had a significant relationship with knowledge of 
climate change causes and consequences, which was conveyed through to the 
behavioural indicators through perceived threat and concern. In Study 2, I also found 
support for both hypotheses in a sample of South Africans. Here, again, exposure to 
information had no direct relationship with willingness to protest against government 
inaction or willingness to pay higher taxes to address climate change, but it was directly 
linked to climate change knowledge which along with perceived threat and concern 
serially mediated an indirect link with the behavioural indicators.  
A major limitation of Study 2 was the low reliability of the knowledge measure. In 
addition to this, Both Study 1 and 2 involved a measure of exposure to information 
which only required participants to report the frequency of their encounter with climate 
change information. Considering this measure provided no indication of the nature and 
quality of information that was being encountered, factors which might play a role in 
determining how individuals are affected by the information, I conducted a third study 
examining the effect of information on climate change knowledge, perception and 
action intentions using experimental methods. In Study 3, I randomly assigned 83 South 
African participants to one of two experimental conditions. In one condition (control), 
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they were simply presented with a technical definition of climate change. In a second 
condition (information), they were presented with the climate change definition, as well 
as a brief description of the causes and consequences of climate change. Both groups 
were presented with the climate change definition to ensure that all participants in the 
experiment had the same concept of climate change in mind when they subsequently 
answered questions about their perceptions and attitudes toward the issue.  
The information condition did not produce a significant difference in participants’ 
knowledge of climate change causes. However, it had a significant effect on knowledge 
of the consequences of climate change which in turn conveyed this to willingness to act 
through perceived threat, supporting my first hypothesis. Knowledge of climate change 
consequences and concern did not serially mediate a significant indirect effect of the 
experimental manipulation on willingness to act pro-environmentally in response to 
climate change. The information condition did not have a significant direct effect on 
perceived threat, concern or willingness to engage in pro-environmental behaviour 
Theoretical and practical implications 
Together, the studies reported in Chapter 2 illustrate the argument that much of the 
contribution of knowledge to pro-environmental actions is conveyed indirectly via 
more proximate predictors of behaviour such as beliefs and affective responses. This 
understanding is particularly important in contexts like sub-Saharan Africa where 
climate change awareness is still generally low and calls have been repeatedly made in 
both academic and policy circles for greater investment in efforts aimed at educating 
the public about the implications of climate change. Another key issue highlighted in 
Chapter 2 pertains to the methodological difficulty inherent in reliably operationalizing 
a measure of knowledge in contexts where knowledge of the focal issue is low. The 
knowledge measure employed in Study 1 only achieved the minimum threshold of 
internal consistency deemed acceptable for theory testing (α = .60: Nunnally & 
Bernstein, 1994), while the measure used in Study 2 failed to attain this threshold. 
Better levels of reliability were achieved using the measures of climate change cause 
and consequences knowledge previously validated by van der Linden (2014b), but even 
these fell markedly below the levels of reliability observed in applications of these 
measures in Western contexts (α >.70; e.g., van der Linden, 2015). These observations 
reflect the need for more research focused on addressing public understanding of 
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climate change in African contexts with a view to developing validated measures that 
can be used to map the distribution of climate change knowledge among African 
citizens. 
Chapter 3: Summary of results 
In Chapter 3, I addressed the link between people’s experiences with extreme weather 
and their attitudes toward climate change. Specifically, I focused on the link between 
local flood experience, climate change perceptions and preparedness to reduce energy 
use. Previous research regarding the effects of flooding experience on climate change 
attitudes in the UK has produced mixed evidence. While some studies showed that 
experience of local flooding positively predicts perceived threat, concern about climate 
change and willingness to act-pro-environmentally (e.g., Demski, Capstick, Pidgeon, 
Sposato, & Spence, 2017; Spence, Poortinga, Butler, & Pidgeon, 2011; Taylor, de 
Bruin, & Dessai, 2014), others have indicated that there is no significant relationship 
between flood experiences and climate change attitudes (e.g., Whitmarsh, 2008). I 
argue in Chapter 3 that this seeming inconsistency in the literature may be due in part 
to a failure to account for the role of intervening influences that moderate the link 
between extreme weather experiences and climate change attitudes. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, one of the ways values shape our beliefs is by driving us to 
selectively attend to information based on their congruence with our values. Previous 
research has shown that shared values can give rise to systematic social biases in the 
processing of climate change information, whereby people with shared values, reflected 
by their membership in political or ideological groups, may be more sceptical or less 
willing to accept the scientific consensus on the reality of climate change (Bruine de 
Bruin et al., 2014; Kahan, 2013; McCright & Dunlap, 2011; Whitmarsh, 2011). Based 
on evidence from previous research (Cutler, 2016; L. C. Hamilton, 2011; McCright & 
Dunlap, 2011), I hypothesized that politically right-leaning individuals are less likely 
to see a link between flooding and climate change, and that the link between flood 
experience and climate change attitudes may be weaker among politically right-leaning 
than politically left-leaning individuals. 
I tested these hypotheses using data previously presented by Spence et al. (2011) which 
showed a positive link between local flooding experience and climate change attitudes 
in the UK. My re-analysis of the data revealed that left-leaning voters were more likely 
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to report having noticed signs of climate change in their lifetime and cite flooding when 
asked what signs they had noticed. Further, I found that a model linking flood 
experience indirectly with preparedness to reduce energy use and pay higher prices for 
energy efficient products was not equivalent for left- and right-leaning voters. While 
flood experiences had an indirect link with preparedness to reduce energy use, which 
was significantly mediated by perceived instrumentality, concern and perceived 
vulnerability, among left-leaning voters, this link was not observed among right-leaning 
voters. However, flood experience had a significant indirect link with willingness to 
pay higher prices for energy efficient products among both left- and right-leaning 
voters, but this indirect link was stronger among left-leaning voters. These results 
provided some support for my predictions that political affiliation significantly covaries 
with the likelihood that people see a link between flooding and climate change, and the 
extent to which their experiences with flooding is likely to be linked with positive 
attitudes toward climate change.  
Theoretical and practical implications 
The primary theoretical implication of the results obtained in Chapter 3 pertains to its 
indication of variation in the way people with different political loyalties process their 
experiences with extreme weather in the context of climate change. A great deal of 
existing research has simply investigated associations between climate change attitudes 
and objective exposure to extreme weather, or self-reported experiences of extreme 
weather deemed to be connected with climate change (e.g., Bruine de Bruin, Wong-
Parodi, & Morgan, 2014; Spence et al., 2011), without explicit analyses of individual 
differences in the interpretation of these experiences and the consequences of different 
interpretations for subsequent motivation to address climate change. My findings 
suggest that greater attention needs to be directed at: 
(1) assessing plausible differences in the psychological routes through which 
extreme weather experiences are linked with climate change engagement. For 
example, I observed that flooding experience was indirectly linked to 
willingness to pay higher prices for energy efficient appliances via perceived 
instrumentality among left-leaning voters, and via perceived vulnerability 
among right-leaning voters. 
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(2) understanding how these differences may determine the way people draw on 
their experiences with events such as flooding as a motivational basis to act on 
climate change.  
A practical implication of the results obtained in Chapter 3 is that simply drawing a link 
between extreme weather and climate change is unlikely to be a broadly effective 
strategy for promoting public engagement with climate change. Communication 
strategies that draw on extreme weather experiences as a means of changing climate 
change attitudes and galvanizing action need to be tailored to the values and motives of 
specific segments of the general population (Moser & Dilling, 2004). Such 
communication can only be truly effective if it is guided by an understanding of the 
processes by which people manage and change their behaviours (Pelletier & Sharp, 
2008).  
Audience segmentation research in the health risk communication domain shows that 
communications that target recipients’ belief about their self-efficacy are typically more 
effective in eliciting attitude and behaviour change (Bostrom, Böhm, & O’Connor, 
2013), and this observation may also apply to in the climate change context to an extent 
as I found that the indirect influence of flooding experiences on preparedness to reduce 
energy use and pay more for energy efficiency was most strongly conveyed via 
perceived instrumentality among left-leaning individuals. In other words, messages that 
draw on flooding experiences and emphasize the efficacy of individual action to help 
address climate change may prove to be effective among the left-leaning demographic. 
On the other hand, perceived instrumentality did not mediate a link between flooding 
experience and preparedness to reduce energy use or pay more for energy efficiency 
among right-leaning individuals. But, there was evidence of a mediated indirect link 
between flooding experience and preparedness to pay more for energy efficacy via 
perceived local vulnerability to climate change impacts among this demographic. 
Drawing on prior research showing that climate change deniers may be driven to 
support climate policy by framing climate change mitigation with an emphasis on 
positive societal outcomes (Bain et al., 2012), it seems plausible that messages that 
frame flooding events to climate change and negative social impacts may also be 
effective in eliciting motivation to engage in mitigation actions among politically right-
leaning individuals.   
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Chapter 4: Summary of results 
In Chapter 4, I sought to build on the findings reported in Chapter 3 by exploring the 
role of values and attribution in the link between flood experience and climate change 
attitudes. Due to the practical constraints inherent in operationalizing actual flood 
experiences for experimental purposes, flood experience was operationalised in the 
series of studies presented in Chapter 4 using mental simulation. Drawing on prior 
research from various fields of psychology showing that imagined situations can elicit 
similar effects as real-life experiences on cognition, affective responses and behaviour 
(Crisp et al., 2011; Greenwood, 1989; Ji et al., 2016), I expected that the attitudinal 
consequences of real flood experiences may be recreated with mentally simulated 
personal experiences of flooding. Therefore, I hypothesized that a mentally simulated 
experience of flooding will have positive effects on perceived threat from climate 
change, concern and perceived efficacy, and that these factors would mediate an 
indirect effect of the mentally simulated flood experience on behaviour and intentions. 
Further, I hypothesized that any indirect effects of a mentally simulated flood 
experience on behaviour mediated by perceived threat, concern and efficacy would be 
greater among individuals with stronger biospheric values. I tested these hypotheses by 
comparing people asked to imagine themselves as victims of a severe flooding event 
with a group who had been asked to imagine a neutral outdoor scene  
These hypotheses were not supported in Study 4. However, I found that the imagined 
flood experience had a significant positive effect on perceived threat after controlling 
for biospheric values, past flood experience, gender and age. Additionally, there was a 
significant interaction between the imagined flood experience and biospheric values, 
whereby the mentally simulated flood experience had a significant effect on perceived 
threat among individuals with low levels of biospheric values but not those with high 
levels.  
In Study 5, I attempted to address some of the shortfalls of Study 4. Based on previous 
research suggesting that the vividness and psychological impacts of mental imagery 
may be enhanced by allowing people to generate their own imagery (Krans et al., 2010), 
the imagined flood experience task was presented in Study 5 with no accompanying 
images. Further, I made no indication in the manipulation of a link between climate 
change and flooding event described.  
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I found no support for my hypotheses in Study 5. The imagined flood experience had 
no significant effects on perceived threat, concern or perceived efficacy nor did these 
factors significantly mediate an indirect link between the mentally simulated flood 
experience and the pro-environmental behaviour indicator (donation to an 
environmental group). When I split the participants assigned to the imagined flood 
experience condition into groups of those who attributed the imagined flood to climate 
change and those who did not, I found that attribution had a moderating influence on 
the effect of the imagined flood experience condition.  
In this respect, I found that participants who thought the imagined flood may have been 
linked to climate change reported greater levels of perceived threat and concern than 
participants in the control group, while those who did not think the imagined flood was 
likely to have been linked to climate change reported a lower level of perceived threat 
than participants in the control group. However, perceived threat, concern and 
perceived efficacy did not significantly mediate an indirect relationship between the 
imagined flood experience and the behaviour indicator regardless of whether 
participants thought the flooding may have been linked to climate change. A key 
limitation of Study 4 and 5 is that no account was taken of pre-existing levels of 
scepticism among the participants which could have reduced the effectiveness of the 
imagined flood experience manipulation. Additionally, participants in the control group 
did not receive any information about the flood so there was no way to account for 
variability in their inclination to attribute the event to climate change across the sample.   
In Study 6, I addressed the limitations of the previous studies. I accounted for pre-
existing scepticism, and measured attribution of the flooding event across the sample. 
Further, I hypothesized that attribution would moderate the effect of the imagined flood 
experience on perceived threat, concern and perceived efficacy, as well as any indirect 
effects conveyed through these factors to behavioural intentions.  I found that the 
imagined flood experience did not have a significant effect on perceived threat or 
perceived efficacy, but the effect on concern was trending towards significance. 
Further, the imagined flood experience had significant indirect effects on pro-
environmental behavioural intentions mediated by concern but not by perceived threat 
or perceived efficacy. The indirect link between the mentally simulated flood 
experience and behavioural intentions mediated by concern was not significantly 
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moderated by attribution. There are no obvious reasons why the imagined flood 
experience manipulation failed to produce an effect on most of the dependent variables 
in Study 6. However, seeing as attribution significantly predicted all the dependent 
variables, I conducted another experiment exploring the extent to which a direct 
manipulation of participants’ attribution of the flood event would influence the effect 
of the imagined flood manipulation on climate change attitudes.  
In Study 7, I hypothesized that participants who attributed the mentally simulated flood 
to climate change would report higher levels of perceived threat and concern than those 
in the control group. I also hypothesized that trust in scientists would significantly 
interact with the manipulation, such that the effects of the manipulation would be 
strongest among participants with the highest levels of trust in scientists as a source of 
climate change information. Like the prior studies, the imagined flood experience did 
not have a significant main effect on perceived threat, concern or perceived efficacy 
regardless of whether participants attributed the flood to climate change in Study 7. 
However, there was a significant interaction between the manipulation and trust in 
scientists. Further examination of this interaction revealed that the climate change-
attributed imagined flood experience only had a significant positive indirect effect on 
behavioural intentions mediated by concern among participants with a high level of 
trust in scientists. Whereas, the dis-attributed imagined flood experience had significant 
positive indirect effects on behavioural intentions mediated by concern and perceived 
efficacy among participants with low trust in scientists, and a negative indirect effect 
mediated by perceived efficacy on behavioural intentions among those with a high level 
of trust in scientists. The results of Study 7 show that when the mentally simulated 
flooding experience was considered in the context of scientific statements regarding the 
involvement of climate change, the effect of attributing or not attributing the event to 
climate was dependent on the extent to which individuals see scientists as a trustworthy 
source of information.  
Theoretical and practical implications 
The findings presented in Chapter 4 provided some support for my prediction that 
mentally simulated flooding experiences may elicit similar attitudinal and perceptual 
responses as actual flooding experiences. However, this support was not consistently 
found across the four studies detailed in the chapter. Nonetheless, my findings have an 
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important theoretical implication pertaining to the use of mental simulation techniques 
as a method of exploring the role of mental imagery in public engagement with climate 
change. The results obtained in studies 4, 5 and 7 indicate that, depending on 
individuals’ values, attribution of the flooding event envisioned and trust in scientists 
as a source of climate change information, mentally simulated flooding experiences can 
exert a significant influence on concern, perceived threat and perceived efficacy 
regarding climate change with subsequent implications for intentions to engage in 
mitigation behaviour. This pattern of observations provides a link between previous 
research in cognitive psychology that has traditionally explored the effects of 
affectively charged mental images on attitudinal and behavioural outcomes with 
environmental research addressing the cognitive processing of weather experiences as 
a source of information on climate change.  
This link represents an avenue to draw on the two areas of research in developing and 
investigating further questions regarding the psychological processes involved in the 
encoding of climate change-related mental imagery from personal experiences and how 
such mental imagery operates as an influence on climate change perceptions and 
attitudes. For example, a question that arises from the current research pertains to the 
moderating influence of biospheric values in the link between mentally simulated flood 
experience and perceived threat from climate change. In this regard, it is would be 
informative to determine the specific role of biospheric values in this link by exploring 
the likelihood that people are motivated by their values to construct such mental images 
from their experiences that bolster pre-existing views on the threat posed by climate 
change and inclination to act, or an alternative possibility that biospheric values simply 
amplify the link between mental imagery and perceived threat by increasing the 
salience and accessibility of mental imagery of plausible climate change impacts.  
Mentally simulated flood experiences may have some potential as a practical means of 
influencing perceived threat and concern regarding climate change. However, a 
considerable amount of research is still necessary to determine the specific set of 
parameters that define the extent and limit of the applicability of this strategy in real-
world settings.  
189 
 
Chapter 5: Summary of results  
In Chapter 5, I focused on how perceived descriptive and injunctive norms shape 
individuals’ responses to climate change. Specifically, I addressed the independent and 
interactive effects of descriptive and injunctive norms on perceived threat change, 
concern and perceived efficacy regarding climate change. I also addressed how the 
interactive influence of the two types of norms on climate change-related behaviour 
and intentions may be mediated by perceived threat, concern and perceived efficacy. 
There is an extensive literature showing that both descriptive and injunctive norms have 
direct and indirect effects on environmental behaviour (e.g., Andersson & von 
Borgstede, 2010; Göckeritz et al., 2010; Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008; 
Klöckner, 2013). However, there are conflicting findings on the effects of incongruence 
between the two types of norm on attitudes and behaviour. Rimal and Real (2003) 
proposed that injunctive norms moderate the influence of descriptive norms such that 
the effects of descriptive norms on behaviour are strongest when injunctive norms are 
supportive and they are reduced when injunctive norms are unsupportive.  
This hypothesis has been supported in the environmental domain by prior studies 
showing that self-reported conservation behaviours among a sample of California 
residents were at their highest when both perceived descriptive norms and injunctive 
norms were supportive, but they were significantly reduced when perceived descriptive 
norms were supportive and perceived injunctive norms were unsupportive (Göckeritz 
et al., 2010). Similarly, Smith et al. (2012), found that incongruence between 
descriptive and injunctive norms weakened intentions to engage in energy conservation 
behaviour across three experimental studies. However, McDonald et al. (2013) found 
that norm-conflict does not always result in reduced motivation to conform, and that 
the effect of norm-conflict on behaviour intentions is mediated by perceived 
effectiveness of the behaviour. Specifically, they found that norm-conflict had an 
energizing effect of behaviour intentions among people with strong environmental 
attitudes, while those with weak environmental attitudes were de-motivated by norm-
conflict 
Based on these studies and my review of the wider literature, I revisited the interplay 
between descriptive and injunctive norms as predictors of pro-environmental 
behaviour. I hypothesized that perceived threat, concern and perceived efficacy 
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significantly mediate the link between pro-environmental behaviour and perceived 
descriptive and injunctive norms. I also hypothesized that the interactive influence of 
descriptive and injunctive norms on pro-environmental behaviour is significantly 
mediated by perceived threat, concern and perceived efficacy. In Study 8, I found that 
the link between perceived injunctive, and descriptive, norms and pro-environmental 
intentions and behaviour was significantly mediated by perceived threat, concern and 
efficacy in a large cross-national student sample. However, the interaction between the 
two types of norms was not significantly related to self-reported behaviour or 
intentions, nor did perceived threat, concern and perceived efficacy mediate a link 
between the interaction of the two norm types and the behavioural indicators. I 
suggested in my discussion of the findings from Study 8 that the interaction between 
descriptive and injunctive norms may be better explored using experimental methods 
as the two norm types tend to converge at the individual level since individuals might 
rationally expect that most others conform to the injunctive norm or perceive the 
descriptive norm to be indicative of the injunctive norm (Thøgersen, 2008). I also 
argued that the interaction between the two norm types may be contingent on the extent 
to which individuals identify with the referent group and the strength of their attitudes 
toward the environmental issues (Christensen et al., 2004; McDonald et al., 2013; 
Rinker & Neighbors, 2014). 
I incorporated these arguments in the design of Study 9. Here, I attempted to manipulate 
perceived injunctive and descriptive norms in a 2x2 between-subjects experiment. In 
addition to my initial hypotheses, I predicted that social identification and biospheric 
values significantly moderate the indirect influence of the descriptive and injunctive 
norms manipulations, and their interaction, on pro-environmental behaviour that is 
mediated by perceived threat, concern and perceived efficacy.  I found that descriptive 
and injunctive norms did not have any significant indirect effects on pro-environmental 
behaviour or intentions mediated by perceived threat, concern or efficacy. I also found 
that the interaction between the two types of norm did not have any significant influence 
on pro-environmental behaviour or intentions through any of the mediators.  
Further, my hypotheses regarding the moderating influence of social identification on 
the relationship between descriptive and injunctive norms and behaviour and intentions 
were not supported. There was a significant three-way interaction between biospheric 
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values, the descriptive norm manipulation and the injunctive norm manipulation in their 
influence on concern about climate change.  Further examination of this interaction 
revealed that the injunctive norm manipulation had a significant negative indirect 
influence on behavioural intentions mediated by concern when biospheric values and 
descriptive norms were low. However, when descriptive norms were high and 
biospheric values were low, the injunctive norm manipulation had a positive indirect 
influence on behavioural intentions mediated by concern. This mediated three-way 
interaction effect was not observed with pro-environmental behaviour, and biospheric 
values did not significantly moderate the independent or interactive indirect influence 
of the two norm types on behaviour and intentions mediated by perceived threat or 
concern. 
Overall, the studies reported in Chapter 5 indicate that descriptive and injunctive norms 
may exert a significant indirect influence on pro-environmental behaviour and 
intentions through perceived threat, concern and perceived efficacy. Study 9 also 
provided some support for previous indications that incongruence between descriptive 
and injunctive norms may have a de-motivating indirect effect among people with weak 
environmental values. However, a key limitation of the two studies is that they were 
entirely based on student samples and there is little certainty that the norm referent 
categories employed are the most relevant in the context of participants’ response to 
climate change. Further, in Study 9, the descriptive norm manipulation affected both 
perceived descriptive and injunctive norms which suggests that the intended orthogonal 
manipulation of the two norm types was not achieved.  
Theoretical and practical implications 
The findings detailed in Chapter 5 reiterate the importance of social norms as a source 
of motivation for individual engagement in pro-environmental behaviour insofar that I 
demonstrated in Study 8 that descriptive and injunctive norms are linked with climate 
change perceptions, concern and intentions to act pro-environmentally. However, the 
interaction between the two norm types did not have a significant relationship with any 
of the indices of climate change engagement measured in Study 8, while I failed to 
obtain clean independent manipulations of the two norm types in Study 9. Therefore, 
the evidence from the studies does not provide a strong basis upon which to draw any 
definite conclusions on the primary theoretical objective of the chapter, which was to 
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assess the effect of norm incongruence on climate change perceptions and pro-
environmental behaviour. Nonetheless, the findings suggest that social norms based 
communications that draw on pro-environmental descriptive and injunctive norms may 
have a significant effect in influencing threat perception, concern and perceived 
efficacy to make a personal impact in addressing climate change.  
Contributions of the thesis  
The value of information and knowledge provision 
As discussed previously in Chapter 2, there is a consensus among many psychologists 
that information and knowledge play a trivial role in motivating pro-environmental 
behaviour. However, my research supports a view that the influence of knowledge is 
generally conveyed via more proximate determinants of environmental behaviour, 
specifically in perceived threat and concern. Information provision may play a 
particularly important role in contexts where awareness of the focal issue is relatively 
low. The results of Study 3 also indicate that different forms of knowledge may 
influence climate change perceptions and intentions to act pro-environmentally to 
varying degrees. In this case, only knowledge of the consequences of climate change 
appeared to have a significant influence on perceived threat and behavioural intentions 
regarding climate change.  
Overall, my research suggests that the influence of knowledge is not negligible and that 
there are still questions to be investigated, particularly regarding the forms of 
knowledge that are most likely to produce attitude and behaviour change in presently 
underexplored contexts such as sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast to the critical view of 
knowledge campaigns that has been expressed by several authors (e.g., Abrahamse, 
Steg, Vlek, & Rothengatter, 2005; Steg & Vlek, 2009), there is evidence, even in 
Western contexts, that information provision can have a significant positive influence 
on the degree and strength of pro-environmental attitude change (Bidwell, 2016; 
Delmas, Fischlein, & Asensio, 2013). Fundamentally, the levels of attention and 
interest directed at uncovering the nuances of how informational strategies contribute 
to pro-environmental behaviour in the context of climate change is linked with the 
priorities that guide international scientific activities and funding mechanisms.  
The overrepresentation of WEIRD perspectives and case-studies in environmental 
behaviour research reflects the inequalities in non-Western countries’ participation and 
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representation in global scientific and policy agendas (Blicharska et al., 2017; Karlsson, 
2002). The case of research into environmental knowledge and informational strategies 
illustrates how evidence from a unique and largely unrepresentative subsection of the 
global human population is often used to substantiate pervasive claims about the 
universal nature of processes with global relevance. This practice presents a challenge 
for managing global threats such as climate change because research into aspects of 
psychological engagement that may prove decisive in creating a large-scale personal 
motivation to pursue mitigation and adaptation goals among the greater proportion of 
the world population may not be initiated because these aspects are not a priority in 
Western societies.  
Many non-Western countries have limited capacities to pursue research, inadequate 
academic resources, and different research priorities than Western countries 
(Blicharska et al., 2017). However, an understanding of environmental behaviour that 
is primarily rooted in the experiences of Western societies may not be suited to 
addressing problems and situations in non-Western contexts (Karlsson, 2002). Given 
the global nature of climate change, it is necessary for researchers in environmental 
psychology to strive for an understanding that is commensurate in scope with the 
requirement of coordinated effort by people in diverse social and cultural contexts to 
achieve effective responses to the problem.  
There is a need for research addressing the effects of knowledge and awareness in 
African countries, in particular, primarily because Africa is exceptionally vulnerable to 
climate change impacts (Carter & Parker, 2009; IPCC, 2014), and low awareness of the 
threat posed, and of appropriate coping strategies, have been widely identified as key 
barriers to effective mitigation and adaptation (Antwi-Agyei, Dougill, & Stringer, 
2015; Muller & Shackleton, 2014; Shackleton, Ziervogel, Sallu, Gill, & Tschakert, 
2015). My findings with samples from Nigeria and South Africa suggest that 
information that fosters a view of climate change as a personal and social threat is likely 
to motivate engagement in actions aimed at addressing the issue.  
However, it is important to note that information provision is only one element in the 
process of behavioural change (Hornik, 1989; Maio et al., 2007). It is also necessary to 
tackle situational influences that may limit individuals’ capacity or willingness to act 
on the threat of climate change irrespective of their level of awareness. For instance, in 
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Study 2, I found that knowledge of climate change was negatively related to willingness 
to pay higher taxes to address climate change among the South African sample. A 
reason for this might be a lack of public trust in the government or other relevant 
institutions to use the funds generated from a ‘climate tax’ for the intended purpose. It 
is practically common knowledge that corruption is a salient and pervasive problem in 
African countries (Lawal, 2007). In many parts of the world, corruption has been 
consistently linked with low interpersonal and institutional trust (Morris & Klesner, 
2010; Seligson, 1999). In Africa, it has been linked with reduced willingness to make 
voluntary contributions to public goods (Beekman, Bulte, & Nillesen, 2014), increased 
political participation, particularly willingness to protest (Inman & Andrews, 2009). 
Therefore, while participants in Study 2 showed increased willingness to protest against 
government inaction on climate change with increasing climate change knowledge, the 
relationship between knowledge and willingness to pay higher taxes for addressing 
climate may plausibly have been inverted by exposure to institutional corruption31.  
Some authors have indicated that increased knowledge of climate change in African 
societies may engender negative reactions including anger and resentment at the 
disproportionate ratio of responsibility for the cause of climate change and projected 
consequences of climate change for the continent (Deane, 2009). Since knowledge only 
showed a negative relationship with willingness to pay tax and was unrelated to 
willingness to protest, the negative relationship may also reflect reactance in the sense 
that individuals may feel less inclined to make personal sacrifices to address climate 
change with increasing understanding of the causes of the problem. 
Although the points made in the preceding two paragraphs are only speculative, they 
serve to illustrate the idiosyncratic landscape of climate change communication and 
engagement in Africa. The findings in my research indicate that providing information 
about climate change can play a role in creating motivation to act on climate change, 
but they also reflect the need for a broader research program that more holistically 
examines how the acquisition of such information is likely to interact with other 
contextual factors in determining the way people respond to climate change. 
                                                 
31 Low levels of interpersonal trust and exposure to corruption may also explain participants’ lack of 
willingness to participate in the raffle in Study 3 
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Extreme weather experiences and climate change engagement 
A growing amount of literature suggests that extreme weather experiences are 
positively linked with concern, risk perceptions and pro-environmental behavioural 
intentions regarding climate change (Akerlof et al., 2013; Broomell, Budescu, & Por, 
2015; Demski et al., 2017; A. Taylor et al., 2014). Some authors have expressed 
optimism regarding the potential of extreme weather experiences to promote climate 
change engagement against a backdrop of political polarization on the issue (Akerlof et 
al., 2013; Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & Smith, 2010). The literature on this 
topic suggests that extreme weather experiences can impact climate change attitudes by 
confirming pre-existing beliefs, increasing the salience of climate change, facilitating 
personal realization of the immediacy of the problem, and increasing attentiveness (and 
possibly receptiveness) to climate change information (Demski et al., 2017; Howe et 
al., 2014; C. Lang & Ryder, 2016; Myers et al., 2013; Spence et al., 2011). However, 
extreme weather experiences may not universally produce more positive attitudes 
toward climate change, particularly among individuals who do not make a link between 
the event and climate change and in situations where the indicator of engagement or 
attitude change pertains to mitigation actions and policies (McCright et al., 2014; Reser 
et al., 2012; van der Linden, 2014b). 
Previous research in the US has consistently shown a significant effect of political 
orientation on climate change beliefs, whereby politically right-leaning individuals 
have been shown to exhibit greater levels of scepticism about climate change on 
average than their left-leaning counterparts (Marquart-Pyatt et al., 2014; McCright & 
Dunlap, 2011). A similar pattern of political differences has also been shown in relation 
to the way US citizens perceive salient weather events as extreme or unusual, and their 
willingness to act pro-environmentally with regard to climate change (Cutler, 2015; 
Gromet et al., 2013; Hamilton et al., 2016). The primary contribution of this thesis to 
research in this area is showing that political orientation may also explain the seeming 
inconsistency in evidence regarding the link between flood experiences and climate 
change attitudes in the UK. My findings in Chapter 3 suggest that the indirect influence 
of flood experiences on preparedness to engage in mitigation behaviour among 
politically right-leaning individuals was weaker or non-significant compared with left-
leaning individuals. I argued that this may be a result of right-leaning individuals being 
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less likely to attribute extreme weather events to climate change and being likely to 
have comparatively greater levels of scepticism about climate change.  
However, the moderating effect of political orientation observed in Chapter 3 was 
modest and I reasoned that this may be because political orientation, as measured in 
that study, was only a rough index of more proximate determinants of individuals’ 
views of extreme weather and their attitudes toward climate change. Prior research 
suggests that group differences in attitudes toward salient issues such as climate change 
are often rooted in differences in fundamental shared values (Goebbert et al., 2012; 
Kahan, 2013). I explored the more proximate moderators of the link between flood 
experience and climate change attitudes in Chapter 4. The results obtained using the 
imagined flood experience approach have only made a modest contribution to 
answering the questions raised in Chapter 3. Attribution of flood experiences to climate 
change seemed to make a difference with regard to perceived threat, concern and 
perceived efficacy in two studies (Study 5, Study 7) but these effects were inconsistent 
and in one study (Study 7) they depended on the extent to which individuals trusted the 
source of information invoked to back up the attribution claim. Biospheric values also 
largely showed no effect in moderating the link between the imagined flood experience 
and climate change attitudes, although they showed the reverse of my hypothesis in 
Study 1 where the imagined flood experience was found to have a stronger effect on 
climate change attitudes among individuals with low biospheric values. Overall, the 
research reported in this thesis indicates that the influence of real and imagined flood 
experiences on climate change engagement, and how this influence is moderated by 
intervening variables including values and shared worldviews, remains an open 
question requiring further research.  
Social influence and climate change engagement 
 Social norms are widely recognized as a potentially powerful mechanism for 
promoting public engagement with climate change (Griskevicius, Cialdini, & 
Goldstein, 2008; van der Linden, Maibach, & Leiserowitz, 2015). The results presented 
in Chapter 5 of this thesis suggest that beyond having simple direct effects on 
behaviour, descriptive and injunctive norms may also be linked to behaviour and 
intentions through their influence on perceived threat, concern and perceived efficacy 
regarding climate change. In contrast to the norm focus approach which emphasizes the 
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need to act correctly or avoid social disapproval as key motivations for conformity to 
social norms (Cialdini, 2014; Cialdini et al., 1991), the finding that personal beliefs and 
emotions mediate the link between social norms and pro-environmental behaviour and 
intentions (Study 8) suggests that people may also internalize what they perceive to be 
the responses of relevant social referents to the focal issue. This understanding is 
consistent with the social identity approach which suggests that shared interests and 
concerns within a group may become cognitively represented as personal interests and 
personal concerns depending on the extent to which individuals self-categorize as group 
members (Hogg & Reid, 2006). 
Although the indirect influence of injunctive norms on pro-environmental behaviour 
and intentions through perceived threat and perceived efficacy was not replicated in 
Study 9, the findings of that study make a relevant contribution to the literature 
concerning how social influence may interact with other factors such as individuals’ 
commitment to the issue in determining their motivation to conform with perceived 
norms. Here, I found that injunctive norms had a negative indirect influence mediated 
by concern on intentions to act pro-environmentally when descriptive norms were 
unsupportive and biospheric values were low. Interestingly, when biospheric values 
were low but descriptive norms were supportive, the injunctive norm had a positive 
indirect influence on behavioural intentions which mediated by concern. Values 
typically reflect stable beliefs and preferences which may be resistant to change. On the 
other hand, social norms-based communication strategies are a low-cost persuasion 
strategy that have been shown to effective in eliciting behaviour change across a variety 
of domains. The findings in Study 9 suggest that making congruent, supportive 
descriptive and injunctive norms salient may be an effect way to motivate climate 
change engagement among in instances where intrinsic pro-environmental motivation 
is low.  
Conclusion and future directions  
This thesis has illustrated that influences arising from the external physical and social 
environment play a role in shaping individual behavioural responses to climate change 
through their influence on personal beliefs and concern. Specifically, it has shown that 
informational strategies that furnish individuals with an understanding of the threat 
posed by climate change, and evoke concern about the problem, may be effective in 
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motivating engagement in behaviours aimed at mitigating climate change. Further, it 
also shows that the perceived behaviours and expectations of relevant social referents 
has a significant influence on our beliefs and emotional responses regarding climate 
change with consequences for our subsequent inclinations to personally engage in 
mitigation actions. Most importantly, it shows that the interpretation of our experiences 
with flooding may be contingent on the values and attitudes associated with our salient 
group memberships.  
However, each of the studies presented in the thesis have inherent limitations and 
unresolved questions requiring further investigation. The studies reported in Chapter 2 
provided some evidence that knowledge may exert an indirect positive influence on 
climate change-related behaviour intentions in African contexts through primary 
appraisal processes. Yet, primary appraisal only represents a fraction of the process 
leading to attitudinal and behavioural change. Therefore, there is a need to investigate 
how knowledge affects the way African citizens appraise potential behavioural 
responses options and how the outcomes of this appraisal process determine the way 
they engage with climate change. Additionally, the research was only based on 
opportunistic samples of the two nations surveyed. Subsequent research employing 
representative sampling strategies are necessary to substantiate the validity of the 
current results. 
The role of political affiliation in the link between flood experiences and climate change 
engagement in the UK also requires further investigation. The operationalization of 
political affiliation in the analysis presented in Chapter 3 can only be taken to be a rough 
reflection of shared values and worldviews that more proximally explain the differences 
observed in the link between flood experiences and preparedness to engage in 
mitigation behaviour among politically left and right-leaning individuals. Therefore, 
there is a need for subsequent research that addresses the key factors that explain 
political differences in interpretations of extreme weather experiences and how these 
modulate the motivating influence of such experiences with regard to climate change 
engagement. Although mental simulation strategies have been shown to effective in 
eliciting substantial changes in attitudes and behaviour in various domains, the current 
research failed to produce consistent support for the efficacy of the imagined flood 
experience as a paradigm for understanding the effects of flood experiences. 
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Lastly, the interplay between descriptive and injunctive norms as influences on 
behaviour in the context of climate change and other environmental domains was not 
definitely addressed in the current research. Subsequent studies employing alternative 
approaches such as anchoring (e.g., Eyssel, Bohner, & Siebler, 2006) will be necessary 
to obtain independent manipulations of the two norm types and enable further 
investigation of their interactive influence on individuals’ motivation to engage in pro-
environmental behaviours.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Measure of knowledge of climate change causes and consequences (Study 1) 
Please read the following statements carefully and indicate your level of agreement with each 
one using the scale provided (1= Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree). 
1. Climate change is caused by increasing carbon dioxide in the atmosphere 
2. Climate change is caused by excessive sunshine and volcanic eruptions (Reversed) 
3. Climate change is caused by ozone layer depletion (Reversed) 
4. Climate change can cause a spread of diseases and illnesses 
5. Climate change can result in natural disasters such as floods and droughts 
6. Climate change has no effect on economic growth and development (Reversed) 
7. Climate change does not affect agriculture and food production (Reversed) 
8. Climate change has nothing to do with the rise in sea levels (Reversed) 
Items 2 and 4 were dropped to increase the internal consistency of the measure in Study 2. 
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Appendix 2 
Manipulations (Study 3): 
1. Control condition (climate change definition only) 
“Climate change is a large-scale, long-term shift in the planet’s weather patterns or average 
temperatures. Research shows that the climate – i.e. the average temperature of the planet’s surface 
has risen by 0.89oC from 1901 to 2012. Compared with climate change patterns throughout earth’s 
history, the rate of temperature rise since the industrial revolution is extremely high.” – Met Office 
 
2. Information condition (climate change definition + causes + impacts) 
“Climate change is a large-scale, long-term shift in the planet’s weather patterns or average 
temperatures. Research shows that the climate – i.e. the average temperature of the planet’s surface 
has risen by 0.89oC from 1901 to 2012. Compared with climate change patterns throughout earth’s 
history, the rate of temperature rise since the industrial revolution is extremely high.” – Met Office 
“Most climate scientists agree that human activities are playing a major role in driving the current 
rate of change in the Earth’s climate. Over the last century, the burning of fossil fuels such as coal 
and oil has increased the concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere. To a lesser 
extent, the clearing of land for agriculture, industry and other human activities has also increased 
the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases.” – NASA 
“The consequences of changing the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere are difficult 
to predict precisely, but certain effects seem likely: 
1. On average, Earth will become warmer. 
2. Warmer conditions will lead to more evaporation and precipitation overall, but individual regions 
will vary, with some become wetter and others dryer. 
3. A stronger greenhouse effect will warm the oceans and partially melt glaciers (- glaciers are slowly 
moving rivers or masses of ice formed by the accumulation of compacted snow on mountain tops 
or near the poles) and other ice, increasing sea levels. Ocean water will also expand if it warms, 
contributing further to sea level rise.  
4. While some crops and other plants may respond favourably to increased atmospheric carbon 
dioxide, higher temperatures and changing climatic patterns may change the areas where crops 
grow best and affect the composition of natural plant communities” – NASA 
“Across Africa, communities are already experiencing rising temperatures, growing pressure from 
pests and disease, declining agricultural productivity, and an increase in the frequency of extreme 
weather events such as floods and drought. Scientists have indicated that this trend is evidence of 
the reality of climate change in Africa” - (Toulmin 2009; Tadesse 2010; Berrang-Ford et al. 2012).   
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Appendix 3 
Measures of climate change knowledge (Study 3) 
Cause - Knowledge 
Please indicate, to the best of your knowledge, how much each of the following items 
contribute to Climate Change 
 
Minor contribution 
Don't 
know 
Major contribution 
Burning fossil fuels (coal, oil, gas) 
for heat and electricity 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
The hole in the Ozone Layer -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Driving a car -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Aerosol spray cans (containing 
CFCs) 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Toxic waste -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Nuclear power plants -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Acid rain -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Agricultural activities (e.g., cattle 
breeding) 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
The sun -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Flying/Commercial air travel -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Smoking cigarettes -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Deforestation -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
Impact - Knowledge 
For each of the items listed below, please indicate whether you believe that they are 
likely to decrease, remain constant or increase as a result of Climate Change. 
 
Likely to decrease 
No 
Change 
Likely to increase 
Global average temperature -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Acid rain -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Air pollution -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Areas in the world experiencing 
drought 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Global biodiversity (i.e. variety of 
plants and animals) 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Melting of glaciers and polar ice 
caps 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Global spread of infectious diseases -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
The hole in the Ozone layer -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Extreme weather events (e.g. 
floods, storms etc.) 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Volcanic eruptions -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
The frequency of hot days and 
nights 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Global fresh water supply -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
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Appendix 4 
Gender comparisons of measured knowledge and climate change attitudes (Study 3). 
DV 
Gender 
t p 
Male Female 
M (SD) 
Knowledge (Cause) 6.53 (2.09) 5.61 (2.01) 1.97 .052 
Knowledge 
(Consequences) 7.90 (1.45) 7.65 (1.67) -.69 .492 
Concern 5.88 (1.22) 5.65 (1.13) -.58 .569 
Perceived threat 5.64 (1.14) 5.85 (.89) -.90 .370 
Willingness to act 3.55 (.82) 3.83 (.88) -1.45 .152 
Listwise valid N = 83 (Control = 45, Information = 38). For Concern: N = 36. DV = Dependent Variable 
Correlation between age and the dependent variables (Study 3) 
DV Correlation (r) with age (in years) 
Knowledge (Cause) -.11 
Knowledge (Consequences) -.14 
Concern .25 
Perceived threat .10 
Willingness to act .00 
Cell entries are Pearsons correlations coefficients. None are significant at p<.05. N = 83 except concern: N = 36.  
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Appendix 5 
Multigroup Path Comparisons 
 
 
Figure S1: Path comparisons across left and right-leaning voter categories. Dashed paths 
represent equivalence across groups and solid paths are significantly different for each group. 
Values are chi-square difference estimates for comparisons of unconstrained model and a 
model with the specified path constrained (df = 1 for each estimate). “*” denotes p<.05. 
Results are derived from multi-group comparisons conducted using AMOS 22. 
Chi-square difference estimates and significance for path comparisons: 
1. (flood experience, energy use)     Χ2 = 0.298 (1), p = 0.585 
2. (flood experience, instrumentality) Χ2 = 0.021(1), p = 0.885 
3. (flood experience, concern) Χ2 = 0.016(1), p = 0.898 
4. (flood experience, uncertainty) Χ2 = 0.074(1), p = 0.786 
5. (flood experience, vulnerability) Χ2 = 1.076(1), p = 0.300 
6. (instrumentality , energy use) Χ2 = 0.218(1), p = 0.641 
7. (concern , energy use) Χ2 = 2.211(1), p = 0.137 
8. (uncertainty , energy use) Χ2 = 6.581(1), p = 0.010 
9. (vulnerability , energy use) Χ2 = 1.467(1), p = 0.226 
 
Flooding 
experience 
Uncertainty 
Perceived 
vulnerability 
Perceived 
instrumentality 
Reduce 
energy use 
Concern 
0.021 
0.016 
0.298 
0.074 
1.076 
1.467 
2.211 
6.581* 
1.476 
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Appendix 5 Contd. 
 
 
Figure S2: Path comparisons across left and right-leaning voter categories. Dashed paths 
represent equivalence across groups and solid paths are significantly different for each group. 
Values are chi-square difference estimates for comparisons of unconstrained model and a 
model with the specified path constrained (df = 1 for each estimate). “*” denotes p<.05. 
Results are derived from multi-group comparisons conducted using AMOS 22. 
Chi-square difference estimates and significance for path comparisons: 
1. (flood experience, pay for energy efficiency)   Χ2 = 0.010(1), p = 0.921 
2. (flood experience, instrumentality) Χ2 = 0.005(1), p = 0.943 
3. (flood experience, concern) Χ2 = 0.017(1), p = 0.733 
4. (flood experience, uncertainty) Χ2 = 0.116(1), p = 0.733 
5. (flood experience, vulnerability) Χ2 = 1.098(1), p = 0.295 
6. (instrumentality, pay for energy efficiency) Χ2 = 10.863(1), p = 0.001 
7. (concern, pay for energy efficiency) Χ2 = 2.881(1), p = 0.090 
8. (uncertainty, pay for energy efficiency) Χ2 = 4.610(1), p = 0.032 
9. (vulnerability, pay for energy efficiency) Χ2 = 1.157(1), p = 0.282 
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Appendix 6 
   
Experimental Stimuli and Questionnaire (Study 4)  
 
Past experience 
1. Have you had a personal experience of unusually intense rainfall and flooding in the last 5 
years? □ No □ Yes 
2. Have you personally experienced an extreme or unusual weather event (e.g., severe heatwave, 
freak storm, drought etc.) in the last 5 years? □ No □ Yes 
 
Involvement in Environmental Groups 
Are you currently a member of an environmental group? □ No □ Yes 
 
Self-rated Knowledge 
How would you rate your knowledge of Climate Change? 
Very Low   Very High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Measured Knowledge 
1. Which of the following do you think contributes the most to global warming and Climate 
Change (Tick one)? 
a. The hole in the Ozone Layer 
b. Deforestation 
c. Burning fossil fuels for heat and electricity 
d. Toxic wastes 
e. Volcanic eruptions 
f. Cars and trucks 
g. Cows 
 
2. The earth’s climate is warmer now than it has ever been before  
□ True □ False □ Don’t Know 
3. The decade from 2000 to 2009 was warmer than any other decade since 1850  
□ True □ False  □ Don’t Know 
4. Nuclear power plants are a key driver of Climate Change 
□ True □ False  □ Don’t Know 
5. Global warming will cause a uniform increase in temperature across the globe 
□ True □ False  □ Don’t Know 
6. Climate Change will increase the incidence of certain vector-borne diseases such as Malaria 
□ True □ False  □ Don’t Know 
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Value Orientations 
Below are a number of values that some people consider to be important. Please rate the 
importance of each one as a guiding principle in your life using a scale from 0 (not important) 
to 7 (extremely important). If you disagree with or are opposed to one of the values, please 
circle -1. 
 
Demographics 
1. What is your gender? □ Male □ Female □ Rather not say 
2. Which of the following best describes your ethnicity? 
□ Asian/Asian British/Asian Descent 
□ Black/African/Caribbean/Black British 
□ Caucasian 
□ Mixed/Multiple Ethnicity 
□ Other (please specify) ________________ 
3. Age ____________ 
4. Subject and year of study ____________ 
Influence (having power over people 
and events) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Helpful (working for the welfare of 
others) -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Respecting the earth (harmony with 
other species) -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Wealth (money and material 
possessions) -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Equality (equal opportunity for all) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Protecting the environment 
(preserving nature) -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Authority (the right to lead or 
command) -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Social justice (care for the weak, 
correcting injustice) -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Unity with nature (fitting into nature) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Social recognition (respect and 
approval by others) -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A world at peace  (free from conflict) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Preventing pollution 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Imagined Experience Prompt Message:  
Please take two minutes to imagine yourself as a victim of the flooding described 
above. Imagine watching your home and property being extensively damaged by 
floodwater, and being unable to get access to nearby shops for food and groceries, or 
get to work and school as most roads in the vicinity are now submerged. In the space 
provided below, please describe as many aspects of the scenario you just imagined as 
possible. 
Additional Questions: 
(a) How easy was it for you to imagine yourself being in this situation (7-point: Very 
Difficult to Very Easy). 
(b) How vivid (clear) was your mental imagery of yourself being in this situation (7-
point: Not vivid to Very Vivid) 
(c) In your imagined scenario, how did you feel about the experience of the flood? 
 
Dependent variables   
Attribution 
Do you think the extreme rainfall and widespread 
flooding that occurred in the UK during the winter of 
2013/2014 is a result of Climate Change? 
□ No □ Yes □ Don’t Know 
   
How confident are you these events were/were not a consequence of Climate Change? 
Not Confident   Very Confident 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Perceived issue salience 
How accurately do the following statements reflect your view of climate change? 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Strongly Agree 
To me, the topic of climate change is 
important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
To me, the topic of climate change is of 
interest 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
To me, the topic of climate change is 
relevant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Perceived Threat 
How do you rate the seriousness of the threat posed by Climate Change to the following? 
 Very Low  Very High 
The environment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
People in the UK 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You as an individual 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How do you rate the likelihood that the threat posed by Climate Change will affect the 
following? 
 Very Low  Very High 
Your health and wellbeing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The wellbeing of society as a whole 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Wildlife and natural landscapes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Affect 
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Holistic Affect 
Using the scale below, how do you rate Climate Change overall, as a good or bad thing? 
Very Bad   Very Good 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
Discrete Emotions 
When you think about climate change, how strongly do you experience the following 
emotions? 
 Not at all  Very Strongly 
Fear 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Worry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Concern 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Anger 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Outrage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Acceptance of responsibility 
Focusing on your current feelings about climate change, how accurately do the following 
statements describe your attitude? 
 Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
You consider it a personal 
obligation to address climate 
change in any way you can 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You feel that individuals like 
yourself should not be expected 
to take on the responsibility of 
addressing climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You feel a strong sense of 
responsibility for addressing 
climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You feel that you should not be 
responsible for addressing such a 
problem 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Scepticism 
Based on your knowledge of climate change, how accurately do the following statements 
reflect your beliefs? 
 Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
The actions of a single person 
don’t make any difference in 
tackling climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
There is too much conflicting 
evidence about climate change to 
know if it is really happening 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Climate change is part of a 
natural pattern that has been 
going on for millions of years 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Environmentalists do their best 
to emphasize the worst possible 
effects of climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
People are too selfish to do 
anything about climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Perceived efficacy 
Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
 Strongly Agree 
I can personally help reduce Climate 
Change by changing my behaviour 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
My personal contribution to collective 
efforts aimed at addressing  Climate 
Change can make a significant 
difference 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I believe that I, as an individual, can 
make a difference in reducing Climate 
Change 
       
The combined efforts of individuals  
like myself can go a long way in 
addressing Climate Change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I believe that I, as an individual, can 
make an important contribution to the 
success of collective efforts to address 
Climate Change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The actions of individuals like myself 
can collectively achieve the goal of 
reducing Climate Change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Intentions 
Based on your current feelings about climate change, how likely are you to engage in the 
following behaviours in the near future? 
 Not at all likely  Very Likely 
Sign a petition calling on the 
government to make stronger 
commitments to addressing climate 
change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Donate to an environmental group that 
focuses on climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Volunteer in, or join, an environmental 
group that is engaged with climate 
change issues 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Try to limit your energy consumption 
for the sake of the environment 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Manipulation Check 
There was an unusual amount of rainfall across the 
UK in the winter of 2013/2014 
□ 
Agree 
□ 
Disagree 
□ Don’t 
Know 
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Appendix 7 
Experimental Stimuli and Questionnaire (Study 5) 
Background and Controls 
Demographics 
1. What is your gender? □ Male □ Female □ Rather not say  □ Other 
2. Which of the following best describes your ethnicity? 
□ Asian/Asian British/Other Asian Descent 
□ Black/African/Afro-Caribbean/Black British 
□ Caucasian/White 
□ Mixed/Multiple Ethnicities 
□ Other (please specify) ________________ 
3. Age (in years) ____________ 
4. Subject and year of study ____________ 
5. Nationality _______________________ 
 
Past experience 
a. Considering roughly the 5 years, how often have you personally experienced flooding in 
your local area? 
□ Never □ Once  □ Twice  □ Three times   □ More than 3 times 
  
□ I don't remember 
 
b. Considering roughly the 5 years, how often ( in total) have you personally experienced any 
type of extreme weather event (other than flooding) in your local area (e.g., severe heat 
waves, droughts, freak storms, hurricanes etc? 
□ Never □ Once  □ Twice  □ Three times   □ More than 3 times 
  
□ I don't remember 
 
Pro-environmental self-identity (Whitmarsh & O'Neill, 2010) 
Thinking about your attitude toward environmental issues, how accurately do the following 
statements describe you? 
 
Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
I think of myself as an 
environmentally-friendly consumer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would be embarrassed to be seen 
as having an environmentally-
friendly lifestyle 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I think of myself as someone who is 
very concerned about 
environmental issues 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would not want my friends and 
family to think of me as someone 
who is concerned about 
environmental issues 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
 
 
Identification with the Environmental Movement (McCright &Dunlap, 2015) 
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"The environmental movement is a diverse scientific, social and political movement for 
addressing environmental issues. Environmentalists advocate the sustainable management of 
resources and stewardship of the earth through changes in public policy and individual 
behaviour. The movement is centred on ecology, health and human rights."  
This statement was retrieved from Wikipedia and will be presented at the top of the 
page in which the following items (a-c) are presented. 
a. Are you currently a member of an environmental group? [No] [Yes] 
ii. If yes, what is the name of the environmental group? _______________                       
  
b. Do you consider yourself an environmentalist? [No] [Yes] 
 ii. If yes, would you say you are a strong environmentalist? [No] [Yes] 
c. Thinking specifically about the environmental movement, do you think of yourself as: 
 1. Unsympathetic toward the environmental movement 
 2. Neutral 
 3. Sympathetic toward the environmental movement, but not actively involved 
 4. An active participant in the environmental movement 
 
Perceived norms (Descriptive + Injunctive) 
Please evaluate the extent to which each of the statements below accurately describes the attitudes of students at 
the University of Leicester by indicating your level of agreement/disagreement with each using the scale 
provided. 
 Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
"Most people around me are personally 
doing something to help reduce the risk of 
Climate Change" (D) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
"My friends and relatives would support 
me if I decided to change my behaviour to 
help reduce Climate Change"(I) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
“Most people I know generally do not 
expect me to do anything personally to help 
address Climate Change”(I-) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
“Most of my colleagues, friends and other 
people I know are involved with a charity 
or society that addresses environmental 
issues including Climate Change” (D) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
“Most people around me approve of 
donating to, or fundraising for, 
environmental groups that focus on 
Climate Change” (I) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
"Addressing Climate Change, is not a high 
priority for most people I know" (D-) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
"Most of my relatives and friends are not 
personally doing anything to help address 
Climate Change" (D-) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
"My friends and relatives would not 
support me if I decided to change my 
behaviour to help reduce Climate Change" 
(I-) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Value Orientations 
Below are a number of values that some people consider to be important. Please rate the 
importance of each one as a guiding principle in your life using a scale from 0 (not important) 
to 7 (extremely important). If you disagree with or are opposed to one of the values, please 
circle -1. 
 
Imagined Experience Manipulation 
In February 2014, the UK Met Office confirmed that England and Wales had 
experienced the wettest winter since records began in 1766. Downpours totalling 
435mm of rain broke the 250 year old England and Wales precipitation records. 
Heavy rainfall from late 2013 into early 2014 resulted in severe flooding around the 
UK, affecting thousands of homes and farms, cutting off critical transport routes, and 
disrupting social and economic activities across large parts of the country.  
(Sources: The Guardian, BBC News) 
 
Imagined Experience Prompt Message:  
For the next two minutes, please imagine yourself as a victim of the flooding 
described above. Imagine watching your home and property being extensively 
damaged by floodwater, and being unable to get access to nearby shops for food and 
groceries, or get to work/school as most roads in the vicinity are now submerged. In 
the space provided below, please describe as many aspects of the scenario you just 
imagined as possible. 
Additional Questions: 
(d) How easy was it for you to imagine yourself being in this situation (7-point: Very 
Difficult to Very Easy). 
(e) How vivid (clear) was your mental imagery of yourself being in this situation (7-
point: Not vivid to Very Vivid) 
(f) In your imagined scenario, how did you feel about the experience of the flood? 
Influence (having power over 
people and events) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Helpful (working for the 
welfare of others) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Respecting the earth (harmony 
with other species) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Wealth (money and material 
possessions) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Equality (equal opportunity for 
all) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Protecting the environment 
(preserving nature) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Authority (the right to lead or 
command) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Social justice (care for the 
weak, correcting injustice) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Unity with nature (fitting into 
nature) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Social recognition (respect and 
approval by others) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A world at peace  (free from 
conflict) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Preventing pollution 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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(g) How likely do you think it is that the flooding that occurred across the UK in 2014 is 
linked to climate change? (1 = Not at all likely, 7 = Very Likely). 
(h) How confident are you that the flooding is linked to climate change? (1 = Not 
Confident, 7 = Very Confident). 
Control Prompt Message 
For the next two minutes, please imagine an outdoor scene. Try to imagine aspects of 
the scene about you (e.g., is it a beach, a forest, are there trees, hills, what's on the 
horizon?). In the space below, please list the different things you saw in the scene you 
just imagined. 
 
Dependent variables   
Perceived Threat 
Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability 
 Not Serious at all   Very Serious 
How serious of a threat do you believe 
Climate Change is to you personally? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How serious of a threat would you rate the 
current impacts of Climate Change around 
the world? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How serious would you estimate the 
impacts of climate change are for the 
natural environment? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How serious of a threat do you think 
current Climate Change impacts are for the 
area you currently live in?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 Very Unlikely  Very Likely 
In your judgment, how likely do you think 
it is that Climate Change will have very 
harmful long-term effects on our society? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How likely do you think you are to 
experience serious threats to your health or 
overall well-being, sometime during your 
life, as a result of Climate Change? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How likely do you think it is that the 
natural environment will be severely 
affected by the impacts of Climate 
Change? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Discrete Emotions 
Thinking about the seriousness of climate change right now, and its potential impacts, 
how strongly do you feel the following emotions? 
 Not at all  Very Strongly 
Fear 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Worry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Concern 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Anger 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Guilt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Perceived Efficacy (Self, Participative, Collective) 
How confident are you that the following can make a difference in addressing Climate 
Change? 
 Not Confident  Very Confident 
Personally changing your behaviour and 
lifestyle (e.g. purchasing practices and 
energy use) (Self) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Your personal contribution to collective 
(group) efforts aimed at addressing  
Climate Change (Participative)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Efforts made by you as an individual to 
address Climate Change (Self) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The combined efforts of multiple 
individuals like yourself to address 
Climate Change (Collective) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The personal contributions of 
individuals like you to collective (group) 
efforts aimed at addressing Climate 
Change (Participative) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The collective actions of individuals 
such as in campaign groups, charities 
etc. (Collective) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Acceptance of responsibility (last two items adapted from de Groot & Steg, 2008) 
Focusing on your current feelings about climate change, how accurately do the following 
statements describe your attitude? 
 Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
You consider it a personal 
obligation to address climate 
change in any way you can 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You feel that individuals like 
yourself should not be expected 
to take on the responsibility of 
addressing climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You feel a strong sense of 
responsibility for addressing 
climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You feel that you should not be 
responsible for addressing such a 
problem 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You feel your contribution to the 
cause of Climate Change is 
negligible 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You feel everyone, including 
yourself, is jointly responsible 
for causing Climate Change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Behavioural Intentions (General + Specific) 
Please answer the following questions based on your current feelings about Climate 
Change 
 Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
I intend to help reduce Climate 
Change by changing my behaviour 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I intend to do my bit to help tackle 
Climate Change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I intend to address Climate Change 
by taking personal action 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How likely are you to engage in the following behaviours within the next 4 weeks? 
 Very Unlikely  Very Likely 
Turn off lights in unoccupied rooms 
at home/work 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Walk, cycle, or use public transport 
only when commuting 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Increase current levels of waste-
sorting and recycling 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Donate money to, or raise funds, for 
an environmental group or charity 
involved with Climate Change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sign an online petition calling on 
the government to commit to 
renewable energy and lowering 
carbon emissions in the UK (please 
omit if non-British resident) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Join, or volunteer in, an 
organization involved with Climate 
Change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Purchase and consume only locally 
sourced produce 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Reduce meat consumption or switch 
to a meat-free diet 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Climate Scepticism (Whitmarsh, 2011) 
The following statements have been extracted from recent polls of public opinion on 
Climate Change in the UK. Please indicate the extent to which each reflects your current 
beliefs. 
 
Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
Claims that human activities are 
changing the climate are exaggerated 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Climate Change is just a natural 
fluctuation of the earth's temperature 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I am uncertain about whether Climate 
Change is really happening 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
It is too early to say whether Climate 
Change is really a problem  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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The evidence for Climate Change is 
unreliable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
There is too much conflicting 
evidence about Climate Change to 
know if it is actually happening 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Climate change is too complex and 
uncertain for scientists to make useful 
forecasts 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Too much fuss is made about Climate 
Change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Floods and heat waves are not 
increasing, there's just more reporting 
of them in the media these days 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Many leading experts still question if 
human activity is contributing to 
Climate Change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The media is often too alarmist about 
issues like Climate Change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Self-rated Knowledge 
How would you rate your knowledge of Climate Change? 
Very Low   Very High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Cause - Knowledge 
Please indicate, to the best of your knowledge, how much you believe that each of the 
following items contribute to Climate Change 
 
Minor contribution 
Don't 
know 
Major contribution 
Burning fossil fuels (coal, oil, gas) 
for heat and electricity 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
The hole in the Ozone Layer -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Driving a car -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Aerosol spray cans (containing 
CFCs) 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Toxic waste -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Nuclear power plants -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Acid rain -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Agricultural activities (e.g., cattle 
breeding) 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
The sun -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Flying/Commercial air travel -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Smoking cigarettes -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Deforestation -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
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Impact - Knowledge 
For each of the items listed below, please indicate whether you believe that they are 
likely to decrease, remain constant or increase as a result of Climate Change. 
 
Likely to decrease 
No 
Change 
Likely to increase 
Global average temperature -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Acid rain -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Air pollution -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Areas in the world experiencing 
drought 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Global biodiversity (i.e. variety of 
plants and animals) 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Melting of glaciers and polar ice 
caps 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Global spread of infectious 
diseases 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
The hole in the Ozone layer -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Extreme weather events (e.g. 
floods, storms etc.) 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Volcanic eruptions -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
The frequency of hot days and 
nights 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Global fresh water supply -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
Actual Behaviour Measure 
For participating in this study, you will be entered into a raffle for a £50 Amazon 
voucher. If you are selected to receive the voucher at the end of the survey, you can 
choose to keep the full amount or donate up to £25 to People and Planet, a student-
led campaign organization that addresses pressing social and environmental issues.  
A. Will you like to donate a part of your remuneration?   ( ) Yes  ( ) No 
B. How much will you like to donate (please select a value below): 
i. £5 
ii. £10 
iii. £15 
iv. £20 
v. £25 
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Appendix 8 
Experimental Stimuli and Questionnaire (Study 6) 
Background and Controls 
1. What is your gender? □ Male □ Female □ Other  □ Rather not say 
2. Age (in years) ______________________ 
3. Do you have any of the following qualifications? 
 a. No formal qualifications 
 b. GCSE/O-Level 
 c. A-Level/Higher/BTEC 
 d. Vocational/NVQ 
 e. Degree or equivalent 
 f. Postgraduate Qualification 
 g. Other (please specify)________________ 
 
4. Do you have any of the following qualifications in a science –related subject? 
 a. Vocational/NVQ 
 b. Degree or equivalent 
 c. Postgraduate Qualification 
 d. Other (please specify)________________ 
 
6. Which of the following political parties are you most likely to vote for in an election? 
 □ Conservative 
 □ Green 
 □ Labour 
 □ Liberal Democrat 
 □ Labour 
 □ UKIP 
 □ Other (please specify) ______________________ 
 □ Prefer not to say 
 □ Would not vote 
 
7. Annual household income (please select one category below) 
 □ Up to £9,999 
 □ £10,000 - £19,999 
 □ £20,000 - £29,000 
 □ £30,000 - £39,000 
 □ £40,000 and above 
 □ Prefer not to say 
 
8. Do you believe the world’s climate is changing? 
 □ No □ Yes □ Don’t know 
8b. Do you think human activities are contributing to current changes in the world’ climate? 
 □ No □ Yes □ Don’t know  
8c. How concerned are you about global climate change? 
  □ □ □ □ □ 
 Not at all    Highly concerned 
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9. Shortened NEP – New Ecological Paradigm (Dunlap et al. 2000; Whitmarsh, 2011) 
and Shortened Scepticism scale (Whitmarsh, 2011) 
To what extent do the following statements reflect your views on climate change and the environment? 
 Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
Humans have the right to modify the environment 
to suit their needs 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Humans are severely abusing the planet 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Nature is strong enough to cope with the impact 
of modern industrial nations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The balance of nature is very delicate and easily 
upset 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Plants and animals have the same rights as 
humans to exist 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I do not believe climate change is a real problem 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The evidence for climate change is unreliable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Recent floods and heat-waves in this country are 
due to climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Floods and heat-waves are not increasing, there’s 
just more reporting of it in the media these days 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
It is impossible to link a single event, such as a 
flood, to climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Claims that human activities are changing the 
climate are exaggerated 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
10. Perceived norms (Descriptive + Injunctive) 
Please evaluate the extent to which each of the statements below accurately describes the attitudes of people you 
know, and British citizens in general by indicating your level of agreement/disagreement with each using the scale 
provided. 
 
Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
"Most people around me are personally 
doing something to help reduce the risk of 
climate change" (D) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
"My friends and relatives would support me 
if I decided to change my behaviour to help 
reduce climate change"(I) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
“Most people I know do not expect me to do 
anything personally to help address climate 
change”(I-) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
“Most of my colleagues, friends and other 
people I know are involved with an 
organization or group that addresses 
environmental issues including climate 
change” (D) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
“Most people around me approve of 
donating to, or fundraising for, 
environmental groups that focus on Climate 
Change” (I) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
"Addressing Climate Change, is not a high 
priority for most people I know" (D-) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
"Most people I know are not personally 
doing anything to address Climate Change" 
(D-) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
"My friends and relatives would not support 
me if I decided to change my behaviour to 
help reduce Climate Change" (I-) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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“Most people in Britain are concerned 
about climate change” 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
“Most people in Britain are making 
personal efforts to address climate change” 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Past experience 
a. Considering roughly the last 5 years, how often have you personally experienced flooding 
in your local area? 
□ Never □ Once  □ Twice  □ Three times   □ More than 3 times 
  
□ I don't remember 
 
b. Considering roughly the 5 years, how often (in total) have you personally experienced any 
type of extreme weather event (other than flooding) in your local area (e.g., severe heat 
waves, droughts, freak storms, hurricanes etc.? 
□ Never □ Once  □ Twice  □ Three times   □ More than 3 times   
□ I don't remember 
 
 
Imagined Experience Manipulation 
 
Beginning on Saturday, 4th December 2015, Storm Desmond brought exceptionally heavy 
rainfall to large parts of northern England, southern Scotland and north Wales. The rainfall 
resulted in record-breaking flooding in Cumbria, Northumberland and the Scottish Borders. In 
the course of the following three days, 45,700 homes across the UK were left without power, 
over a thousand people were evacuated from their homes, and three people lost their lives due 
to the severity of the wind and rainstorms. Further, the storm also caused extensive disruption 
to critical road, rail and air transport services across the country. According to Met Office 
Chief Scientist, Professor Dame Julia Slingo, the “extraordinary amounts of water” dumped 
by the storm broke precipitation records going back to the 1800s.  (Sources: BBC News; Met 
Office). 
 
Imagined Experience Prompt Message:  
For the next two minutes, please imagine yourself as a victim of the floods described above. 
Imagine watching your home and property being extensively damaged by floodwater, being 
unable to get access to nearby shops for food and groceries, and being unable to go to work as 
most roads in the vicinity are now submerged. In the space provided below, please describe as 
many aspects of the scenario you just imagined as possible. 
 
Additional Questions: 
(i) How easy was it for you to imagine yourself being in this situation (7-point: Very 
Difficult to Very Easy). 
(j) How vivid (clear) was your mental imagery of yourself being in this situation (7-
point: Not vivid to Very Vivid) 
(k) In your imagined scenario, how did you feel about the experience of the flood? 
(l) How likely do you think it is that Storm Desmond and the extreme flooding it caused 
are linked to climate change? (1 = Not at all likely, 7 = Very likely). 
(m) How confident are you that the storm and flooding are linked to climate change? (1 = 
Not Confident, 7 = Very Confident). 
 
Control Prompt Message 
The control group will be presented with the text describing Storm Desmond and the floods at 
the end of the questionnaire along with questions (d) and (e) above. 
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Dependent variables   
 
Perceived Threat 
Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability 
 Not Serious at all   Very Serious 
How serious of a threat do you believe climate 
change is to you personally? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How serious of a threat do you think climate 
change impacts are for the area you currently 
live in?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How serious do you estimate the impacts of 
climate change are for the natural environment? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How serious of a threat do you think the 
impacts of climate change are across the world? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 Very Unlikely  Very Likely 
In your judgment, how likely do you think it is 
that climate change will have harmful effects 
on your local area? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How likely do you think it is that you will 
experience serious threats to your health or 
overall well-being, sometime during your 
lifetime, as a result of Climate Change? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How likely do you think it is that the natural 
environment (including wildlife and 
biodiversity) will be affected adversely by 
climate change? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How likely do you think it is that British 
society as a whole will experience adverse 
long-term consequences from climate change? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Discrete Emotions 
When you think about the seriousness of climate change, and its potential impacts, how strongly do you feel the 
following emotions? 
 Not at all  Very Strongly 
Fear 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Worry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Concern 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Anger 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Perceived Efficacy (Self, Collective, Response) 
How confident are you that the following can make a difference in addressing Climate Change? 
 Not Confident  Very Confident 
Changing your behaviour and lifestyle (e.g. 
purchasing, consumption and energy use practices) 
(Self) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Efforts made by you as an individual to influence 
climate policies (e.g. petitioning local politicians, 
participation in demonstrations) (Self) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The combined efforts of groups of individuals like 
yourself to address climate change (Collective) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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The collective actions of individuals such as in 
campaign groups, charities etc. (Collective) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Acceptance of responsibility 
Focusing on your current feelings about climate change, how accurately do the following statements describe your 
attitude? 
 Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
You consider it a personal obligation to 
address climate change in any way you 
can 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You feel that individuals like yourself 
should not be expected to take on the 
responsibility of addressing climate 
change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You feel a strong sense of responsibility 
for addressing climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You feel that you should not be 
responsible for addressing such a problem 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Climate Scepticism (Whitmarsh, 2011) 
The following statements have been extracted from recent polls of public opinion on climate change in the UK. Please 
indicate the extent to which each reflects your current beliefs. 
 
Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
The media is often too alarmist about 
issues like climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I am uncertain about whether climate 
change is really happening 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Climate change is too complex and 
uncertain for scientists to make useful 
forecasts 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
There is too much conflicting evidence 
about climate change to know if it’s really 
happening 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Many leading experts still question if 
human activity is contributing to climate 
change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Claims that human activity is changing the 
climate are exaggerated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Behavioural Intentions (General + Specific) 
Please answer the following questions based on your current feelings about Climate Change 
 Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
I intend to help reduce climate change by 
changing my behaviour 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I’m willing to greatly reduce my energy use to 
help tackle climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How likely are you to engage in the following behaviours within the next 4 weeks? 
 Very unlikely  Very likely 
Mostly walk, cycle, or use public transport when 
commuting 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Launch or sign a petition calling on the 
government to make stronger commitments to 
lowering carbon emissions and investing in 
renewable energy  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Join, or volunteer in, an organization involved 
with climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Donate to, or raise funds for, an environmental 
group involved with climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Purchase and consume only locally sourced 
produce 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Conserve energy by switching off lights in 
unoccupied rooms and turning off unused 
appliances at home/work  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Self-rated Knowledge 
How would you rate your knowledge of Climate Change? 
Very Low   Very High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Cause - Knowledge 
Please indicate, to the best of your knowledge, how much you believe that each of the following items contribute to Climate 
Change 
 
Minor contribution 
Don't 
know 
Major contribution 
Burning fossil fuels (coal, oil, gas) for heat and 
electricity -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
The hole in the Ozone Layer -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Driving a car -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Aerosol spray cans (containing CFCs) -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Toxic waste -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Nuclear power plants -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Acid rain -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Agricultural activities (e.g., cattle breeding) -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
The sun -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Flying/Commercial air travel -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Smoking cigarettes -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Deforestation -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
Impact - Knowledge 
For each of the items listed below, please indicate whether you believe that they are likely to decrease, remain constant or 
increase as a result of Climate Change. 
 
Likely to decrease 
No 
Change 
Likely to increase 
Global average temperature -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Acid rain -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Air pollution -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Areas in the world experiencing drought -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Global biodiversity (i.e. variety of plants and 
animals) 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Melting of glaciers and polar ice caps -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Global spread of infectious diseases -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
The hole in the Ozone layer -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Extreme weather events (e.g. floods, storms etc.) -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Volcanic eruptions -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
The frequency of hot days and nights -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Global fresh water supply -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
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Appendix 9 
Questionnaire and Experimental Stimuli (Study 7) 
Background and Controls 
1. Do you believe the world’s climate is changing? 
 □ No □ Yes □ Don’t know 
2. Do you think human activities are contributing to current changes in the world’ climate? 
 □ No □ Yes □ Don’t know  
3. How concerned are you about global climate change? 
  □ □ □ □ □ 
 Not at all    Highly concerned 
 
4. Trust 
How much do you trust the following groups to provide the public with reliable information on climate 
change? 
 No trust  A lot of trust 
Politicians 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Scientists 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Journalists 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Environmental Organizations/Charities 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Meteorologists 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5. Self-rated Knowledge 
How do you rate your knowledge of climate change? 
Very Low   Very High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
6. Shortened Scepticism scale (Whitmarsh, 2011) 
To what extent do the following statements reflect your views on climate change and the environment? 
 Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
I am uncertain about whether climate change is 
really happening 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The evidence for climate change is unreliable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Many experts still question the notion that human 
activity is contributing to climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Floods and heat-waves are not increasing, there’s 
just more reporting of it in the media these days 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
There is too much conflicting evidence about 
climate change to know if it’s really happening 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Claims that human activities are changing the 
climate are exaggerated 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
7. Past experience 
a. Considering roughly the last 5 years, how often have you personally experienced flooding in your 
local area? 
□ Never     □ Once □ Twice    □ Three times  □ More than 3 times      □ I don't 
remember 
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b. Considering roughly the 5 years, how often (in total) have you personally experienced any type of 
extreme weather event (other than flooding) in your local area (e.g., severe heat waves, droughts, freak 
storms, hurricanes etc.? 
□ Never     □ Once □ Twice    □ Three times  □ More than 3 times      □ I don't 
remember 
 
8. Perceived Norms (Descriptive + Injunctive) 
Please evaluate the extent to which each of the statements below accurately describes the attitudes of 
people you know, and people in Britain in general, by indicating your level of agreement/disagreement 
using the scale provided. 
 Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
"Most people around me are personally 
doing something to help reduce the risk 
of climate change" (D) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
"My friends and relatives would support 
me if I decided to change my behaviour 
to help reduce climate change"(I) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
“Most people I know do not expect me to 
do anything personally to help address 
climate change”(I-) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
“Most of my colleagues, friends and 
other people I know are involved with an 
organization or group that addresses 
environmental issues including climate 
change” (D) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
"Addressing Climate Change, is not a 
high priority for most people I know" 
(D-) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
"Most people I know are not personally 
doing anything to address Climate 
Change" (D-) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
"My friends and relatives would not 
support me if I decided to change my 
behaviour to help reduce Climate 
Change" (I-) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
“Most people in Britain are concerned 
about climate change” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
“Most people in Britain are making 
personal efforts to address climate 
change” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
9. Demographics 
4. What is your gender?  □ Male □ Female □ Other  □ Rather not say 
5. Are you currently a student (if no, please skip next question)? □ No □ Yes 
6. Course and year of study _____________ 
7. Age (in years) ______________________ 
8. Nationality _________________________ 
9. Which of the following political parties are you most likely to vote for in an election? 
 □ Conservative 
 □ Green 
 □ Labour 
 □ Liberal Democrat 
 □ UKIP 
 □ Other (please specify) ______________________ 
 □ Prefer not to say 
 □ Would not vote 
 □ Not eligible to vote 
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Imagined Experience Manipulation (Attributed) 
Beginning on Saturday, 4th December 2015, ‘Storm Desmond’ brought exceptionally heavy rainfall to 
large parts of northern England, southern Scotland and north Wales. The rainfall resulted in record-
breaking flooding in Cumbria, Northumberland and the Scottish Borders. In the course of the following 
three days, 45,700 homes across the UK were left without power, over a thousand people were 
evacuated from their homes, and three people died as a result of the severity of the wind and 
rainstorms. The storm also caused extensive disruption to critical road, rail and air transport services 
across the country. According to Met Office Chief Scientist, Professor Dame Julia Slingo, the 
“extraordinary amounts of water” dumped by the storm broke precipitation records going back to the 
1800s”. Scientists at the Center for Atmospheric Sciences also added that “the characteristics of Storm 
Desmond appear to be consistent with the pattern of extreme weather events that are expected to 
become more likely as a consequence of global climate change.” (Sources: BBC News; Met Office). 
 
Imagined Experience Manipulation (Disattributed) 
Beginning on Saturday, 4th December 2015, Storm Desmond brought exceptionally heavy rainfall to 
large parts of northern England, southern Scotland and north Wales. The rainfall resulted in record-
breaking flooding in Cumbria, Northumberland and the Scottish Borders. In the course of the following 
three days, 45,700 homes across the UK were left without power, over a thousand people were 
evacuated from their homes, and three people lost their lives due to the severity of the wind and 
rainstorms. The storm also caused extensive disruption to critical road, rail and air transport services 
across the country. According to Met Office Chief Scientist, Professor Dame Julia Slingo, the 
“extraordinary amounts of water” dumped by the storm broke precipitation records going back to the 
1800s. However, scientists at the Center for Atmospheric Sciences also added that “the characteristics 
of Storm Desmond do not appear to be consistent with the pattern of extreme weather events that are 
expected to result from global climate change”. (Sources: BBC News; Met Office). 
 
Imagined Experience Prompt Message:  
For the next two minutes, please imagine yourself as a victim of the floods caused by ‘Storm 
Desmond’. Imagine watching your home and property being extensively damaged by floodwater, being 
unable to get access to nearby shops for food and groceries, and being unable to go to work as most 
roads in the vicinity are now submerged. In the space provided below, please describe the scenario you 
just imagined in as much detail as possible. 
 
Additional Questions: 
(n) How easy was it for you to imagine yourself being in this situation (7-point: Very Difficult to 
Very Easy). 
(o) How vivid (clear) was your mental imagery of yourself being in this situation (7-point: Not 
vivid to Very Vivid) 
(p) In your imagined scenario, how did you feel about the experience of the flood? 
(q) How likely do you think it is that Storm Desmond and the extreme flooding it caused are 
linked to climate change? (1 = Not at all likely, 7 = Very likely). 
(r) How confident are you about your answer to question (d) above? (1 = Not Confident, 7 = 
Very Confident). 
Control Prompt Message 
Beginning on Saturday, 4th December 2015, ‘Storm Desmond’ brought exceptionally heavy rainfall to 
large parts of northern England, southern Scotland and north Wales. The rainfall resulted in record-
breaking flooding in Cumbria, Northumberland and the Scottish Borders. In the course of the following 
three days, 45,700 homes across the UK were left without power, over a thousand people were 
evacuated from their homes, and three people died as a result of the severity of the wind and 
rainstorms. The storm also caused extensive disruption to critical road, rail and air transport services 
across the country. According to Met Office Chief Scientist, Professor Dame Julia Slingo, the 
“extraordinary amounts of water” dumped by the storm broke precipitation records going back to the 
1800s” 
 
The control group will be presented with the text describing Storm Desmond and the floods at the end 
of the questionnaire along with questions (d) and (e) above. 
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Dependent Variables   
Perceived Threat 
Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability 
 Not Serious at all   Very Serious 
How serious of a threat do you believe climate 
change is to you personally? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How serious of a threat do you think climate 
change impacts are for the area you currently live 
in?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How serious do you estimate the impacts of 
climate change are for the natural environment? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How serious of a threat do you think the impacts 
of climate change are across the world? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 Very Unlikely  Very Likely 
In your judgment, how likely do you think it is 
that climate change will have harmful effects in 
your local area? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How likely do you think it is that you will 
experience serious threats to your health or 
overall well-being, sometime during your 
lifetime, as a result of Climate Change? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How likely do you think it is that the natural 
environment (including wildlife and biodiversity) 
will be affected adversely by climate change? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How likely do you think it is that society as a 
whole will experience adverse consequences from 
climate change? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Discrete Emotions 
When you think about climate change, and its potential impacts, how strongly do you feel the following emotions? 
 Not at all  Very Strongly 
Fear 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Worry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Concern 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Anger 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Perceived Efficacy (Self, Collective, Response) 
How confident are you that the following can make a difference in addressing Climate Change? 
 Not Confident  Very Confident 
Changing your behaviour and lifestyle (e.g. 
purchasing, consumption and energy use 
practices) (Self) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Efforts made by you as an individual to 
influence climate policies (e.g. petitioning local 
politicians, participation in demonstrations) 
(Self) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The combined efforts of groups of individuals 
like yourself to address climate change 
(Collective) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The collective actions of individuals such as in 
campaign groups, charities etc. (Collective) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Acceptance of Responsibility 
Focusing on your current feelings about climate change, how accurately do the following statements describe your attitude? 
 
Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
You consider it a personal obligation to address 
climate change in any way you can 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You feel that individuals like yourself should 
not be expected to take on the responsibility of 
addressing climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You feel a strong sense of responsibility for 
addressing climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You feel that you should not be responsible for 
addressing such a problem 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Climate Scepticism (Whitmarsh, 2011) 
The following statements have been extracted from recent polls of public opinion on climate change in the UK. Please indicate the 
extent to which each reflects your current beliefs. 
 
Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
The media is often too alarmist about issues like 
climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I am uncertain about whether climate change is 
really happening 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Climate change is too complex and uncertain 
for scientists to make useful forecasts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
There is too much conflicting evidence about 
climate change to know if it’s really happening 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Many leading experts still question if human 
activity is contributing to climate change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Claims that human activity is changing the 
climate are exaggerated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Behavioural Intentions (General + Specific) 
Please answer the following questions based on your current feelings about Climate Change 
 Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
I intend to help reduce climate change by 
changing my behaviour 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I’m willing to greatly reduce my energy use to 
help tackle climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How likely are you to engage in the following behaviours within the next 4 weeks? 
 Very unlikely  Very likely 
Mostly walk, cycle, or use public transport when 
commuting 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Launch or sign a petition calling on the 
government to make stronger commitments to 
lowering carbon emissions and investing in 
renewable energy  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Join, or volunteer in, an organization involved 
with climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Donate to, or raise funds for, an environmental 
group involved with climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Purchase and consume only locally sourced 
produce 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Conserve energy by switching off lights in 
unoccupied rooms and turning off unused 
appliances at home/work  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Cause - Knowledge 
Please indicate, to the best of your knowledge, how much you believe that each of the following items 
contribute to Climate Change 
 
Minor contribution 
Don't 
know 
Major contribution 
Burning fossil fuels (coal, oil, gas) for 
heat and electricity 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
The hole in the Ozone Layer -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Driving a car -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Aerosol spray cans (containing CFCs) -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Toxic waste -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Nuclear power plants -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Acid rain -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Agricultural activities (e.g., cattle 
breeding) 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
The sun -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Flying/Commercial air travel -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Smoking cigarettes -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Deforestation -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
Impact - Knowledge 
For each of the items listed below, please indicate whether you believe that they are likely to decrease, 
remain constant or increase as a result of Climate Change. 
 
Likely to decrease 
No 
Change 
Likely to increase 
Global average temperature -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Acid rain -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Air pollution -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Areas in the world experiencing 
drought 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Global biodiversity (i.e. variety of 
plants and animals) 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Melting of glaciers and polar ice caps -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Global spread of infectious diseases -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
The hole in the Ozone layer -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Extreme weather events (e.g. floods, 
storms etc.) 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Volcanic eruptions -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
The frequency of hot days and nights -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Global fresh water supply -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
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Appendix 10 
Questionnaire (Study 8) 
 
1. What is your gender? 
o Male 
o Female 
 
2. In what year were you born? 
3. What subject are you studying? (e.g. Law, Economics, Psychology) 
4. Using the scale below, how would you rate the severity of climate change impacts in 
your country?  (circle a number) 
 
  Not Severe                                                  Very Severe 
1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9 – 10  
 
5. Considering the severity of climate change impacts in your country, to what extent do 
you agree that climate change is a threat to: 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Your Lifestyle               
Your Health               
Your Livelihood               
Your Family               
Your Community               
Your society in 
general  
              
 
6. When you think about the threat of climate change, how strongly do you experience 
the following emotions? 
 Not at all Very 
Mildly 
Mildly Moderately A bit 
Strongly 
Strongly Very 
Strongly 
Concern               
Fear               
Frustration               
Powerlessness               
Indifference               
Anger               
Worry               
 
7. Have you ever had a personal direct experience of the effects of climate change? 
o No 
o Yes 
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8. How often do you come across general information about climate change? 
o Never 
o Rarely 
o Fairly Regularly 
o Weekly 
o Daily 
 
9. How often do you come across information on actions by which you could personally 
address climate change issues in your country? 
o Never 
o Rarely 
o Fairly Regularly 
o Weekly 
o Daily 
 
10. How would you rate yourself in the following aspects? 
 Very 
Low 
Low Less than 
Average 
Moderate Above 
Average 
High Very 
High 
General Knowledge 
of Climate Change 
              
Knowledge of 
personal actions by 
which to address 
climate change 
              
 
11. Have you engaged in any of the following activities recently? 
 No Yes 
Joined an environmental group     
Talked to friends/family about climate change and other 
environmental issues  
    
Looked for information about climate change in books, magazines 
or websites 
    
Attended a climate change related event, lecture or seminar     
Chosen or avoided a product because of its climatic impact      
Changed any aspect of your lifestyle because of climate change     
Tried to do things in a way that minimizes your impact on the 
environment 
    
Volunteered in, or donated money to an environmental organization     
Participated in climate change related public sensitization campaign     
 
12. Based on your knowledge of yourself and others around you, how confident are you 
about the accuracy of the following statements at the present time?    
 Not at all 
Confident  
Very 
Weakly 
Confident  
Less than 
moderately 
Confident 
Moderatel
y 
Confident 
More than 
moderatel
y 
Confident 
Confident Very 
Confiden
t 
Your personal efforts can 
significantly help in 
              
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reducing the threat of 
climate change in your 
country 
You are capable of getting 
information that will help 
you understand climate 
change issues affecting 
your present locality 
              
You can make lifestyle 
changes that will 
significantly help in 
reducing the threat of 
climate change in your 
area 
              
You can help in pressuring 
local leaders and the 
government to address 
climate change issues in 
your locality 
              
Collective action, like the 
efforts of people in 
environmental groups, can 
help reduce the threat of 
climate change in your 
country 
              
Participating in 
environmental groups can 
help everyone improve 
their understanding of 
climate change issues in 
your country 
              
Through collective efforts, 
people in your country 
could be influenced to 
make lifestyle changes that 
will reduce the threat of 
climate change 
              
Yourself and other people 
you know can collectively 
influence the government 
and public leaders to 
address climate change 
issues in your country 
              
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13. Based on your personal worldviews, to what extent do you agree with the following 
statements about the issue of climate change in your country? 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somew
hat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Climate change is partly 
evidence of mother 
nature's displeasure at 
humanity's unnatural 
activities 
              
Climate change cannot 
be resolved solely by 
scientific interventions, 
but with some form of 
divine intervention 
              
Climate change is a sign 
of God's reaction to 
humanity's many sins 
              
Climate change is 
ultimately beyond human 
control 
              
Climate change is part of 
our destiny, and human 
efforts to resolve climate 
change issues are 
unlikely to succeed 
              
Climate change is 
uncontrollable and 
attempting to tackle it 
with human ability is a 
waste of time 
              
 
 
14. Thinking about people close to you and others you know, to what extent do you agree 
that the following statements accurately describe your social circumstances? 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewh
at 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somew
hat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Your friends/relatives think 
climate change is a serious 
threat 
              
Your close friends and 
relatives think you should 
personally do something to 
address climate change 
              
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Your friends and family 
expect you to be concerned 
about climate change 
              
Your friends and relatives 
think being concerned 
about climate change is a 
waste of time 
              
Most people you know are 
already trying to do 
something about climate 
change 
              
Some people you know are 
trying to reduce the 
negative environmental 
impacts of their lifestyles 
              
Some people close to you 
have volunteered in, or 
contributed money to 
environmental groups 
              
Some people you know are 
members of environmental 
groups 
              
 
 
15. Now, focusing on your own feelings about the issue of climate change, to what extent 
do you agree that the following statements accurately reflect your attitude? 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagre
e 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Some
what 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
You feel a strong sense of 
personal responsibility for 
addressing climate change 
issues  
              
You do not feel you should 
be personally responsible for 
such a general problem as 
climate change 
              
Individuals like yourself 
should not be burdened with 
the responsibility of 
addressing climate change 
issues 
              
You consider it your 
personal duty to try to 
address climate change in 
whatever way you can 
              
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16. Thinking about the possible consequences of climate change, to what extent do you 
think each of the following is likely to affect you and other people around you? 
 Not 
Likely 2 3 4 5 6 
Very 
Likely 
Increasing frequency of 
extreme weather events 
such as heat-waves, 
droughts and floods 
              
A climate change induced 
decline in economic growth 
and development 
              
Increase in weather-related 
health issues such as heat-
stress and vector-borne 
disease infection 
              
A climate-related reduction 
in overall quality of life 
              
Increasing human mortality 
from natural disasters 
              
An increase in terrorism 
and violent social conflicts 
              
 
 
 
17. Based on your present feelings about climate change, do you intend to engage in any 
of the following activities in the near future? 
 No Yes 
Talk to friends/relatives about climate change      
Attend a seminar or public lecture on climate change      
Try to learn more about climate change from books, websites and TV 
programs 
    
Stop buying/using products that have a negative impact on the environment      
Try to do more things that minimize your environmental impact     
Join an environmental group     
Volunteer in, or donate money to an environmental group     
Participate in a climate change related public sensitization campaign     
Take up a climate-friendly lifestyle     
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Appendix 11 
Norms Experiment – Questionnaire & Stimuli 
Background and Controls 
5. What is your gender? □ Male □ Female □ Rather not say  □ Other 
6. Which of the following best describes your ethnicity? 
□ Asian/Asian British/Other Asian Descent 
□ Black/African/Afro-Caribbean/Black British 
□ Caucasian/White 
□ Mixed/Multiple Ethnicities 
□ Other (please specify) ________________ 
7. Age ____________ 
8. Subject and year of study ____________ 
9. Nationality _______________________ 
 
6. Social Identification 
Please rate the level to which the following statements represent your view of other students of 
the University of St Andrews by indicating agreement or disagreement as appropriate.  
 
Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
“I identify with University of St 
Andrews students” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
“I have a lot in common with 
other students at the University of 
St Andrews” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
“Being a student at the University 
of St Andrews is an important part 
of how I see myself” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
“I feel personally criticised when 
someone who is not a student here 
criticises University of St Andrews 
students” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
“I feel strong ties with other 
University of St Andrews 
students” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
7. Impression Management (Shortened BIDR scale: Paulhus, 1991; Milfont, 2009) 
Using the scale provided, please indicate your level of agreement with each statement below 
 Not True  Very True 
“I sometimes tell lies if I have to” 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
“I never cover up my mistakes” 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
“There have been occasions where I 
have taken advantage of someone” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
“I never swear” 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
“I sometimes try to get even rather 
than forgive and forget” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
"I always obey laws, even if I am 
unlikely to get caught" 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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"I have said something bad about a 
friend behind his or her back" 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
"When I hear people talking 
privately, I avoid listening" 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
"I have received too much change 
from a salesperson without telling 
him or her" 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
"I have never dropped litter on the 
street" 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
8. Value orientations (de Groot & Steg, 2008) 
Below are a number of values that some people consider to be important. Please rate 
the importance of each one as a guiding principle in your life using a scale from 0 (not 
important) to 5 (extremely important). If you disagree with or are opposed to one of 
the values, please write -1. 
_________Influence (having power over people and events) 
_________Helpful    (working for the welfare of others) 
_________Respecting the earth (harmony with other species) 
_________Wealth    (money and material possessions) 
_________Equality (equal opportunity for all) 
_________Protecting the environment (preserving nature) 
_________Authority (the right to lead or command) 
_________Social justice (care for the weak, correcting injustice) 
_________Unity with nature (fitting into nature) 
_________Social recognition (respect and approval by others) 
_________A world at peace   (free from conflict) 
_________Preventing pollution 
 
9. Pro-environmental self-identity (Whitmarsh & O'Neill, 2010) 
Thinking about your attitude toward environmental issues, how accurately do the following statements 
describe you? 
 Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
I think of myself as an 
environmentally-friendly consumer 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would be embarrassed to be seen as 
having an environmentally-friendly 
lifestyle 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I think of myself as someone who is 
very concerned about environmental 
issues 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would not want my friends and 
family to think of me as someone 
who is concerned about 
environmental issues 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
10. Identification with the Environmental Movement (McCright &Dunlap, 2015) 
"The environmental movement is a diverse scientific, social and political movement 
for addressing environmental issues. Environmentalists advocate the sustainable 
management of resources and stewardship of the earth through changes in public 
policy and individual behaviour. The movement is centred on ecology, health and 
human rights."  
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This statement was retrieved from Wikipedia and will be presented at the top of the 
page in which the following items (a-c) are presented. 
a. Are you currently a member of an environmental group? [No] [Yes] 
ii. If yes, what is the name of the environmental group? _______________                       
  
b. Do you consider yourself an environmentalist? [No] [Yes] 
 ii. If yes, would you say you are a strong environmentalist? [No] [Yes] 
c. Thinking specifically about the environmental movement, do you think of yourself 
as: 
 1. Unsympathetic toward the environmental movement 
 2. Neutral 
 3. Sympathetic toward the environmental movement, but not actively involved 
 4. An active participant in the environmental movement 
 
11. Personal experience of extreme weather 
a. Considering roughly the 5 years, how often have you personally experienced 
flooding in your local area? 
□ Never □ Once □ Twice □ Three times  □ More than 3 times   
□ I don't remember 
b. Considering roughly the 5 years, how often ( in total) have you personally 
experienced any type of extreme weather event (other than flooding) in your local 
area (e.g., severe heat waves, droughts, freak storms, hurricanes etc? 
□ Never     □ Once       □ Twice    □ Three times  □ More than 3 times   
□ I don't remember 
 
In the next section of this study, you will be asked to read an excerpt from a 
magazine article. The text will be presented to you for a period of 10 minutes 
before you are automatically moved on to the next page without an option to 
return. Please read the text carefully and try to identify and memorize the main 
facts it contains as you will need to recall these when completing a subsequent 
section of the questionnaire. Click the “next” button to proceed. 
(Norms manipulation) 
Pro-descriptive + Pro-injunctive 
"The University [of St Andrews] aims to become carbon neutral for energy 
consumption, to understand the carbon impact and reduce this footprint in the key 
areas of resource use, waste, travel, transport and ultimately procurement" 
(Sustainable Development Policy and Strategy, 2012). A primary target outlined in 
the university's plan to be carbon neutral by 2020 is to achieve effective 
communication of environment and sustainability issues to all staff and students. 
The results of a survey recently commissioned by the University reflect a high level of 
engagement with environmental issues within the student body. 74% of student 
respondents in the survey (N = 465) reported that they had made efforts to reduce 
their environmental impact and taken advantage of opportunities to act pro-
environmentally in the preceding year. Examples of pro-environmental actions 
reportedly taken by these respondents include:  
1. Recycling (81%)  
2. Walking, cycling or using public transport as primary means of getting around (74%) 
3. Turning out lights and appliances in unoccupied rooms to save energy (68%) 
4. Purchasing only locally sourced produce when possible (56%)  
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5. Supporting an environmental campaign with donations or time volunteered (51%) 
6. Reducing meat consumption/switching to an environment-friendly diet (42%)     
Further, the majority of respondents (86%) in the survey expressed a strong approval 
of the University's mission to minimize its carbon footprint, and a similar proportion 
(83%) indicated agreement or strong agreement with the notion that every student and 
member of staff at the university should be personally involved in the effort to 
achieve a cleaner and healthier environment. According to the Environment Officer, 
[name redacted], the results of the survey are a substantive reflection of progress 
made through the University's commitment to establishing environmental 
consciousness and sustainability as core values among students and staff.  
 
Anti-descriptive + Anti-injunctive 
 "The University [of St Andrews] aims to become carbon neutral for energy 
consumption, to understand the carbon impact and reduce this footprint in the key 
areas of resource use, waste, travel, transport and ultimately procurement" 
(Sustainable Development Policy and Strategy, 2012). A primary target outlined in 
the university's plan to be carbon neutral by 2020 is to achieve effective 
communication of environment and sustainability issues to all staff and students. 
The results of a survey recently commissioned by the University reflect a weak to 
moderate level of engagement with environmental issues within the student body. 
Only 47% of student respondents (N = 465) reported that they had consciously made 
efforts to reduce their environmental impact and taken advantage of opportunities to 
act pro-environmentally in the preceding year. Examples of pro-environmental actions 
reportedly taken by these respondents include: 
1. Turning out lights and appliances in unoccupied rooms to save energy (48%) 
2. Waste sorting and recycling (47%)  
3. Walking, cycling or using public transport as primary means of getting around (44%) 
4. Purchasing only locally sourced produce when possible (26%)  
5. Supporting an environmental campaign with donations or time volunteered (19%) 
6. Reducing meat consumption/switching to an environment-friendly diet (8%)      
Further, the most of the respondents (63%) in the survey were unaware of the 
University's carbon management plan, and only a minority (42%) indicated agreement 
with the notion that every student and member of staff at the university should be 
personally involved in the effort to achieve a cleaner and healthier environment. 
According to the Environment Officer, [name redacted], the results of the survey are 
a substantive reflection of the challenge faced by the University in its commitment to 
establishing environmental consciousness and sustainability as core values among 
students and staff.   
 
 
Pro-descriptive + Anti-injunctive       
"The University [of St Andrews] aims to become carbon neutral for energy 
consumption, to understand the carbon impact and reduce this footprint in the key 
areas of resource use, waste, travel, transport and ultimately procurement" 
(Sustainable Development Policy and Strategy, 2012). A primary target outlined in 
the university's plan to be carbon neutral by 2020 is to achieve effective 
communication of environment and sustainability issues to all staff and students. 
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The results of a survey recently commissioned by the University reflect a high level of 
engagement with environmental issues within the student body. 74% of student 
respondents in the survey (N = 465) reported that they had made efforts to reduce 
their environmental impact and taken advantage of opportunities to act pro-
environmentally in the preceding year. Examples of pro-environmental actions 
reportedly taken by the respondents include:  
1. Recycling (81%)  
2. Walking, cycling or using public transport as primary means of getting around (74%) 
3. Turning out lights and appliances in unoccupied rooms to save energy (68%) 
4. Purchasing only locally sourced produce when possible (56%)  
5. Supporting an environmental campaign with donations or time volunteered (51%) 
6. Reducing meat consumption/switching to an environment-friendly diet (42%)     
However, the majority of respondents (63%) in the survey were unaware of the 
University's carbon management plan, and only a minority (42%) indicated agreement 
with the notion that every student and member of staff at the university should be 
personally involved in the effort to achieve a cleaner and healthier environment. 
According to the Environment Officer, [name redacted], the results of the survey are 
a substantive reflection of the progress made, and some of the challenges yet to be 
tackled, by the University in its commitment to establishing environmental 
consciousness and sustainability as core values among students and staff. 
 
Anti-descriptive + Pro-injunctive 
"The University [of St Andrews] aims to become carbon neutral for energy 
consumption, to understand the carbon impact and reduce this footprint in the key 
areas of resource use, waste, travel, transport and ultimately procurement" 
(Sustainable Development Policy and Strategy, 2012). A primary target outlined in 
the university's plan to be carbon neutral by 2020 is to achieve effective 
communication of environment and sustainability issues to all staff and students. 
The results of a survey recently commissioned by the University reflect a weak to 
moderate level of engagement with environmental issues within the student body. 
Only 47% of student respondents (N = 465) reported that they had consciously made 
efforts to reduce their environmental impact and taken advantage of opportunities to 
act pro-environmentally in the preceding year. Examples of pro-environmental actions 
reportedly taken by these respondents include: 
1. Turning out lights and appliances in unoccupied rooms to save energy (48%) 
2. Waste sorting and recycling (47%)  
3. Walking, cycling or using public transport as primary means of getting around (44%) 
4. Purchasing only locally sourced produce when possible (26%)  
5. Supporting an environmental campaign with donations or time volunteered (19%) 
6. Reducing meat consumption/switching to an environment-friendly diet (8%)     
 
However, the majority of respondents (86%) in the survey expressed a strong approval of the 
University's mission to minimize its carbon footprint, and a similar proportion (83%) 
indicated agreement with the notion that every student and member of staff at the university 
should be personally involved in the effort to achieve a cleaner and healthier environment. 
According to the Environment Officer, [name redacted], the results of the survey are a 
substantive reflection of the challenge faced by the University in its commitment to 
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establishing environmental consciousness and sustainability as core values among students 
and staff. 
 
Manipulation Check: 
Based on the information provided in the article, please identify each of the following 
statements as “true” or “false”. 
1. Most St Andrews students agree that staff and students should all be personally 
involved in ensuring a cleaner and healthier environment 
(  ) True (  ) False 
2. Most respondents in the survey reportedly made a conscious effort to act pro-
environmentally in the preceding year 
(  ) True (  ) False 
 
12. Perceived norms (Descriptive + Injunctive) 
Please evaluate the extent to which each of the statements below accurately describes the attitudes of 
students at the University of St Andrews by indicating your level of agreement/disagreement with each 
using the scale provided. 
 Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
"Most students at the University of St 
Andrews are personally doing 
something to help reduce the risk of 
Climate Change" (D) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
"Most students at the University of St 
Andrews would support me if I decided 
to change my behaviour to help reduce 
Climate Change"(I) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
“My colleagues and other students at 
the University of St Andrews generally 
do not expect me to do anything 
personally to help address Climate 
Change”(I-) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
“Most students at the University of St 
Andrews are involved with a charity or 
society that addresses environmental 
issues including Climate Change” (D) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
“Most students at the University of St 
Andrews approve of donating to, or 
fundraising for, environmental groups 
that focus on Climate Change” (I) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
"Addressing Climate Change, is not a 
high priority for most students at the 
University of St Andrews" (D-) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
"Most students at the University of St 
Andrews are not personally doing 
anything to help address Climate 
Change" (D-) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
"Most students at the University of St 
Andrews would not support me if I 
decided to change my behaviour to 
help reduce Climate Change" (I-) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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13. Perceived Efficacy (Self, Participative, Collective) 
How confident are you that the following can make a difference in addressing Climate Change? 
 Not Confident  Very Confident 
Personally changing your behaviour and 
lifestyle (e.g. purchasing practices and 
energy use) (Self) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Your personal contribution to collective 
(group) efforts aimed at addressing  
Climate Change (Participative)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Efforts made by you as an individual to 
address Climate Change (Self) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The combined efforts of multiple 
individuals like yourself to address 
Climate Change (Collective) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The personal contributions of individuals 
like you to collective (group) efforts aimed 
at addressing Climate Change 
(Participative) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The collective actions of individuals such 
as in campaign groups, charities etc. 
(Collective) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
14. Response Efficacy 
The following are examples of potential climate change mitigation actions. To what extent to do 
you think that each will be effective in addressing Climate Change? 
 Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
Petitioning government(s) to make 
stronger commitments to developing 
renewable energy sources 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Reducing energy use in homes and 
workplaces 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Reducing personal car use and substituting 
with cycling and public transport when 
possible 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Donating to, or fundraising for, groups and 
charities working to help reduce the risk of 
Climate Change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Only purchasing and consuming locally-
sourced food  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Eating less meat 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Joining an environmental group 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
15. Acceptance of responsibility (last two items adapted from de Groot & Steg, 
2008) 
Focusing on your current feelings about climate change, how accurately do the following statements 
describe your attitude? 
 
Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
You consider it a personal 
obligation to address climate 
change in any way you can 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You feel that individuals like 
yourself should not be expected to 
take on the responsibility of 
addressing climate change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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You feel a strong sense of 
responsibility for addressing climate 
change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You feel that you should not be 
responsible for addressing such a 
problem 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You feel your contribution to the 
cause of Climate Change is 
negligible 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You feel everyone, including 
yourself, is jointly responsible for 
causing Climate Change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
16. Perceived Threat 
Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability 
 Not Serious at all   Very Serious 
How serious of a threat do you believe 
Climate Change is to you personally? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How serious of a threat would you rate 
the current impacts of Climate Change 
around the world? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How serious would you estimate the 
impacts of climate change are for the 
natural environment? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How serious of a threat do you think 
current Climate Change impacts are for 
your country?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 Very Unlikely  Very Likely 
In your judgment, how likely do you 
think it is that Climate Change will have 
very harmful long-term effects on our 
society? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How likely do you think you are to 
experience serious threats to your health 
or overall well-being, sometime during 
your life, as a result of Climate Change? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How likely do you think it is that the 
natural environment will be severely 
affected by the impacts of Climate 
Change? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
17. Discrete Emotions 
Thinking about the seriousness of climate change right now, and its potential impacts, how strongly do 
you feel the following emotions? 
 
Not at all  Very Strongly 
Fear 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Worry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Concern 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Anger 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Guilt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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18. Climate Scepticism (Whitmarsh, 2011) 
The following statements have been extracted from recent polls of public opinion on Climate Change in 
the UK. Please indicate the extent to which each reflects your current beliefs. 
 
Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
Claims that human activities are changing the 
climate are exaggerated 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Climate Change is just a natural fluctuation of 
the earth's temperature 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I am uncertain about whether Climate Change 
is really happening 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
It is too early to say whether Climate Change 
is really a problem  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The evidence for Climate Change is unreliable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
There is too much conflicting evidence about 
Climate Change to know if it is actually 
happening 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Climate change is too complex and uncertain 
for scientists to make useful forecasts 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Too much fuss is made about Climate Change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Floods and heat waves are not increasing, 
there's just more reporting of them in the 
media these days 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Many leading experts still question if human 
activity is contributing to Climate Change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The media is often too alarmist about issues 
like Climate Change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
19. Behavioural Intentions (General + Specific) 
Please answer the following questions based on your current feelings about Climate Change 
 Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
I intend to help reduce Climate Change by 
changing my behaviour 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I intend to do my bit to help tackle 
Climate Change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I intend to address Climate Change by 
taking personal action 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How likely are you to engage in the following behaviours within the next 4 weeks? 
 
Very Unlikely  Very Likely 
Turn off lights in unoccupied rooms at 
home/work 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Walk, cycle, or use public transport only 
when commuting 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Increase current levels of waste-sorting 
and recycling 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Donate money to, or raise funds, for an 
environmental group or charity involved 
with Climate Change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sign an online petition calling on the 
government to commit to renewable 
energy and lowering carbon emissions in 
the UK (please omit if non-British 
resident) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Join, or volunteer in, an organization 
involved with Climate Change 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
294 
 
Purchase and consume only locally 
sourced produce 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Reduce meat consumption or switch to a 
meat-free diet 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
20. Cause - Knowledge 
Please indicate, to the best of your knowledge, how much you believe that each of the following 
items contribute to Climate Change 
 
Minor contribution 
Don't 
know 
Major contribution 
Burning fossil fuels (coal, oil, gas) for 
heat and electricity -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
The hole in the Ozone Layer -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Driving a car -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Aerosol spray cans (containing CFCs) -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Toxic waste -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Nuclear power plants -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Acid rain -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Agricultural activities (e.g., cattle 
breeding) 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
The sun -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Flying/Commercial air travel -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Smoking cigarettes -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Deforestation -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
21. Impact - Knowledge 
For each of the items listed below, please indicate whether you believe that they are likely to 
decrease, remain constant or increase as a result of Climate Change. 
 
Likely to decrease 
No 
Change 
Likely to increase 
Global average temperature -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Acid rain -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Air pollution -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Areas in the world experiencing drought -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Global biodiversity (i.e. variety of plants 
and animals) 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Melting of glaciers and polar ice caps -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Global spread of infectious diseases -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
The hole in the Ozone layer -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Extreme weather events (e.g. floods, 
storms etc.) 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Volcanic eruptions -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
The frequency of hot days and nights -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Global fresh water supply -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
22. Behaviour Measure 
For participating in this study, you will be entered into a raffle for a £50 Amazon 
voucher. If you are selected to receive the voucher at the end of the survey, you can 
choose to keep the full amount or donate up to £25 to People and Planet, a student-
led campaign organization that addresses pressing social and environmental issues.  
A. Will you like to donate a part of your remuneration?   ( ) Yes  ( ) No 
B. How much will you like to donate (please enter a value between £1 and £25)










